Quality Of Information Disclosure,Institutional Investors' Ownership And Tunneling Of Major Shareholders ——Empirical Evidence From A-share Listed Companies In Shenzhen Stock Exchange

The 21 st century is an era of big data.It can be said that "those who get information get the world".In the capital market,investors will make their own investment choices through the information disclosed by the company,but due to different identities,investors and listed companies are in the position of asymmetric information.In recent years,it is common for the controlling shareholders of listed companies to "empty" the listed companies in China's stock market.Almost every year in China's securities market,the controlling shareholders misappropriate and encroach on the funds of listed companies,which seriously infringes on the interests of small and medium shareholders.In order to regulate the behavior of listed companies,it is necessary to improve the quality of information disclosure.Therefore,starting from the quality of information disclosure,this paper studies the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and the tunneling of major shareholders,and from the perspective of signal transmission,analyzes that institutional investors strengthen the inhibitory effect of the quality of information disclosure on the tunneling of major shareholders.This paper selects A-share listed companies in Shenzhen stock market from2004 to 2018 as the research sample,empirically tests the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and the tunneling of major shareholders,and on this basis,introduces institutional investors' shareholding as a moderating variable for further research.The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between the quality of information disclosure and tunneling.In addition,it is found that institutional investors can not only restrain the tunneling of large shareholders through external supervision.Institutional investors play a moderating role in this process.The empirical results show that under the background of imperfect investor protection system in China,the improvement of information disclosure quality of listed companies can improve the information asymmetry,make the small and medium shareholders have a deeper understanding of the operation and financial situation of listed companies,and restrict the interest encroachment of controlling shareholders of listed companies;As an important market participant,institutional investors play an irreplaceable role in improving information asymmetry.According to the research results,this paper proposes to further the construction of information disclosure system,improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,effectively improve the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.In addition,strengthen the construction of the team of institutional investors,so as to strengthen the role of institutional investors.