| This dissertation was inspired by the bigger puzzle of how to explain state behavior in the unipolar order, whether states conduct balancing or not, and if they do, what kind of balancing occurs and the conditions under which it happens are just some of the issues for further discourse.From the dominant theoretical perspective of neorealism, they assume that alliance formation through balancing is treated as a predetermined behavior among great powers in the systemic level. Balancing takes place to augment state capacity and balance against a rising power, a perceived threat, or to pursue state’s interest. For instance, the modern European system characterized by a multipolar structure typifies how alliances among great powers work to balance against a rising power or threat in order to prevent the rise of a hegemon and thus preserve the status quo.During the Cold War, second-tier states had only two poles to choose sides with, and the balance of power translated not just into state behavior but also as a consequence due to both the United States and Soviet Union’s preponderance in power capacity.. Moreover, while the US endures to be the unipole of the current order, the existence of other major powers aside from Russia such as Japan, the European Union and China, with its re-emergence and as realist scholars argue a rising challenge complicates the question of alliance configuration especially between smaller states and great powers.I analyse state behaviour from the perspective of smaller states within asymmetric alliances that involves the United States. I also look at the case of the former Soviet Union and its alignment with another smaller state and found out that there seems to be a pattern of behavior among smaller states in asymmetric alliance. Therefore, in the post-Cold War, the divergence in alliance patterns with asymmetric features that involves the United States and the former Soviet Union is a puzzle that I pose in this thesis. How does the change in their asymmetric capacities affect small states strategic behavior? How do small states strategies toward them differ in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally?This dissertation is divided into six chapters: Chapter I:Introduction; Chapter Ⅱ:Theoretical Framework:Soft Balancing; Chapter III:U.S.-Philippine Case; Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case; Chapter V: Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case; and Conclusion.Chapter I:Introduction The first chapter is divided into two sections:the Introduction and Related Literature Review. In the Introduction I pose the dissertation’s main research questions, argument, case selection, significance of the study, methodology and structure of thesis. I pose two main questions in this thesis:(1) how does the change in the structure affect states’strategic decision? and,(2) in what ways have small states alliance decisions towards the United States and the Soviet Union diverge in the post-cold war? Can small states wield influence over their much greater ally in asymmetric power relations? If any, in what ways have small states’ alliance decisions toward the United States and the Soviet Union diverged after the Cold War? To answer these questions, I explore and apply theoretical concept of "soft balancing" by Robert Pape and T.V. Paul.Whether states do balancing against or bandwagon with a hegemon in the post-Cold War era challenges conventional wisdom of realist theories, especially with regard to balance of power and alliance formation. For some realist scholars, balance of power is unavoidable and it is just a matter of time before other great powers resort to balancing even in a unipolar world. Others contend that the persistence of perceived threat among states will push states to balance in order to uphold their security and survival. Some scholars, however, argue that balancing is unnecessary because the US in the post-Cold War period is so asymmetric in terms of its capacity and does not pose a direct threat that making balance of power is not helpful for great powers and small states. While it is true that so far, there is no clear evidence of the formation of traditional hard balancing against the US, in actual many scholars are likely to agree that states form a type of balancing different from its traditional meaning, that is—soft balancing. When scholars contend soft balancing, however, they are more likely to focus on the role of great powers as political actors who have more weight to strategically conduct soft balancing.Contrary to their argument, this paper contends that small states are as likely to form soft balancing in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing takes place when political leaders of small states perceive that they can maximize their political gains through its use within a given domestic political situation that they face. For instance, state leaders could make use of soft balancing for their own legitimacy when there is strong public sentiment such as nationalism against the preponderant ally; or, political elites could take advantage of soft balancing as a negotiating tool against the bigger ally when confronted with political and economic difficulties.In other words, even in asymmetric alliance, small states could find more strategic leverage against their old allies through the use of soft balancing. And political leaders make use of soft balancing when they could take advantage of it for their own domestic political purposes.In the Review of Related Literature, I first review major arguments on great power politics in international relations that had framed the on-going debate on the subject. I then review recent literature that explain the structure and interaction of states in the post-Cold War period specifically among great powers in the unipolar order and reflect on some of the theoretical lacunae for which this paper aims to contribute to the discussion on how to explain the current order. In particular, I re-examine the concept of soft balancing among great powers that have gained much attention recently and propose a more inclusive dialogue on the relations between great powers and smaller states in order to present why and how the behavior of small states can pose as a challenge to traditional international relations assumptions in the current period.Chapter II:Theoretical Framework presents the Theoretical Framework of this dissertation. This paper uses soft balancing to explain small states’strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. Soft balancing has been widely applied to explain the distinctive features of balancing in the era of a single hegemon led