Research On Channel Conflict And Coordination Of Hybrid Channels In Telecommunication Industry

With the rapid development of Chinese economy, the competition in telecommunication market become dractical, the telecom operators face great challenge. The competition between telecom operators have changed from the scope of network, the diversity of services, the subscriber number and the brand to the marketing channel management. Marketing channels have become the most essential component in core competitiveness for telecom operators. With the development of domestic communication electronics technology, and telecommunications networks, wide power grid and the further integration of the Internet to provide users with e-services has become an irreversible trend in Telecommunication Industry. The advent of e-commerce has prompted many telecom operators to redesign their traditional channel structures by complementing their existing social channels with an e-channel channel and construct a hybrid channel system. The hybrid channel system is the major change in Telecommunication Industry, and is a promising channel mode. However the hybrid channel system brings both opportunities and challenges to the Telecommunication Industry. Due to the existence of social channels, the introduction of the e-channel channel may always be detrimental to the channel distributor, and usually lead to channel conflict. The channel conflict in hybrid channel system become acute, and has been a core focus of the channel management in Telecommunication Industry. In this case, the problem that telecom operators must face is not only whether to introduce an e-channel channel, but how to explore a new operating model and a new conflict coordination mechanism to balance the profit between different channel members, it is a very important and urgent problem for telecom operators.The hybrid channel structure looks like a facial phenomenon, but its scientific explanation and analysis remains a big challenge. This dissertation uses normative theoretical analysis and adopts integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Therefore, by adopting theories and methods of Game Theory, principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, this dissertation based on the channels harmony and the profit maximization, focuses on the conflict between the social channel and the e-channel, explores the possible optimization and coordination mechanism, so as to provide scientific references for people to understand the prevailing channel structure in nowadays’business world, as well as to provide a new perspective for researchers and telecom operator managers.The dissertation consists of following seven chapters:Fisrt, chapter one is the introduction, including the research background, the research object, the main structure, innovative points, and so on.Second, in chapter two, a summary of basic theories of marketing channel and channel conflict is presented.The dissertation firstly combines some characteristics of Telecommunication Industry to expatiate the marketing channels theories, then thoroughly analyzes the china telecom industry and its marketing channels development evolution course as well as the present marketing channels situation of the three main telecom operators.Third, the dissertation considers a hybrid channel system involving one telecom operator and one independent channel distributor, the hybrid channel consists of a traditional social channel and an e-channel. Customers are assumed to be heterogeneous and are able to purchase telecom products either through the social channel or through the telecom operator’s e-channel. Optimization theory, non-cooperative game theory are utilized to construct an complete information dynamic game model to study on the conflicts between social channel and e-channel, between telecom operator and channel distributor. Both the horizontal price competition and acceptance level of customers in each channel are considered in the model. Decision frameworks related are established also. The dissertation studies three noncooperative games of different power structures, including Static Nash game, Telecom operator Stackelberg game and channel distributor Stackelberg game. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented, the purpose is to investigate the influence of acceptance level of customers and horizontal price competition on the choice strategies of dual channel. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel channel in the hybrid channel system, the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.Fourth, the dissertation divides the channel conflict of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry into three types:the level channel conflict, the vertical channel conflict and the multi-channel conflict and takes it as a standard that whether an action would prevent channel members from maximize their respective profits. The dissertation analyzes the causes of the level channel conflict using qualitative methodology, it constructs an incomplete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the vertical channel conflict, an complete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the multi-channel conflict.Fifth, according to the characteristics of telecom products, a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming is established. By comparing and analyzing equilibrium profits and pricing strategies between the integrated and the decentralized in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry, we found that the profit in the hybrid channel under the decentralized is less than the integrated. Based on stackelberg game models, this dissertation builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel and solve the problem of profit-sharing between the telecom operator and the channel distributor. It draws a conclusion that the telecom operator can induce the channel distributor to coordinate through flexible pricing method, and both of them can share cooperative profits based on negotiation mechanisms, the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation and finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The telecom operator can provide infinite such contract for coordination of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry.Sixth, the dissertation firstly analyzes the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting, the main study is the value of sharing cost information of the channel distributor about sales effortAccording to the channel distributor whether to share its marginal cost information to the telecom operator, the model can be divided into complete information dynamic game and incomplete information dynamic game. We analyze the equilibrium pricing policies and the equilibrium profits of telecom operator and channel distributor under both the full information sharing case and no information sharing case based on the stackelberg game theory, and compute the value of information sharing. After analyzing the value of information sharing to the hybrid channel, aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor’s effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The optimized incentive intensity and the influencing factors which the telecom operator gives the channel distributor are established. The mechanism’s characters and the parameters’terms to ensure the validity are discussed also. Seventh, as the last chapter, the seventh chapter concludes the whole dissertation, andpoints out the main innovation, the limits and the future research fields. The major innovations of the dissertation include the following:1) This dissertation constructs an complete information dynamic game model between the telecom operator and the channel distributor in the hybrid channel in telecommunication industry and studies three noncooperative games of different power structures. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel in the hybrid channel system, the choice strategies of dual channel and the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.2) This dissertation constructs a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming in telecommunication industry and builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel. It draws a conclusion that the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation through flexible pricing method and parameter design, finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The issue of cooperative profits distribution is discussed also.3) The game theory is employed in this dissertation to study the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting. Aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor’s effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The mechanism’s characters and the parameters’terms to ensure the validity are discussed also.