Font Size: a A A

Study On Modes Of RJVs And CLA Based On The Perspective Of Implicit Contract

Posted on:2013-11-08Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1229330395984470Subject:International Trade
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Development of today’s world economy has gradually shift from the capital competition to technological competition. It has come into the technology capital period in which core technical capacity determines the competitiveness in international markets. Research and development is the most direct source of access to new technologies. With the ever shortening technology life cycle, technology and product markets are more competitive. So the quantity, kind and quality of resources needed are more and more complex. Research and development is uncertainties, at the same time, the problem of technology spillovers and innovation public products are severe tests to R&D. Companies rely solely on its own strength, has been unable to meet the requirements of technological innovation.In this case, the enterprise must go beyond organizational boundaries to seek the advantage of complementary resources and risk-sharing. Cooperative R&D between enterprises is becoming increasingly important. Cooperative R&D will help enterprises to share the innovation information and result. It can optimize the combination of production factors and improve resource utilization and R&D efficiency. It also can reduce R&D investment to ease the R&D uncertainty risk. Cooperative R&D, the most important effect, is beneficial to enhance their dominant position in the international market and technology market, to enhance the right to speak of the negotiations.Research joint ventures and cross-license agreement are the most common cooperative R&D mode, the former one is equity cooperation, belonging to the investment style; while the latter one is non-equity cooperation, belonging to method of trade. But the goal is the same-technology innovation and industrialization. The process of technology capital of the two cooperative R&D modes is different because of the differences in organizational structure. As an effective complement to explicit contract, implicit contract on unverifiable factors constrained the operation of the co-operation mechanism and incentive can not be ignored. Therefore, the article mainly focuses on research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement model under the implicit contract.In this context, the article based on the game theory, investigate the microscopic mechanism of these two cooperative R&D model; based on the contract theory and the use of normative study, establish a theoretical model to explore the two modes through the different paths of the business performance, structure stability and polices etc. aspects under the influence of the implicit contract; using the innovation theory, investment theory, contract theory, and international trade theory, explain the effects of these two modes on subject profit, object efficiency, contract validity and the social welfare; analyzing the empirical results in developed countries, test the effect of cooperative R&D mode operating mechanism under the impact of implicit contract; based on transaction cost theory, industrial organization and organizational learning through, compare the partner selection in a particular mode of competition, arrangements for the ownership of the innovation, efforts behavior and know-how disclosed and stability, in order to achieve the preferred cooperative R&D mode; Combing the international experience of cooperative R&D policy, provide advice to develop our research joint ventures and cross-license agreement.Based on the above research, the article concluded, research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement can play the advantage of complementary resources, promoting technological progress and enhancing the core competitiveness of the market. At the same time, the implicit contract which is the key factor during the operation of cooperative R&D can mitigate the risk of adverse selection, opportunistic behavior and moral hazard problems aroused by bounded rationality, uncertainty and incomplete information. The enterprise should be based on strategic objectives, development status, resource requirements and future market expectations to choose the optimized mode. Thus the government should be timely for the industry objects different market positioning, development and innovation capacity, to appropriate economic and legal policy and to support a favorable environment for research joint ventures and cross-licensing agreement..
Keywords/Search Tags:implicit contract, cooperative R&D mode, Research Joint VenturesCross-licensing agreement, operation mechanism, optimized mode
PDF Full Text Request
Related items