Research On The Commercialization Operation Policy Of Technological Patent For Enterprises

Essentially, patent is one of the intangibly intellectual assets with legal concept. In the age of knowledge economy, patent is regarded as a kind of commercial resources with highly extra value, and with inherent resource attribute and relevant operational attribute. Achieving the economic value of patent not only depends on legal protection and strategical system, but more importantly depends on a strong necessary condition: drawing out the attribute of patent as excellent resource, and operating it with scientific solution, namely, based on utilizing adequately the law attribute of patent, enterprises make patent resources as an engine for improving their revenue, value and competence by appropriately operational polices of patent. Therefore, systemic, particular, comprehensive and efficient solutions are necessary for enterprises to operate this excellent patent resource, which include the solutions to improve the ability of creating patent, utilizing patent and outspreading patent. Some researches in present literatures have been done by academic experts and enterprises from the macro-strategic perspectives, mainly. However, quantitative researches are infrequent and scattered, and so many detailed problems are still blank in academic research field.Based on digging out the predominant resource and operation attribute of patent, this dissertation constructs a comparatively integrated framework to study and analyze the tactics of commercialization operation for enterprises'technological patent, according to the hints from other research fields and the observations of enterprises'activities in real business because there are no more systematic and exact references in this research field. The reaserch of this dissertation is outspreaded from two problem layers:"creating patent"tactics layer and"patent achievement"tactics layer."Creating patent"layer discusses two tactics problem: the R&D valuation of patent project; and patent competition."Patent achievement"layer also discusses two tactics problem: the judgment of commercial value for technological patent; and the tactics of commercial transform and utilization for patent achievement.This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter one is introduction. It explains the background and significance of this dissertation, and reviews the present literatures. Based on summarizing the predominances and shortages of present research, this chapter describes the research opportunities, and gives a research proposal of this dissertation, including the research target, research methodology, research framework, contents and chievements. Chapter two discusses the R&D valuation of patent project. The fuzzy theory can be used to optimaize the method of R&D valuation for patent project investment, thereby, to improve the rigidity of present method with flexiblility of fuzzy theory. This chapter put forwards and demonstrates a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic."Multi-phase"considers the option value of delay, stop, interruption, and transfer in the process of project operation. This method is superior to NPV method and one-pahse method in valuating the time-consuming projects and the projects with high venture.Chapter three discusses whether and when the enterprises start the process of R&D and apply patents for their achievements. Based on the patent relationship, the relevant policies of competitive patent and complementary patent are different. This differentiation is showed initially in this dissertation.(1) The key point of racing policies of competitive patent is the opportunity selection of R&D investment. The analysis in this dissertation shows that investment opportunity is depend on the comparison of the expected revenue of preemption and the expected value of delayed options. The investment opportunity of Monopoly is just a simple waiting options, while there are two equilibriums for duopoly: the cooperative equilibrium, which is invested later than on monopoly condition, when the value of cooperation is always more than that of preemption; and the leader-follower equilibrium when the two values have intersection. Moreover, Critical point of investment is ahead because of the competition.(2) There are two policies for complementary patent, one is applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, namely apply patent for any one of these complementary innovations immediately when it is completed. The other is bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed, in order to apply a whole product patent. The scattering cost c and the expected time to achieve the innovation are the key effective factors for decision-making:①If the expect revenue is high enough, and the expect time is short enough, both competitors persist in two innovations, and apply patent separately, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2;②If c is not too high, separate policy is appropriate for the complementary innovation which will take more time adopts, while bundling policy is right for the one that develops rapidly;③If c is too high, when the discount rate r is large, expect time is the main index, namely, separate policy for short time, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2; And when the r is small, the ineffectively repeated R&D cost is the main index. To avoid this cost, separate policy is appropriate, and after one firm applies the patent of innovation1, the other firm quits.Chapter four studies the judgment of commercial value for technological patent. Firstly, considering the simultaneously synthetic effect of multi-restriction, especially the restrictions of substitutability and time depreciation of patent which are always ignored by the previous valuation methods, this dissertation improves on the valuation model of patent initial value. Moreover, this chapter studies deeply two outspread problems of patent value, and gives the relevant conclusions:①Delayed commercial development has impact on the value of patent, manufacturers have to optimize their produce level based on maximized value of new product project related that patent, unless their ability of produce or supply is unlimited. The optimized produce level increases as the price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay increasing, while decreases as the unit cost increasing. As the volatility of demand increasing, the optimal produce level increases first, and decreases then. The primary demand has no impact on the optimal produce level generally;②To improve the activity of"stakeholders"to anticipate in the marketing transform of patent, this dissertation has put forward and demonstrated a multi-point profit distribution model for the commercialization of patent from the perspective of patent value. Nash bargaining solution is appropriate if the patent property belongs to scientist, and Shapley value algorithm is appropriate if the patent property belongs to the third-party organization. Chapter five and chapter six study the methods and tactics of commercial transfer of patent achievement.Patent capitalization (patent financing) is almost a bran-new concept of patent operation and method of patent commercial transform in practice. Chapter five analyzes the economic efficiency and value, principle, venture, operation mode of some all kinds of patent financing, and their important points in operating process. Some pertinent suggestions for establishing and rectifying the institutions of patent financing in our country have been provided in this dissertation.In chapter six, two new solutions are put forward and demonstrated for restraining adverse selection in patent trading market:"price-promise"signaling mechanism for patentee and"principles-agents"contract for licensee. The conclusions of analysis show that①if the patentee claim