Sentence Meaning And Proposition: On The Dichotomy Of The Analytic And The Synthetic

Since Kant’s cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths, the study of analyticity become an important topic in epistemology. The dichotomy of the analytic and the synthetic is a foundation of the theory of logical positivism. But Quine has shown that such a dualism is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, the conception of analyticity is problematic.In Chapter One of this dissertation, the history of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is outlined, and the arguments of White and Quine against the distinction are displayed. In Chapter Two, I examine all the main different definitions of analyticity in the literature, including Kant’s, Frege’s, Russell’s, Carnap’s, Quine’s definitions. The I-analyticity of Paul Horwich, the hyper-analyticity of Ned Block, and the "analytic in S" of Mario Bunge are not proper analyticity. The conceptions of the S-analyticity of Zhou Bei-hai and the representational analyanticity of Jack C. Lyons can’t count the normal phenomena of analyticity. Excluding them, the definitions of analyticity are classified into four categories.In Chapter Three, I examine the arguments against the Quine’s Thesis by Benson Mates, H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, and the arguments of Gilbert Harman for replying them. I analyze the prior presumption argument of Grice and Strawson, and conclude that Scott Soames doesn’t understand the argument quite well. Then, I rebut the arguments of Morton White and some arguments of Quine. In Chapter Four and Five, I explore the definitions of sentence and meaning, and distinguish sentence and sentence meaning from proposition respectively. I establish the existence of proposition, explicate some of its properties systematically. Meanwhile I show that the refusal of propositions by Quine and Andrea Iacona is implausible.In Chapter Six, I prove that there isn’t any analytical sentence in whatever a rational conception of analyticity. I examine Katz’s definition of analyticity, rebut both Paul Boghossian’s and Gillian Russell’s definitions of analytical sentence.Finally, in Chapter Seven, I show that there exist analytical propositions, and every proposition is either analytic or synthetic, in an appropriate cultural community. I rebut Putnam and advocate the finite blockism to confront holism, and give a new solution to the paradox of analysis.