Study On Durable Firm’s Intertemporally Strategic Behavior And Technology Licensing

Using a two-peorid durable model, this dissertation analyzes the intertermporally strategic behavior and related technology licensing under durable framework. The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:To begin with, this paper analyzes the intertermporally strategic behavior of durable-firms. By developing a two stage game model, where a differentiated durable duopoly choose their intertemporal strategies including durability and selling or leasing strategy simultanelously in the first stage, afer that, they compete against a la Counot in the second stage, the paper emphatically studies the impact of product differentiation beween durable duopoly on each of their strategic behavior. It is found that the degree of product differentiation determines the choice of intertemporal strategy. Both firms produce and sell a durable good if their products are highly closer substitutes or complements, alternatively, they will choose to produce nondurable goods or produce and rent their durable goods, which contrast deeply with Goering (2007). Social welfare depends both on the number of firms which choose to produce and to sell durable goods simultaneously. The so called ’Antitrust Policy’(the Lease only policy) for durable industry doesn’t improve social welfare when durable enterprise can endogenize intertemporal strategies before.Secondly, combining licensing phenomena with an intertemporal durable model, this paper studies the optimal licensing contract in durable industry, and also emphatically analyzes the licensee’s commitment capability (ability to maintain intertemporal price) on licensing contract. Specifically, assuming that the patent holder is also a third part nonproducer with a cost-reducing technology, the patent receivers are durable-duopoly under intertemporal competition. This paper revisits the the exclusive or non-exclusive licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation by a third part nonproducer. It’s shown that licensee’s commitment ability decides the licensing contract. Specifically, the patentor chooses to license exclusively by means of fixed fee or non-ex clusively by means of royalty or two-part tariff. Moreover, from the perspective of patent holder, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing, which contrasts sharply with Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Li and Wang (2010). In addition, licensing is not always better than non-licensing. For instance, the two-part tariff licensing reduces consumer surplus and may lower social welfare if the innovation size is small.Thirdly, by incorporating the multi-product competition and the new product innovation into a two-period durable model, this paper studies the optimal licensing contract under intertemporal competition with new product licensing. We assume that there exists a multi-product firm and a single product enterprise in the two-period market, the multi-product firm monopolies a durable technology and also competes with the single-product firm in nodurable market, which is complementary to duable. This paper revisits the optimal licensing contract on a newly complementary durable technology by the multi-product producer to the single product enterprise. It’s found that, from the perspective of patent holder, the preferred licensing contract relies on the complementarity of the durable and nondurable. Specifically, the multi-product firm chooses to license by fixed fee, when the products are highly closer complements, and license by royalty vice versa, which is highly different from the classical argument made by Wang (1998).Lastly, inbedding the product differentiation and complementary innovation in a two-period durable model, this paper review the optimal licensing contract on a complementary durable or nondurable technology transfer between a durable firm and a nondurable enterprise. We assume that there exists a differentiated duopoly in the two-period market, each of them monopolies a single durable or nondurable technology. This paper revisits the optimal licensing contract on a newly complementary technology (a durable or nondurable) between the producing firms. It’s found that the preferred licensing contract for the pantent holder relies mainly on the complementarity of the durable and nondurable but the licensing period. It’s also shown that the patentor chooses to license by fixed fee, when the durable and nondurable are highly closer complements or license by royalty vice versa, which also contrast sharply with Wang (1998).