Research On The Strategic Synergy Of Coal And Electricity Enterprises Based On Value Creation Of Industrial Chain

The paper shows that the root of conflict of coal and electricity enterprises is the opportunism behavior caused by asset specificity and intensive volatility of China's coal market, proposing that a strategic synergy pattern between the coal and electricity corporations is an effective approach for the coal and electricity conflict. The conclusions are propitious to the long-term developing strategy of the industries on the industrial chain of coal and electricity. Theoretically, the research enriched the strategic synergy theory and consummated the transaction costs approach.Firstly, the paper explains the motivations of strategic synergy based on transaction cost theory, value chain theory, strategic management theory, network theory. It has shown that the two enterprises can share the value chain when the resources can not obtained through market transaction or conventional channel, and the overall profits will also grow. It points out the optimal contract of strategic synergy of coal and electricity enterprises should be designed based on the recognition of information asymmetry, using incentive compatibility as the core and making the degree of information symmetry and incentive compatibility as two latitudes to construct the stability of synergy thinking. Studies have shown that, with the increase of the information, strategic synergy contracts tend to be traditional contracts, but with the reduction of information, it should be gradually change from the traditional contract mechanism to automatic mechanism. It is an extreme situation to take the oral form of tacit contract.Secondly, this paper, using non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, clarifies how the strategic synergy of industrial chain of coal and electricity creates additional surplus through the restructuring and adjustment for the value activities, as well as the resource allocation and transaction. Through the study of acquiring resources and resources strategic synergy, shows that the equilibrium of strategic synergy is path-dependent. Under the condition that intermediate products and end-product cost function and the demand function is known in the coal and electricity industrial chain, this paper constructs static and dynamic game models. Studies have shown that in the game of the profit allocation of the strategic synergy between the coal and electricity enterprises, it has"first-mover advantages"over the price decision-making.Thirdly, in the perspective of information economics, this paper uses game theory to solve the issue of partner selection in coal and electricity industrial chain strategic synergy, and proposed contractual risks, the uncertainty of specific assets as well as the information dissymmetry are the main causes of adverse selection problems. In this paper, the author respectively constructs partner selection mechanism without considering the observable variables and that with observable variables. Studies have shown that if we do not consider the observable variables, the optimal contract is composed of effort compensation, risk compensation and information rents; If we consider the observable variables, the optimal contract consists of fixed income, information rents, risk income, incentive income and coordinative members of the market price.Finally, the paper gives some advices from four aspects that are contract designing of strategic synergy, different stages of the life cycle, sustaining of the stability of strategic synergy. The paper proposed that the coal and electricity enterprises should adopt a strategic synergy mode based on the long-term contract, and the process of strategic synergy also has the discipline of life cycle and changes of its forms. The paper suggested that it should strengthen the information communication and integrity awareness, the adaptation and coordination of the two enterprises, reduce the imbalance of the supply and demand caused by information barrier, thereby reduce the opportunism behavior. The government should establish a cooperation association of coal and electricity enterprises, information coordination institution and professional arbitration organization, and draw up some regulation measures for the monopoly so that the conflict of coal and electricity enterprises can be eased, ensuring the healthy development of Chinese economy.This paper includes 18 figures, 27 tables and 166 references.