| In the existing micro-mechanism study for institution, the research on control rights allocation of enterprise has not yet drawn the great attention from scholar. First of all, this paper along with the two contexts of "institution" and "technology", analyses the nature of enterprise, enterprise's general model, and the dynamic adjustment of enterprise-scale and the identification of enterprise's boundary, and describe that enterprise is a framework of "institution" and "technology", with "material" and "social" duality; the dynamic adjustment of size and determination of the boundary of the enterprise are determined by the difference in efficiency between enterprises and asset complementarily condition. State-owned enterprises have general enterprise's basic characteristics, in a given technical conditions, the performance of enterprise depends largely on the firm's institutional arrangement.Secondly, on the basis of induction of the existing various academic perspectives about the research on control rights of enterprise, this paper analyzes the phenomenon of multi-level and structured of control rights of enterprise, considers that control rights of enterprise actually is a right to make the appropriate decision-making to disposable resources and property of enterprise to meet the needs of control, governance and management enterprise. Around the theme of study, the author believes that we should expand research on control rights of enterprise not only from the diversity of right sources, the divisibility of rights allocation and the dependence of right state and so on, but also from the function and effect of rights, power and function of the control right of enterprise which is as the core of the rights allocation should be the basic analysis unit of the study, and implement linking up with the classical theory of corporate governance on the study of control rights of enterprise by building three-tier power and function structure of control rights of enterprise.Then, the control rights allocation of enterprise is explained as powers and functions allocation of the enterprise's control right in the paper, and this concept is analysed contacting with reality, based on the interpretation, author makes the control rights of enterprise as a structural framework with three-tier power and function, according to the right sources, the logic of exercise of right, division labor of rights, dipartition of the right boundary region and the concentration characteristic of exercise of rights, contacting the internal logic of corporate governance, investigates the effective distribution and composition of powers and functions of the control right and interrelated hierarchical structure. At the same time, this paper is based on the measurement of powers and functions allocation of the enterprise's control right and characterization of its models, applying life cycle and growth theory of enterprise, investigating internal mechanism of the powers and functions allocation of the enterprise's control right along with the general growth path of enterprise. This study make "production technology" and "market conditions" as two exogenous variables, take "ownership structure" and "management of human capital" as two endogenous variables, under the premise of given the "production technology" and "market conditions", respectively demonstrate that the powers and functions allocation of the enterprise's control right depending on the variables of "ownership structure" and "management of human capital" and the models of powers and functions allocation of the control right depending on the variables of internal and external mechanism and initial allocation combine with the dynamic adjustment, and make this argument as theoretical foundation and basis for analysis of the study of powers and functions allocation of Chinese state-owned enterprise's control right.Author analyzes the differences between state-owned and private enterprise respectively from three perspectives of the external market environment, agency structure and target utility and behavior of the enterprise, describes and evaluates the present situation and problems of powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise's control right, and expands the research on the powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise's control right in the sectors of quasi-public goods, natural monopolies, high-tech and competitive industries under the dual constraints of the economic transformation and "after-catch up strategy", and thinks that the powers and function allocations of control right of different types of state-owned enterprises should follow different paths, the analysis of the conclusions as following: 1.The proportion of state ownership of state-owned enterprises and corporate performance are positive correlated in Quasi-public goods sector, because these enterprises have difficulties in taking into account the public interest and profit goals, so we should make a strict distinction from technology or the main body of product supply between the public interest and profitability which can be competitive, then find the optimal model of the powers and functions allocation of control right to different types of state-owned enterprises.2.The proportion of the largest shareholder of state-owned enterprises and firm performance are significant positive correlated in natural monopoly industry, other ownership concentration and firm performance are also positively correlated; in the composition of the other shareholders, corporate shares and institutional shares are significantly and positively related to firm performance, it is a negative correlation between natural stocks and corporate performance; in the formation mechanism of executives, market allocation model is superior to administrative allocation mode, the separation of chairman of the board and CEO will bring about the positive performance effects to enterprise.3. The human capital of state-owned enterprises in high-tech industry has endogenous characteristic; executive ownership as an effective incentive, its proportion is significantly positively related to corporate performance, but this relativity is not set up to state-owned enterprises in natural monopoly industry, this shows that the realization of the status of human capital property rights associate with the industrial characteristics.4. In competitive industry, the largest state-owned shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with firm performan-ce, and other shareholders equity ratio is positively correlated with corporate performance. Accordingly, we believe that the relationship of the various relevant is the analysis point of the study of powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise's control right.On empirical research, according to the characteristics of production technology and market conditions in industry, corresponding to industry classification of listed companies, this paper combines the strategic orientation of layout and structural adjustment of the state-owned economy further to divide it as three sub-sample groups of natural monopolies, high-tech and competitive industries on the basis of the total sample group of state-owned enterprises, by constructing multiple linear regression model, using the least squares method, we were tested and inspected the four sample groups, the results show that empirical analysis has a certain confidence level on the relationship between the relevant test, according to the analysis conclusion, we further study on improvement and optimization powers and functions allocation model of state-owned enterprise's control right, and in the policy recommendations, strategies and measures, there is empirical support to the normative analysis.
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