international relations from previous balancing studies that explain states’effort to balance against an emerging great power or threat based on conventional concepts of hard balancing. Like many classical arguments with regards to balancing, therefore, the concept of soft balancing shares core elements with conventional realist thoughts but further extends realist wisdom to account for states’strategic behavior in a unipolar world. In order to arrive at my re-conceptualization of soft balancing, I first explore the development of the balancing theory by looking at the original concept of balance of power and its variants:balance of threat, balance of interest, omnibalancing, hard balancing, and the most recent variant, soft balancing. The paper also analyzes under which conditions these diverse concepts of balancing are used and how they differ from each other. Finally, I discuss how soft balancing has been applied in the post-Cold War period and employ its meaning from small states’perspective. In terms of the reconceptualization of soft balancing, I use the concept of soft balancing-te-explain smaller states’ strategic response to asymmetric alliances in the post-Cold War. Soft balancing involves the strategic foreign policy use that is "nonmilitary" means as a way to limit the behavior or influence of the bigger state in order to achieve domestic political purpose. These strategies may include non-cooperation with the bigger ally such as denying or relocating military base access and facilities or inviting another great power’s military base to constrain the bigger ally’s domestic influence. In asymmetric bilateral relations involving small and weaker states, there is a tendency for the bigger ally to have a considerable domestic influence on the affairs of the smaller states. This happens particularly when the relationship leans more towards dependence on the part of the smaller state.Overtime, however, this continued influence and assertion by the big ally could turn into discontent or even resentment within the domestic sphere of the smaller partner. This dissatisfaction maybe manifested through nationalistic emotions among the constituents against the bigger state. When incumbent political leaders face a domestic issue that could have negative implications on their reputation or even jeopardize their staying power, political leaders could make use of the issue against the bigger state as a way to rally the people’s sentiments and support behind the incumbent leaders. Furthermore, small states can conduct soft balancing as an act of defiance or noncompliance to the bigger ally’s foreign policy decisions to show the domestic political leaders’resolve against such imposition. By doing so, the smaller state can achieve its political purpose on two levels:1) in terms of state level, it constrains the influence of the great power ally on the small states and reduce of dependence of the small state on them, thereby resulting in more autonomy with the small states’political decisions; and2) in terms of domestic politics, state leaders can enhance their political image and standing through the mobilization of nationalistic issue against the bigger ally. Thus, soft balancing works not only as a strategic foreign policy response to the change in the distribution of power between allies but also as an effective leverage to advance the domestic political leaders’ interests.Chapter Ⅲ:U.S.-Philippine Case examines the first case study to support my argument on soft balancing:the case of the U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations. The United States and the Philippines shares more than a century of historical relations, starting with the colonial period in early1900s, which contributed to their extensive security alliance and economic relations. The Philippines, which had once hosted of the many strategic bases established by the United States as a measure against any potential aggressive power, has served the U.S. strategic purposes well during the Cold War with the two countries maintaining cordial and close ties. However, the changing environment with the end of the Cold War also presented several challenges to their "special partnership" that resulted in the termination of the military bases agreement during the Aquino administration and their relationship continued to be equivocal right until the mid-term of the Ramos administration. In this section, I will present the security agreements between them from the Cold War up to the end of the Cold War that brought about the shift in each other’s foreign policy attitude,In the course of doing so, I will pose the following research questions to systematically present the case:(1) What was the main objective of the U.S.-Philippine security relations?(2) How did the U.S.-Philippine alliance shifted from one of friendship to moribund relations at the turn of the post-Cold War? What factors can account for the change in their relations? and,(3) Why did the U.S.-Philippine relationship continue to be distant right before the turn of this century? Ⅰ contend that the Philippine government under two administrations (Aquino to Ramos) was constrained by domestic considerations that left them with a second-best strategic choice against the United States in order to keep them in power. I will organize this section in the following:(1) historical background of U.S.-Philippine Security Relations;(2) the (dis)continuity of the Cold War alliance-Aquino Administration; and (3) the ambivalence of the U.S.-Philippine relationship-Ramos administration.Chapter Ⅳ:U.S.-South Korea Case The U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship is another case of "love-hate" relations between the patron and its client. Their alliance dates back to the end of the Second World War, when Japan lost to the United States and had to give up its almost half a century’s colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. Even with this relative short span of time, U.S.-South Korean relationship has been shaped and strengthened over the course of the Cold War years, from politics, economics and security, with a common aim of preventing the spread of communism and deterring the potential threat of North Korea. With the culmination of the Cold War, however, the evolving strategic circumstances and each country’s shifting foreign policy assessments within the East Asian region provided another round of redefining their alliance:from one of patron-client relations to a more equitable partnership. And as the two countries attempted to renegotiate the conditions of their alliance, it has also blown hot and cold on the certainty of their relationship from the long-held authoritarian ruling party several years after the cold war and after South Korea’s transition to the opposition of the United Democratic Party under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and the Uri Party of Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations. This paper will review the shifting patterns of US-South Korea relations in the post-Cold War era with the following research questions in mind:(1) How did the U.S.