Font Size: a A A

Hegel's Theory Of Violence - At The Beginning Of The War View

Posted on:2013-04-09Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:J WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1225330377457500Subject:International politics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Violence-war are very important subjects in international politics.However, although the mainstream IR theories among which theneo-realism is the most typical one explain violence and war indifferent ways, most of the explanations are the results of empiricalresearch and tend to view violence as a means in the means-end logic.The mainstream IR theories do not analyse the essence of war, of thestate and the relationship between individual, the state and violencein an ontological way. Hegel’s thoughts on war-violence originatesfrom his reflection on historical and political events. These thoughtsare also based on Hegel’s philosophy(especially his dialectics) andphilosophy of right. To deepen the understanding of violence, war andthe essence of international relations, we interpret Hegel’s view onviolence in the context of the whole of his thoughts and compare hisand other schalars’ arguments. This is indispensibal for thedevelopment of IR theory.In the course of the spirit from the lower levels to the higher levels,violence appears in different forms. Each form of violencenecessarily develops to a new one due to its intrinsic contradictions.Violence first appears as the fighting between two self-consciousnessfor aknowledgement and freedom. It is in this fighting that theself-conscious meets his other. Thus this violence is not so much theexistentiell possibility in Wendt’s constructivism as the preconditionand essential structure of intersubjectivity. This violence as astructure is also the ontological basis of Huntington’s “clash ofcivilizations”. Next, violence appears as the oppresion of the slave bythe master and the battle of the master. These two forms mustdevelop to higher ones because they cannot face to nothingness in anauthentic way. Following Kojeve, Fukuyama takes the one-sidednessof the self-conscious as something valuable and thereforemisunderstands hegel. In the lower level of objective spirit, violenceappears as the violation of property and body, and the punishment for the culprits. The essence of morality is hollowness and arbitrariness.The extrme of morality as a passive freedom is the all-destroyingpower of the terror in the French Revolution. In civil society, violencetakes the appearance of overseas expansion and anti-colonism forliberation.The state as absolute substance is the highest form of objectivespirit. Here violence is not only the enforcement but also the warbetween states. We divide the relationship between the state and theindividual in war into three levels each of which exists all the time.In the in-itself level, the state takes part in war for its ownparticular will. Thus the Kantian obligation cannot limit wars. The willof the individual is united with that of the state. Therefore, to fight inthe name of the state is also to fight in the name of himself. Theindividual will should also be addressed. The individual serve the statenot because the state enforce the individual with violence, butbecause the violence as a essentical structure makes the stateobjective.In the level of for-itself, the state is the power to create anddestroy. It can actually appropriate people and resources in war.Standing army is indispensible to the extent that it not only protectsthe particular interest of the state but also prevents an endless war.Although the state in war needs the individual, it takes the life anddeath of him as trivial. Nonetheless, this is just what the individualneeds. For, the smaller the individual is compared with the state, themore objective and greater the state appears, the more valuable theaknowledgement of the individual by the state is. Thisaknowledgement creats reality for the individual out of nothingness.If the individual desires freedom, he must strive for freedom which isitself an end. The individual’s self-sacrifice and self-sublation in war isan extreme form of the realization of self-transcendence and a rightpromised by the state. In the battlefield, the individual soldier of eachside belongs to his own universality. Although they try to kill eachother, there is no hatred between them. The more I respect my enimy, the harder I try to kill him. This anonimity in the battlefield isembodied in the mass killing of guns and cannons. Although Hegelemphasizes that the individual should sacrifice for the state, he is notan absolutist. This is because to construct and protect the state is theindividual’s freedom.In the level of in-and-for-itself, the state’s war is permeated withsubjectivity. The state no longer takes what realizes the state assomething outside it. The state’s institution is the product of itsself-conscious and history and should not be interfered in by otherstates. The state shows its strenghth and grandiosity in order to drawmore aknowledgement from the individual. Through war, the stateshocks people’s customs, the civil society’s interest and thebureaucratic system so as to maintain the vitality of the sittlichkeit.The state therefore needs war. Patriotism is the unity of free will anddisposition. The individual in war desires to be aknowledged by thestate.As woman is able to be conscious of the death of man instead ofman himself, Hegel argues, unlike feminist IR theory, that to someextent it is woman that makes war takes place.The state can realize morality and is thus higher than morality.Politics between states does not need morality. Morality cannotrestrict inter-state relationship. Kant mistakenly reduces internationallaw to the morality between states and insists that it can play annormative role. However, international law has its own reasonableposition because it is an appeal sent by the absolute spirit to the stateas an imperfect entity. Meanwhile, international law is also the state’smisunderstanding of the state itself’s essence. The state realizes itspower by disobeying international law. International law also fails torestrict war.In the course of world history, moral judgement should not bemade in terms of war. The good is achieved by balance of power ratherthan by morality and supra-national instiutions. Hegel’s andMorgenthau’s view on power have both similarities and differences. War is the driving force of world history. War requires labor. Thedifference between war and labor is only a formal one. History will notend and war will not disappear. However, as nothingness, humanbeings constantly negate themselves and understand their existencein different ways. As a result, the disappearance of war is imaginable.
Keywords/Search Tags:violence, war, Hegel, the state, freedom, international law, phenomenology
PDF Full Text Request
Related items