The Economic Ananlysis Of The R&D Cooperation

Because of fierce competition in high-tech industries, life cycle of product is short, and self-development of new products is of very high cost and risks. Therefore, research joint venture has become globally competitive strategy trend recently. In face of increasingly fierce market competition and scarce resources or capacity, manufacturers hope to ensure their competitiveness in the market through research joint venture formed by strategic alliances.First of all, the paper modifies Atallah's symmetry assumptions on the spillover coefficient, so that it makes the theory model closer to economic reality; besides further understanding the spillover effect, the relationship between R&D outputs and R&D cooperation, the paper also discusses the comparison and selection of R&D cooperation structure (including incorporation, general cooperation, horizontal cooperation and vertical cooperation).On the spillover effects of the R&D outputs under different modes of R&D cooperation, the paper finds that the increase of vertical spill extent has a positive effect on output and social welfare; Under the circumstance of general or horiz0ontal cooperation, the increase of horizontal spillover also has a positive impact on R&D output and social welfare; Only in the case of vertical cooperation or no cooperation between manufacturers, the horizontal spillover may have a negative impact on R&D output and social welfare.Moreover, with different spillover characteristics, the paper has the following conclusion on the choice of R&D cooperation: in most cases, general cooperation model can make the external competition of majority research and development internal, so general R&D cooperation has advantages on the R&D outputs than other models, and it is closest to the social optimum. If the spillover effects are generally small, vertical cooperative R & D model is superior to other models, it is closest to the social optimum (under completely no spillover circumstance, even equals to social optimum).Then, the paper will extend the framework of Wang (1998) model and consider the existence of spillover effect between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. Divide the range of manufacturers'innovation into drastic innovation and non-drastic innovation. When considering the spillover effects, it analyzes the feasibility of authorization under these two circumstances between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. If both sides have authorization action, what is the optimal authorized strategy? In addition, what influence does spillover effect have on equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the influence between the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio? As well as the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers?The results of this study show that: (1) if the innovation is drastic, RJV manufacturers will not grant authority to non-RJV manufacturers non-manufacturers. (2) If the innovation is not drastic, the optimal authorized strategy of RJV manufacturers is to authorize unit premium. (3) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio decrease with increasing spillover effect. (4) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers'is less than optimal social cooperation scale.Finally, the existence of the limited rationality and transaction cost makes the R&D cooperation contract been an incomplete contract; More importantly, before receiving appropriate compensation, the parties of the contract make necessary investments to facilitate the performance of a contract. The incompleteness of R&D cooperation easily induces a party to make the use of information asymmetry for the quasi rent invested by the other party.