Government Behavior Research In The Process Of Urban Infrastructure Financing Under Multi-participant

Urban infrastructure is not only the foundation of the city but also the guarantee of urban economic development and social stability. Since entering into the 21st century, China's urbanization has made forward with an average annual rate of more than 1%, the demand for urban infrastructure will be even more urgent. For a long time, the Government has been the main supplier of urban infrastructure. However, with the rapid growth of infrastructure needs involved by city population rising and economic growth, the limited revenue can not meet such a huge amount of fund to improve urban infrastructure. Many local governments'investment in urban infrastructure is more than the local fiscal financial growth, which made fiscal overwhelmed. At this background, by drawing on international experience, China applied a new financing mode which introduced the participants other than government to financing urban infrastructure, that is, urban infrastructure financing mode under multi-participant with good results. With the new financing mode, government's role and behavior had been changed a lot. .How to clearly define the role of government and recognize itself will directly affect the smooth realization of the mode. Therefore, in order to breakthrough the financing dilemma, it is important and significant topic to research government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant.In this paper, based on the condition of our country, from the angle of government's participation in urban infrastructure financing, the mechanism, values and implementation ways of the government's financing behavior under multi-participant is studied and the government participants'selection commitment and monitoring behavior under the mode is analyzed systematically. The purpose of the study is to provide a theoretical basis for the conduction, control and optimization of government behavior in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant and to promote the construction and development of urban infrastructure.According to the existing research, this paper classifies the urban infrastructure financing mode from the view of government, and puts forward a theoretical framework of government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, analyzes the motivation and restriction of government behavior under the framework, and pointed out three basic behaviors in accordance with the franchise contract time, which were project participants, selection behavior, commitment behavior and monitoring behavior. About the selection behavior of government project participants before signing franchise contract, the paper analyzes the selection process of project participants, and points out the characteristics of the selection process and the key section. to the tendering agent selection, the optimal contract of tendering agency is designed by using the auction theory to reduce the cost of the tender committee. to the dual conspiracy of project participants that may exist in entire selection process, game theory is applied to build dual conspiracy model triggered by tendering agency and tendering board, then corresponding countermeasures is promoted. With the issue of selection ways of project participants, the participant selection mode is built by combining the rough set theory and the gray relational grade theory, and calculating examples is analyzed to verifiy the model validity. On Government's commitment during the franchise contract being signed, this paper analyzes funding commitments made by the government, franchise commitment and investment income ensuring commitment, applying the game theory the possible loss of state-owned assets resulted from the conspiracy between project manager and project staff authorized by the Government departments is analyzed, and this paper proposed a mechanism to provent collusive behavior. the general form of commitment to the franchise is analyzed, the grant possibility of the multi-phase franchise is demonstrates. Applying growth option theory of real option, the option pricing model granted by multi-phase franchise is built and the validity of the model is verified by calculating example. this paper analyzes the problems of the government current floating rate of return, presents the government commitment to investment income model which is embedded in motivate behavior, applying effective barrier options theory of real options, the government commitment pricing model embedded in motivate behavior is built to ensuring investment-income, and the validity of the model by is verified calculating example.On the government monitoring behavior after signing franchise contract, this paper analyzes the possible breach among the project participants of multi-participant financing on urban infrastructure, proposes the mode of intermediaries monitor commissioned by the government, and applied game theory to build the irregularities report model and government check model to monitoring process. On noncompliance of project participants, this paper builds government monitoring indicator system based on support vector machine (SVM) theory, and verifies the accuracy of the model by monitoring simulation. For incentives probably carried by government according to intermediaries'monitoring report, it applies Cellular Automata (CA) theory to build simulation model based on the results of monitor. the features of the evolution under various incentives is found through the analysis of evolution results.The paper researches government behavior systematically in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, offeres effective instruments to the implementation, controlg and optimization of government behavior of multi-participant, which will enrich the financing theory and method in China's urban infrastructure .