The Institutional Investors' Ownership Choices In The Circumstances Of Institution Restriction And Large Shareholders Agency

With the reform and opening up of China for 30 years, its economy has undergone a sustained development, the living standards of people, economic development level, capital markets and corporate governance standards have greatly improved, but during 30 years of development process, interest conflict between various groups become increasingly evident because of continuous production of the new interest groups, and it becomes the important issues that influences the socio-economic development of China. The capital market of China came into existence in the end of twentieth century, it has become an important force in economic development after nearly two decades of development, especially with the involvement of institutional investors, making the capital markets to a more rapid development of capital market of China, also made a more mature and improve, and a new forces for the improvement of corporate governance of listed companies. However, due to the capital market of China is still in development stage, and the market mechanism is imperfect, the interest conflict of shareholders of listed companies is very serious, the violations of the major shareholder to the other shareholders is very common, compared to western countries, due to the important characteristics of state-owned shares major shareholder holding (non-tradable shares) which led to the split share structure, so that a agency conflict between the shareholders (Type II agents) is particularly clear. The main conflict of interests between the traditional large shareholders and small shareholders is reflected as a major shareholder against the interests of small shareholders, when he suffered from the aggressor and had to swallow their anger because of only a small proportion of stock or"vote with their feet". But the problem changed a lot with the development and growth of institutional investors, when they were in the face of the same violation, they could restraint and supervision the majority shareholder in terms of violations from day to day decision-making and market operations because of its strong capital strength and more of the equity share, to improve the governance structure of listed companies and promote the development of China's capital market more healthy and fast.Based on this, this paper gave more emphasis on exploring the form of the institution path of the interests pattern between shareholders of listed companies from a historical perspective, and analysis behavior to obtain interests of major shareholders and other shareholders from our unique background, in order to obtain the history and reality of various types of shareholders and how to survive and develop in listed companies. The status of the institutional investors don't have the exact location in listed companies yet, but its force in its holdings of stock increasingly powerful, and whether the former institution conditions and shareholder agency conditions in line with the interests and demands of development and survival of institutional investors? How do the institutional investors make choices when facing of shareholder proxies and split share structure reform? What kind of roles would the institutional investors play in the unique pattern of interests in listed companies of China? What impact would holdings choose of institutional investors on major shareholders of companies dominated the decision-making, information disclosure, dividend distribution, etc. This is the urgent need for the reality of academic analysis and research topics. With these questions, and based on the theoretical study of large shareholders and institutional investors' creation and development,this paper had qualitative and quantitative analysed the environments of institution restriction and large shareholders agency, finally this paper had theory and empirical researched on institutional investors' ownership choices of institutional investors and its impact on listed companies.