Research On Dual Channel Supply Chain Coordination Based On Revenue Sharing Contract

The traditional supply chain sales model is a distribution mode, the retailer’s product is wholesale from suppliers, and sell products to customers with the retail price. But with the development of economy and the progress of science and technology, the growing popularity of Internet applications, the single traditional retail channels have already can’t satisfy the needs of the customers, and online shopping because of its fast, convenient, optional features attracted many customers, therefore, Many enterprises such as haier, suning, gome is no longer simply using the traditional way of distribution to commodity circulation market, rather than using the form of electronic commerce and traditional sales mode of double channel sales to expand the market. In contemporary society, the rapid development of electronic technology, two kinds of sales channels have their own advantages to increase their own channel competitiveness. Therefore, the enterprise in increasing network of sales channels at the same time also makes the enterprise’s competition pressure increases. Enterprise competition way diversification, the uncertainty of market demand, customer demand of the characteristics and the types of goods is increasing, the replacement of goods speed and so on all can affect the whole supply chain system profit, the problems show that supply chain management should be win-win cooperation as the core.In this article, with revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain system of corporate profit distribution to establish the double channel model for supply chain coordination, the retailer through traditional retail channels to sell goods to consumers and suppliers through the Internet sales channels to sales to consumers. For demand function of two factors affecting price and channel service level detailed analysis, by use of EXCEL and MATLAB simulation to numerical validation and graphic analysis. This article also use probability and mathematical statistics, differential equations, the game theory, supply chain management, and other related theory knowledge, for chapter 3 and chapter 4 dual channel supply chain model is analyzed, and concluded the optimal decision of each node enterprise: price, service level, and the maximum profit. In the fifth chapter all of the retailers’ policy decisions are studied solely.First of all, the third chapter builds a supplier and a retailer of double channel decision model of supply chain, the retailer through traditional retail channels to sell goods to consumers and suppliers through the Internet sales channels to sales to consumers. For both centralized and decentralized decision-making supply chain model under the condition of study and through the comparative analysis of the two decision variables, the results show that the double channel overall supply chain profit under centralized decision making than profit under decentralized decision making, revenue sharing factor is proportional to the supplier’s profit and inversely proportional to the retailer’s profit.When other parameter variables are fixed, the revenue sharing factor is equal to 0.5, supplier and retailer’s profit difference is positive, at this time of revenue sharing factors can make whole double channel profit of perfect coordination of supply chain each node enterprise. Further, the fourth chapter is on the basis of the model in the third chapter, retailers are to build a new network marketing channels of two layers of double channel two-level supply chain model, supplier still only online direct marketing channels. Research and analyze the model, can be found, when revenue sharing factor is between 0.1 and 0.6, the profits of supplier and retailer will increase, the revenue sharing contract mechanism can make the node enterprises of supply chain system to effectively reasonable profits without affecting the distribution of the single enterprise’s profit pursuit. Finally, in chapter 5 mainly studies to the impact for the retailers when the network channel is increased. Results show that even if the traditional prices continue to reduce but its profits are increasing. And consumers’ preference for retailers to traditional channels and the retailer’s profit is proportional to the relationship, when the preference degree increases, the retailer’s profit increase, by the results of numerical analysis shows that the degree of preference is less than 0.5, retailers profit is a loss.