Monitoring And Evaluation Of H5N1Avian Influenza Virus Of Laboratory Micro-environment Cluster In The Experiment Whole Process

Many of the routine procedures used to process influenza virus for laboratory research,such as centrifugation or mixing, have a high potential of producing aerosols, and theparticle load of each has been estimated to be up to1–5μm. In addition, it is expected thatlarger particles will tend to fall out of the air and contaminate surfaces. Fundamentally,aerosols are suspensions in the air of solid or liquid particles small enough that they willremain transmissible and airborne for a prolonged period of time. Particles of5μm or lessincrease the risk of establishing an infection upon airborne transmission, as they areremarkably capable of penetrating the physical cellular barrier of the respiratory tract andtraveling all the way to the alveolar region. As with naturally-acquired infections, mostindividuals are not diagnosed before onset of symptoms, impeding the time to initiation oftreatment.Avian H5N1influenza viruses present a challenge in the laboratory environment, asthey are difficult to collect from the air due to their small size and relatively lowconcentration. The prototype sampling device consisted of a controller and six pumps of awireless networking technology. This instrument can collect several samples of aerosolssimultaneously, or can be set to have one of the six pumps operate independently. Thesensitivity to detect AIV was evaluated by using a10-fold diluted virus series (ELD50).Establish a sensitivity method of virus adsorb-proliferation to detect H5N1AIV aerosolsthough compared to infect a host cell, membrane adsorption elution, RT-PCR andRT-LAMP methods.Normal laboratory procedures used to process the influenza virus were carried outindependently and the amount of virus polluting the on-site atmosphere was measured. Inparticular, zootomy, grinding, centrifugation, pipetting, magnetic stirring, egg inoculation,and experimental zoogenetic infection were performed. In addition, common accidentsassociated with each process were simulated, including breaking glass containers, syringeinjection of influenza virus solution, and rupturing of centrifuge tubes. A micro-clustersampling ambient air pollution collection device was used to collect air samples. Thecollected viruses were tested for activity by measuring their ability to inducehemagglutination with chicken red blood cells and to propagate in chicken embryos after direct inoculation, the latter being detected by reverse-transcription PCR.Evaluation of ultraviolet irradiation sterilization, peracetic acid disinfection, hydrogenperoxide disinfection and chlorine dioxide disinfectant affect though Simulation twolaboratory procedures. According to the results, we proposed operating standards andcontingency plans, and provide the basis for laboratory safety evaluation and standardizationof treatment.Traditional methods of determining the presence of virus in an aerosol include directlyapplying the concentrated aerosol to infect a host cell, or membrane adsorption elutionmethods wasn’t detectable10^dilution of the virus solution. RT-PCR to detect virus-specificgenes was detectable10^dilution of the virus solution. The sensitivity of the RT-LAMPprocedure to detect AIV was detectable100-fold dilution of the virus solution. AIV wasdetectable by virus adsorb-proliferation method up to10^13dilution of the virus solutionbecause of its remarkable sensitivity and specificity.The results proofed that the air samples from the normal centrifugal group and thenegative-control group were negative, while all other groups were positive for H5N1.Spray hydrogen peroxide, peracetic acid and chlorine dioxide was effective to H5N1AIV aerosols disinfection. And we recommend using the atomization chlorine dioxidebecause it is harmless.The results showed that many of the routine procedures used to process influenza virusfor laboratory research have a high potential of producing aerosols Measuring infectiousvirus from air samples is logistically difficult. Few researchers have detected the infectiouscapacity of influenza viruses sampled from air as they are low concentration and difficult tocollect. Laboratory procedures were carried out under controlled conditions monitoring theamount and character of aerosol produced by virus adsorb-proliferation method. Besides,disinfection of virus aerosol aimed to create a range of environmentally friendly cleaning.Our findings suggest that there are numerous sources of aerosols in laboratoryoperations involving H5N1. Thus, laboratory personnel should be aware of the exposure riskthat accompanies routine procedures involved in H5N1processing and take proactivemeasures to prevent accidental infection and decrease the risk of virus aerosol leakagebeyond the laboratory.