Decision-making System: Phase Boundary Of Strategy Selection Optimization And Effectiveness Of International Sanctions

This thesis mainly puts forward an idea of distribution of decision on the world,which results in history change of the lock-in, and forms a cycle of spiral. The countrymakes policy in the context. The mechanism how a country enters into a lock-in andwithdraws from it will result in the analysis of relative superior. The question thisthesis puts forward about sanction why the United States imposes sanction on China,Iran and Iraq, or Cuba is regarded as ineffectiveness, why they are used evenrecognized ineffective. Why they are on three different ways when they are adjusted?The relation between the United States and China becomes from sanction tocooperation, the United states and Iran or Iraq enter into war and threatened state? TheUnited States and Cuba becomes maintained? Why sanction, war and cooperation willbe interchanged between each other? Why the sanction will change after a time? Thisthesis solves this problem through the distribution of strategy on the globe anddistribution of time value in the period.This thesis puts forward the concept of relative rationality, revising boundedrationality of Simon, which will form the base of distribution of decision-makinganalysis.The main content include: first, construct the system of distribution ofdecision-making on the globe in the fundamental of relative rationality different fromSimon’s bounded rationality and satisfaction. Second, modify the concept of powerand country interest in which make them include time. Third, construct a globaldialectic system in which competitive and cooperation interchange. This includes thedialectic history system and the competition and cooperation interchange. Forth,realize the dynamic analysis of international relation, and build structure analysisthrough period structure.This model constructs an analytic frame of three period structures which form thebase of the country’s decision-making. This includes: first, the distribution law fromshort period to long period; second, the distribution law between two short periods; third, the distribution law from long period to short period.This thesis interprets such question through three cases, including the case of theUnited States sanctions China, the United States sanctions Iran and Iraq, and theUnited States sanctions Cuba. This thesis analyses this sanctions using the concept ofsatisfactory and concludes the effective sanction of satisfactory.The main idea of this thesis is: first is the structure of decision, named the idea ofdecision forming system; second, the idea of dialectic history; third, the individualismof methodology; forth is value structure.This thesis analyzes from the start of value, in sanction theory, the main idea is toconstruct an effective analysis. In the former analysis, international sanctionencounters six stages, this thesis puts forward another effective idea of sanction.Decision-making theory can be system theory, which will form the base of demandand distribution of sanction. In the decision analysis, it will seek to construct a formof situation. This will form a quantity model for the analysis of the country’s mind.This needs revealed preference. Because this preference is changed according tocontext, it is not solid, but adjusted.Although time preference is an individual behavior. But this individual can be asystemic trend in which the restore and the system can be unified. In the time, it canbe planned distributive and result in the change of utility, which will lead to anydistribution of decision.From the time structure, this thesis regards this structure fundamental of unitybetween classical theory and modern behavior theory. These time structures includesthree: time-trend structure, time-balance structure and self-time structure. On the baseof time structures, we can build evaluating system. We use relative rationality tointerpret the transforming structure between sanctions, wars and cooperations.