-South Korea security relations come about? What was the primary purpose of their alliance?(2) Why did the U.S.-South Korea alliance change from having the same direction to one of discordant relationship at the turn of the century? What external and internal causes prompted such differences? and,(3) How did the North Korean playing card affect their relations? US-South Korea security alliance cannot be separated from the question of how to deal with North Korea’s unpredictable actions.I argue that South Korea’s oscillating behavior comes from the country’s changing attitude towards the trilateral relations—between the United States and North Korea. The progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun considered more engagement policies with North Korea in the hopes of reducing the North’s belligerent policies in the peninsula. Also, with South Korea’s political, economic and military enhancements and accomplishments coupled with the United States geopolitical strategic uncertainty in the region, Seoul has mustered the courage to follow a more independent foreign policy course from Washington particularly with regards to the North Korean issue. This policy, however, in several instances contradicted with the United States’views particularly during the second George Bush administration that contributed to their more disagreeable relations. Furthermore, the continued unequal provisions of the alliance treaty led to the rise in the country’s national sensitivities especially with the younger generation, and Roh took advantage of the public’s seething attitude against the United States to relocate U.S. military presence in the heart of the capital by pushing for the relocation of the central base in Seoul to farther down southern part, Pyungtaek, Kyongki. By doing so, he could use these nationalist sentiments against his conservative opponents in order to downplay their political posture enhance his political legitimacy. The next few sections will be organized as follows:(1) history of U.S.-South Korea Security Relations;(2) the shifting policy towards North Korea and effects on the alliance-Kim Dae-jung Administration; and (3) the discordant U.S.-South Korea relations-Roh Moo-hyun administration.Chapter Ⅴ:Russia-Kyrgyzstan Case The post-Soviet Union brought about a sequence of newly independent states in the Asian and European continents. Among them, five Central Asian states were born in1991:Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Due to Russia’s economic and political troubles at home and the decline of its regional hegemony, Russia’s once considerable influence over these Central Asian states had retreated. Over the last decade, however, Russia had tried to reassert its foreign policy sway over them. Nevertheless, the foreign policy strategic interests of these countries have also been affected by the change in geopolitical environment. In particular, the United States’ global ’war on terror’and its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan suddenly placed Central Asia’s trivial geopolitical position into Washington’s strategic map by placing military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, these two incidents started the seeming tug-of-war among great powers in the region—Russia, China and the United States—for political and economic influence.As the United States positioned its military bases in Russia’s former territories, the latter of course was unsatisfied with this turn of event since it still considered these states as part of its sphere of influence. Thus, Russia in the beginning grudgingly accepted but later used its foreign policy sway to convince these states to get rid of the bases in their territories. The problem with the’great power game’ contention is that there is too much focus on great powers and how they can easily politically manipulate smaller and weaker states’ foreign policy decisions. The argument on great powers’ roles neglects the importance of how domestic politics played a crucial role in the decision-making process of consenting to have these bases, rejecting the bases on the part of Uzbekistan, and renegotiating the terms of agreement on the part of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this section will discuss how the domestic political changes and challenges facing political leaders of small states particularly in Kyrgyzstan in post-Soviet Union affected their strategic foreign policy towards their bigger patron, Russia.This section addresses the following questions:(1)In the face of the changes in post-Soviet era, what security, political and economic challenges did small states such as Kyrgyzstan face? How did political elites cope with such situation?(2) How did Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vector policy usher in a new kind of diplomacy that for a time worked to limit the influence of Russia on the political elites’foreign policy decisions? (3) How did the United States’ geopolitical strategic role of placing military base in the country work for the legitimizing purposes of political elites? The foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan has always leaned towards the side of Russia.However, with its renewed geopolitical importance after9/11, Kyrgyzstan’s political leaders found that on the domestic level, the multi-vector foreign policy working not only to resuscitate Kyrgyzstan’s ailing economy but also for the personal usurpation of the political elites, their families and close contacts. Thus, the political, economic and personal gains that the military bases presented was significantly exploited by political elites during the Askar Akaev regime (1991-2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010) for domestic self-interests; furthermore, the hosting of U.S. military base gave these two political leaders a bargaining leverage against Russia to constrain its foreign policy influence over Kyrgyzstan. This case will be divided into three parts:(1) historical overview of Kyrgyzstan after post-Soviet Union era;(2) Askar Akaev’s "multi-vector policy"; and (3) Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s multi-vector policy continuation. |
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