Service Outsourcing Contract Considering Customer's Participation Under Asymmetric Information

With in-depth development of competition globalization and economic integration as well as rapid development of network communication technology, service outsourcing is forming a forceful challenge against traditional business mode of fully independent production with its advantages of low cost and high efficiency. Customer enterprise's participation in outsourcing service can reduce cost and improve efficiency. However, the customer enterprise may involve in a dilemma for asymmetric information. In this regard, this thesis studies how to develop effective services outsourcing contracts for customer enterprise to achieve optimal participation under asymmetric information.Firstly, under the assumption that the customer enterprise cannot clearly know its effect on the production cost of service provider, the service outsourcing contract menu with combining participation degree and transfer-price is designed to achieve the true information of cost. The total price for service provider contains the information rent. The participation degree of customer enterprise is upward distortion to reduce the information rent. The analysis demonstrates that if effect of the participation degree of customer enterprise on production cost of service supplier is slightly, the separating contract can be designed. Otherwise, there is pooling equilibrium in region near the service provider with the highest production cost. In addition, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the character of contract menu.Secondly, on the base of the former study, considering that the customer enterprise cannot observe action of service provider, the incentives service outsourcing contract is designed and the effect of customer enterprise's participation is analyzed. It is assumed that customer enterprise's participation and service provider's effort are complements or substitutes according resource based theory and the change of cost and marginal cost affected by customer enterprise's participation. The analysis demonstrates that when the customer's participation and the service provider's effort are complementary, the service provider can be incented and the proportion of revenue-sharing should be increased with participation increasing. Otherwise, the service provider cannot be incented and the proportion of revenue-sharing should be decreased with participation increasing.Thirdly, considering that stochastic output is affected by customer enterprise's participation, the service outsourcing contract is designed and the effect of exogenous variable, such as degree of risk aversion and the two sides cost coefficient, is analyzed. The analysis demonstrates that the revenue-sharing incentive coefficient should increase with the increase in customer participation, there is not a monotonic relationship between the risk aversion of service provider and customer participation, the optimal revenue-sharing incentive coefficient and the best customer participation are positively related to output coefficient, is negatively related to cost coefficient.Fourthly, considering that service provider's work effort and customer's participation will decide the final output of the outsourcing service project, the service outsourcing contract is designed under double moral hazard. Based on the problem that the formal outsourcing contract cannot incent simultaneously the effort of service provider and customer, a relational outsourcing contract is designed with principal-agent theory, then the incentive effect of the relational contract is analyzed. The conclusions indicate that customer'revenue and system profit under the relational contract are not less than that under the formal contract for all discount rate; the incentive effect of the relational contract increases with the discount rate increasing. When the discount rate is large enough, the first best outcome can be achieved through the relational contract.