A Research On The Law-abiding Incentive

In recent years, among the social development, the law-abiding incentive question discussion has been studied in recent years. Especially in recent universally advocate of “national law-abiding”, and there are increasingly practical issues of concern that how can make better promoting people to abide by the law. Obviously, the importance of law-abiding behavior should be recommended. However, it needs further research that what method is used to improve and strengthen the law-abiding behavior.Using the incentive method to broaden the promoting of law-abiding could provide a new thinking perspective. It is not denying the legitimacy of legal obligation, but surpassing the obligation concepts and promoting people actively comply with the law rather than illegal activities. Therefore, it can be started with the legal act, and using the theoretical premise of law and economics, treating the people as individual behavior of “bounded rationality” characteristic, and then analysing the motivation of law-abiding behavior and the influencing factors, including the behavior of opportunism characteristics, social preferences and diversity of preferences and so on. Meanwhile, the relevant theory of management is also providing a theoretical support for the analysis of law-abiding incentives.The essay is based on the rule of law in our country, analyse the disadvantages and dilemma of the law-abiding problem. Summarizing several prominent situation of obstruction in law-abiding order, that intends to raise a further thinking of the law-abiding. With the method of comparison, analyzing the influence factors of law-abiding one by one, and then having some comparison social factors between law-abiding and illegal behavior. It could find out the inner source of law-abiding from the perspective between the human individual subjectivity and social comprehensive. According to the characteristics of bounded rationality, bounded self-interest and bounded willpower, there also exists the tendency of utility maximization, but it still has a kind of cognitive bias and misunderstanding, the result of the behavior is not optimal at last. At the same time, various social preferences would also affect the behavior decision. The essay mainly applies the classical analysis method of law and economics, cost-benefit, to analyse the law-abiding behavior. Every law-abiding behavior has a certain costs and benefits, through the weighing between the costs and benefits, people would have a decision of whether to obey or break the law. The essay focuses on the deeply researching of incentive theory, starting from the essence of the incentive, with the purpose of improving the law-abiding conscious structure of actors. Then it can remedy the behavior of weakness by bounded rationality, designing a mode of law-abiding incentive in a hierarchical way. There are three model types of incentive, mainly divided into self-motivation, others-motivation and mutual-motivation. The concrete forms are mainly divided into two levels of material incentive and spiritual incentive. In practice, material incentive is a comparative common form of incentive, and spiritual incentive plays a major rule in moral aspect. In order to improve and perfect the law-abiding of the system level in practically, there should be needed that divide the work and protect its legal enforcement and justice. The process of law-abiding incentive is dynamical, it is not only reflects the transformation and promotion of a person’s own motivation, but also give expression to work together in the other parts of the legal operating system. On the one hand, for improving the efficiency of legal enforcement and justice, it could promote the law-abiding comprehensively by the method of reducing the law-abiding cost and improving the illegal cost; on the other hand, there could provide some means of system innovation among the limits prescribed by law, such as law-abiding integrity mechanism, law-abiding aid mechanism, etc. Therefore, we can use the multi-angle to express the incentive function collectively.