that the quality of licensed patent is"good", an accompanied promise signal is necessary, which is designed according to the signaling game mechanism. So, there is little cost for the honest patentee, but the counterfeiter has to give up his counterfeit behavior because of the unbearable counterfeit cost in"Price-promise"signaling mechanism;②the"principles- agents"contract insures the licensee who trusts the patentee's"good"patent gain the optimal revenue. Consequently, the licensee would like to accept the price contract of"good"patent, and give up the fluke and opportunistic mind for accepting"bad"patent. The combination of these two solutions can ensure the separate market of"good"patent comprehensively. Traders may design the contract of patent trading based on the"principles-agents"mechanism, and then design a"promise"signal accompanied with the"good patent"signal.The research on patent industrialization in chapter six focuses on the decisions of the mode selection of patent industrialization and the pricing policy of new product:①putting forward and demonstrating the valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory. This model helps to distinguish the advantage of cooperative industrialization with different cost, sequentially helps to judge whether or when the cooperation reflects the patent value best;②the perceived value of customer is one of the most important influencing factors. According to this concept, a"probability of demand function"provided in this dissertation describes the inherent relationship in the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action. The optimal price induced from the profit function which is modified by the probability of demand function reflects exactly and effects the market diffusion. The conclusions of analysis show that appropriately low price motivates the imitative consumers'innovative purchasing action, and expands the potential market scale. However, the very low price damages the innovative consumers'purchasing utility, furthermore, damages the market diffusion. Moreover, the reserved price of consumers increased if increasing the public utility of product while the price was unchanged, therefore promoted the market diffusion of innovative product.Chapter seven is the primary research about the application of achievements of this dissertation——constructing a patent commercialization decision system of technological innovation for enterprises. The framework of this decision system is designed in this chapter. The stratieigc characters of this decision system and the contribution and support of this dissertation to this decision system are also demonstrated. However, the design and practice of software about the decision system and its sub-module has not been actualized in time. The relevant application research will be one of the sequent research subjects in the future.Chaper eight summarizes the conslusions contributions, original points and shortcoming of this dissertation. The sequent research directions in the future are also put forward.The original points of this dissertation are presented as follows:(1) Optimizing the investment valuation model for the project of patent technology with the multi-phase real options theory and the fuzzy arithmeticPutting forward and demonstrating a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic to improve the rigidity of present method with flexible methodology. The conclusion shows the feasibility and efficiency of this improvement. It is significant for extracting out the deep value of the projects with high uncertainty and developing the valuation method theoretically.(2) Base on the patent relationship, this dissertation discusses originally the policies of patent race about commercialization operation of technological patent with games theory from two perspectives: competitive patent and complementary patentThe research about the policies of patent race for competitive patent with game theory focuses on the opportunity selection of R&D investment for monopoly and duopoly, and analysis the respective condition of equilibrium. It is a great improvement on the previous researches. While the corresponding research for complementary patent forcuses on the condition and opportunity about applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, or bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed in order to apply a whole product patent. This research fills in the blank of quantitative research about this problem.(3) Improving present valuation method for patent achievement, and studies originally the two outspread problems about commercial value of patent with quantitative methodThe valuation model of patent initial value is modified considering the simultaneous effect of multi-restriction, especially the substitutability and the time depreciation of patent. The valuating result from new valuation model is proved being more reasonable and realistic. Moreover, the quantitative analysis of two outspread problems about patent value is discussed originally: the reaserch on how the delayed development of patent to influence the patent's option value explains the effects respectively from price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay, unit cost, and so on. This research will contribute to decide the introduction and investment plan of new product with new patent technology rationally; moreover, how the profit of patent commercialization to be distributed in scientist, organization, and manufacturer with different patentees is discussed, in order to impelling the patent transform. It is the efficient mode for protecting intellectual property, protecting motivation of innovation, and impelling the transform from technological patent to actual productivity, on the perspective of profit distribution.(4) In order to constrain the adverse selection in the patent trading, put forwarding two new and more feasible solutions from the perspective of restricting patentee to be honest and the perspetive of motivating licensee to trust in the high qulity patent, therefore, protecting the separate marketing for"good"patentThe"price-promise"signaling mechanism ensures the patentee to be honest, namely, to provide the ture quality imformation of the licensed technology. In this mechanism, the"good"patent has its own separate market naturely, while the patentee keeps his technological secret, and the licensee doesn't have to do his best to learn the quality information of the licensed technology. On the other hand, optimizing the price contract from the perspective of motivating the licensee is a important complementarity for the academic research about constraining the adverse selection. The"principles-agents"mechanism leads the licensee to accept the"good"patent contract rather than to give up his fluke mind. In practice, the combination of these two solutions provides comprehensive protection for the separate market of"good"patent.(5) The quantitative research on the industrialization policies of patent in this dissertation enrichs the academic achievements about the commercial policies of patent The quantitative research on the judgement of industrialization by cooperation or by itself for the patentee is blank in academic researches. The increment valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory which is put forward and demonstrated in this dissertation provides an efficient method to distinguish the advantage of industrialization by cooperation and by itself. Moreover, a new solution for pricing new product is proposed. Based on the perceived value of customer,"probability of demand function"which reflect the relationship of the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action is founded to modify the profit function, consequently induce the optimal price of new product, and discuss how the price to influence the marketing transform of new product and profit.