A Study On Self-interest Of Professional Scientists In Basic Research

Basic research has been a highly professionalized activity. Recently, the development of China's basic research is characterized obviously by quantitative type. Between the input and output of basic research, the self-interest of scientists is one of the variables that could impact the quality of the output. To study the issue of self-interest of scientists under background of professionalization is helpful for understanding the scientist's behavior and improving the scientific administration in China.The self-interest of a professional scientist is defined as the behavior trend to pursue rationally the maximization of peer recognition for his own comprehensive interest. Professional scientists adhere to research organization and the motivations of a professional scientist of doing basic research include the public interest and his own interest. Having analyzed the relationship between the recognition and the comprehensive interest, this dissertation argues that the priority disputes of scientific discovery involves the interest disputes of the scientists who involve. With constrain of resource scarcity, scientist trends to choose his optimal path rationally to obtain comprehensive interest.Science develops also by its own intrinsic logic and the development tendency of a discipline could be forecasted to a certain extend by those who research in the corresponding fields. Through the analysis of the rational choice made by scientists based on their understanding of the development tendency, this dissertation describes the positive effects caused by scientists' self-interested decision. In the select-and -grant types of bottom-up, and top- down-and-bottom-up-mixed, the select-and-grant principles with different concentrations guide scientists' rational choices, making the quick response effect and self adaptive effect reflect the need of social and scientific development.Between society as the final principal and professional scientist as the final agent, there are principal-agent relationships in different levels. Professional scientists driven by interest could make use of information asymmetry and take opportunistic actions to gain grant or peer recognition by cheating, resulting in immoral effect of research misconduct. Also motivated by interest, they might pursue their interest in near future and the other negative short-term effect of being eager for quick success and instant benefit should be caused.The quantitative method is widely applied in administration of China's research institutes and universities. Based on the analysis of the way of assessing research papers and its effect on scientist's behavior, this dissertation suggests that the lack of a mechanism in diminishing returns is the institutional reason that induces a scientist being eager for quick success and instant benefit, and the phenomenon of bad money driving good money out of circulation might happen within any assessment grade with large span. It is suggested in this dissertation that the administration could be improved by introducing attenuation coefficients into recent assessment and dividing the grades into smaller ones in order to encourage scientists to improve the quality of papers. And it is also pointed that the problem of scientists' being eager for quick success and instant benefit must be solved top-down.Research misconduct is the self-interested behavior of scientists, which violates research morality. There are preclusive and corrective mechanisms inside scientifc system itself, but their functions are quite limited. Not all the discovered misconducts are revealed. The result of game analysis shows that the weak strength in examination and punishment is the institutional inducement for research misconducts. This dissertation holds that it is necessary to give those scientists criminal sanctions who misconduct seriously in their research activities, increasing the anticipated cost of misconduct on the whole so that the misconducts can be restrained.