A Study On Leibniz’s Theory Of The Best World

The subject of this thesis is Leibniz’s theory of the best possible world, whereby he tries to solve the problem of evil and vindicate God’s justice. The whole thesis is divided into four chapters.In the first chapter, we consider the theoretical background of theodicy, and discuss especially traditional theodicy shaped by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the history of Christianity. We then focus on the views of Nicholas Malebranche, Leibniz’s contemporary, concerning rules and world order.In the second chapter, we begin with Leibniz’s views on the general nature of truths, and further analysis the distinction between necessary and contingent truths as well as three kinds of necessity, namely, metaphysical, hypothetical and moral necessity.In the third chapter, we discuss Leibniz’s theory of the best possible world itself, and outline overall structure of resolving the problem of theodicy. First, we examine the divine properties and rational methods about demonstrations on God’s existence, i.e., ontological demonstration and demonstration based on the principle of sufficient reason. Next, we consider the reason for God to choose and create the best possible world, and discuss the connotations of metaphysical, physical, and moral perfections as well as their relationships. Last, we point out that the best world not only maximizes the metaphysical perfections as well as physical and moral perfections.In the fourth chapter, we consider the reason why evil exists in the best of all possible worlds, and discuss the nature and origin of the three kinds of evils, i.e., metaphysical, physical and moral evils. We point out that the limitation of ideal nature of creatures is their common origin, and emphasize that privation means negation. At last, we God’s permission of evil is not country to his greatness, charity and justice.In the fifth chapter, we examine Leibniz’s theory of freedom, and point out that there are three elements constituting the concept of freedom:intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. We emphasize that intelligence plays a great role in the possibility of freedom. Finally we discuss the way how to reconcile freedom with the predicate-in-subject principle and divine foreknowledge.