Research On Intuitions In The Philosophical Methdology

The first purpose of this dissertation is to introduce the discussion about evidential status of intuitions in Analytic Philosophy, which rose in 1990s. According to attitudes to evidential status of intuitions in philosophy, we can make a basic distinction between Methodological Intuitionism and Methodological Anti-intuitionism. Methodological Intuitionism treats intuitions as the mechanism which supports the propositions prompted by philosophical thought experiments. So, Methodological Intuitionists believe that intuitions should be the evidence which is used to support or refute to philosophical theory. The core Methodological Intuitionists are George Bealer, Joel Pust, Ernest Sosa and Alvin Goldman. In order to support the evidential status of intuitions in philosophy, Methodological Intuitionists must answer two questions:1. how to understand the nature of intuitions; 2. how to defend or argue for the evidential status of intuitions in philosophy. In chapter 1, we discuss the theory of intuitions which is purposed by Methodological Intuitionism and three arguments for evidential status of intuitions. In contrast with Methodological Intuitionism, Methodological Anti-intuitionism maintains that intuitions or propositions prompted by philosophical thought experiments should not be treated as evidence in philosophy. From my view, it is important to present how Anti-intuitionism argues against the evidential status of intuitions in philosophy. Because the challenge to intuitions from Experimental Philosophy is not just a philosophical theory, but also a new attempt to combine the philosophical methods with scientific methods, in chapter 2,I entirely descript the challenge to intuitions from Experimental Philosophy and try to evaluate this kind of challenge.Facing the intuition challenge from experimentalists, by means of ordinary cognitive capacity, Timothy Williamson defends that the proposition prompted by thought experiment is evidence for philosophy theory. In accordance with Williamson’s view, the intuition challenge from experimentalists is a kind of judgment skepticism which should be refuted by philosophers. This kind of judgment skepticism is brought about by the justification strategy of Methodological Intuitionism which appeals to intuitions to justify the proposition prompted by thought experiment as evidence for philosophy theory. Herman Cappelen reflects the discussion between Methodological Intuitionism and Methodological Anti-intuitionism to claim that in this discussion, Methodological Intuitionism and Methodological Anti-intuitionism share the same presupposition—Centrality whose content is Contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or as a source of evidence) for philosophical theories. In Philosophy without intuitions, Cappelen examines two arguments for Centrality—the argument from’intuition’-talk and the argument from philosophical practice—and believes that these two arguments failed to support Centrality. So, Centrality is false and the discussion between Methodological Intuitionism and Methodological Anti-intuitionism is meaningless. In chapter 3 and 4,I reconstruct and criticize the Williamson’s justification strategy for philosophical thought experiments and Cappelen’s reflection on Centrality.In this dissertation, I specially focus on the strategy which Cappelen uses to reflect on Centrality to address the discussion about evidential status of intuitions in Analytic Philosophy. Cappelen provides a paradigm by means of study texts of history of philosophy to research the question from philosophical methodology. I accept two Cappelen’s ideas. First, I think that Cappelen correctly reflects on the special kind of intuitions, which are accompanied by special phenomenology, with special kind of justification and based on solely on conceptual competence. It is rational to accept his refection and refute the intuition theory which claims intuitions as sui generis mental states. Second, I accept Cappelen’s idea that the relation between intuitions and philosophy theory is the issue of philosophical methodology. This idea brings us a new perspective to consider the discussion between Methodological Intuitionism and Methodological Anti-intuitionism.However, in this dissertation, I believe that the refutation to Centrality is not completely effective. Cappelen provides that Contemporary analytic philosophers do not rely on special kind of intuitions as evidence (or as a source of evidence) for philosophical theories. As we know, this special kind of intuitions has three features which include special phenomenology, Rock status in Epistemology and close relation to conceptual competence. In fact, the intuitions which philosophers rely on as evidence do not satisfy these three features, Centrality is still true. In chapter 5,I form an argument to save Centrality, which illuminates that philosophers rely on intuitions with special epistemic status as evidence for philosophical theories. Therefore, we should supply two kinds of justification to intuitions:the epistemic justification and the mythological justification. The aim of the epistemic justification is to show how to justify contents of intuitions. The epistemic justification for intuitions comes from the intuitive reason process which has been studied by cognitive psychology. However, the epistemic justification do not support that intuitions should be treat as evidence for philosophical theories. Because of cognitive biases in intuitive reason process, we should be careful about propositions from intuitions. So, I offer two mythological justifications to endorse the evidential status of intuitions in philosophy. First mythological justification explains the propositions prompted by philosophical thought experiments come from intuitions. Second mythological justification investigates how philosophers use philosophical thought experiments to conclude that propositions prompted by philosophical thought experiments are able to avoid influences of cognitive biases.