Research On Government Investment Behavior In Rural Infrastructure Construction

China is a big agricultural country, and the problems of rural economy, rural development and rural demography recently have been broadly concerned by all circles of society .Rural infrastructure construction is the physical foundation of new rural construction, the rural infrastructure construction meeting the practical requirement of the rural resident could substantially improve the production and the standard of living of rural resident. However, in the process of rural infrastructure construction, the special funds are retained, embezzled or occupied. Rural resident is excluded from the decision-making of the project selection of rural infrastructure construction, which is decided by the requirement of department decision-maker of local government to promote the political performance and benefit. As a result, the supply of rural infrastructure construction always deviates from the real demand and the limited financing capital can not be utilized effectively. The main reason is that the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction leads to the mismatch of the utilization of investment capital and the requirement of optimizing the resource configuration, as a result, the maximization of the output and benefit is difficult to realize and induces the loss of the rare public resource. Hence, how to guarantee the reasonable configuration of resource by the effective and regular government investment behavior is a significant problem need to be solved immediately.From Chinese situation, the deeply cause of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is discussed, and the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is studied systematically. The objective of this research is to discover the mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, and to recognize the pulse of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction so that the dissimilated government investment behavior could be effectively controlled and optimized and the phenomenon such as capital loss and unreasonable resource configuration led by government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction could be avoid. The research could provide theoretical support for the effective implementation of rural infrastructure construction and improve the construction and development of rural infrastructure construction.On the basis of the review of the existing research result, this paper follows the topic of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction. the research is deployed with the capital flow direction of rural infrastructure construction. The conceptual system of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is built as the basis of the research. The generating mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior is discussed from the angle of cost-benefit and motive-behavior separately, and the research idea is clearer.According to the motive and generation stage, the dissimilated investment behavior of government of rural infrastructure construction can be divided into two kinds: the one is the investment behavior embedded economic rationality in the process of capital distribution, the other one is the investment behavior embedded political rationality in the process of project selection and the typical dissimilation behavior is chosen. The forming mechanism is analyzed by game theory and as a result, the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is caused by the deep level reasons including the careless management of capital of rural infrastructure construction, weak constraint of financial budget and the lack of responsible mechanism of government investment project and the power of rural resident.On this basis, using principle-agent theory, the control and optimization contract of government investment behavior are designed. By the parameters such as incentive, punishment and satisfaction degree of rural resident, the effective control and optimization contract of government investment behavior dissimilation could be realized, and the possible control and optimization mode of government investment behavior is presented to effectively control and optimize government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction.To validate the effectiveness of the parameters in the control and optimization contract, by relative theory of Cellular Automata, the behavior embedded economic and political rationality is simulated. The evolutionary process of government investment behavior and the influence of each parameter to government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction are observed clearly and directly so that the suggestion to regulate the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is proposed pertinently.For the problems of rural infrastructure construction in china, this paper is concentrated on government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, which enriches the theory and method of new rural construction further and the control and optimization method of government investment behavior is meaningful to be learned by urban infrastructure construction at some extence.