Research On Licensing Decision Models For Product Innovation Technology Under Industrial Organization Framework

Domestic and foreign scholars have made a great deal of empirical research on factors affecting economic growth over the years. It is concluded that, over time, the role of technological progress on economic growth is increasing, and gradually replaces the production factors and obtains the dominant position in economic growth. To maintain sustained rapid economic growth, we must strengthen the efforts to technological progress, and change the mode of economic growth, improve the ability to innovate, making the economic growth gradually change from the factor-driven to innovation-driven. Innovative and creative application of knowledge and technology has increasingly become the driving force of technological advances and economic and social development in today’s knowledge economy era. Patent, the measurement of achievement in innovative level, especially the creation, possession and use of a patent, has become a key in the competition to gain an advantage for an enterprise or even a country. Unfortunately, however, the conversion rate of the patent outcome has not increased significantly, and a large number of patents have not been applied and become sleeping patents. That is, the technology can not be transferred into productivity. To completely change the situation of dislocation of technology and economic as well as weak transfer capacity from science and technology into practical productivity, and make the knowledge and technology play an important role in the process of promoting economic growth in our country, it is urgent to research and explore the technology market transactions and the transfer of the scientific and technological achievements.Technology licensing is one of the main forms of technology transactions in the technology market, a main path for the technology to give a full play in the economic growth, an important flow way of technical elements. The method to determine the price item in the technology transfer contract is the core of the technology licensing. Howerver, the decision-making process of technology licensing pricing strategy is very complex and difficult. Thus, with the innovation-based competition becoming increasingly fierce, the technological level rapidly improved, and the protection of intellectual property strengthened worldwidely, the patent license would inevitably play an increasingly more important role in the technology transfer and diffusion process of the industries in our country. The research of internal price decision-making behavior mechanism in the process of patent licensing is significantly important, no matter for the enterprises and universities or other departments to improve the efficiency of the technical transaction, to transfer the scientific and technological achievements into productivity, and to enhance the very important contribution of technological innovation to economic growth as well as to extend the depth and breadth of the theoretical research.The systematic product innovation technology licensing strategy theory under the framework of industrial organization is presented in this paper, considering the decision-making departments as the government, developers, licensors, licensees and consumers making strategies about the technology acquisition modes, market structures, demand structures, product durability, asymmetric information, uncertainties and other factors. Among them, the product innovation is an important type of technology innovation, and practical data show that product innovation occupies a large proportion in technological innovation. The main work carried out in this paper is as follows:(1) The innovation technology acquisition mode is analyzed. As to the issue of technology acquisition for the enterprises, firstly, the collaborative innovation mode is analyzed through a game including innovation and output stage. Then a game model including innovation, licensing, as well as the output stage is disccussed. What is followed is that with the model the technology licensing mode is analyzed. Finally, the optimal innovation technology acquisition strategy is obtained by comparative analysis.(2) The quality improving innovation technology licensing under the market structure of oligopoly is researched in this paper. The optimal licensing schemes of the quality-improving innovation are analyzed in different market structures including Cournot, Stackelberg as well as Bertrand. As the technology licensing behaviors are affected by the market structure, the static and dynamic game models based on output competition are analyzed respectively. The fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, fixed-fee plus royalty licensing equilibriums are compared under different market structures, as well as corresponding optimal licensing strategies, consumer surplus and society surplus. The quality-improving innovation licensing schemes under Bertrand market structure considering product varieties are followed.(3) The impacts of the product market demand structures after the application of innovation technology on the licensing schemes of quality-improving innovation are analyzed in this paper. The market demand is assumed to be a linear market demand, a logit market demand, respectively. And the optimal quality-improving innovation technology licensing schemes are deduced under the up two market demand structures respectively. The inside innovator case is also considered. The analysis under logit demand framework makes it possible to consider the impacts of the comparative attractive of new brand product with substitutes, marginal cost, the level of product differentiation, as well as differences in consumer preferences on licensing schemes. (4) The decision problem of durable goods innovation and technology licensing is analyzed under a vertically integration structure. The case of the durable-good innovation product is analyzed about the impacts of monopoly market structure on licensing schemes of innovation technology. Based on the existing analysis, combining the analysis method of downstream and upstream vertically independent industry, under the assumption of the upstream material market with imperfect competition, that is, existing monopoly power, the innovation incentives of downstream two-stage durable monology producers to the quality-improving and cost-reducing technological innovation are analyzed, as well as the optimal licensing schemes under this sense. As the perfect competition in the real world is impossible, the technology licensing market under the conditions of imperfect competition is of more practical significance.(5) The impact of information asymmetry on the innovation technology licensing decisions is analyzed. As product innovator has private information about the innovation magnitude and the technology users have private information about the product market and the application value of the technology, the asymmetric information affacts the licensing of innovation technology. The pooling licensing equilibrium and separating licensing equilibrium under asymmetric information are deduced as well as the corresponding optimal licensing schemes.(6) The impact of uncertainty on new product innovation technology licensing is analyzed. Under the condition of uncertainty in the process of R&D for new products, a model considering R&D, pro-licensing, post-licensing as well as government subsidies is analyzed. The impacts of product differentiation and technology spillover on the government R&D subsidies are analyzed. An option game model is obtained under the assumption that market demand is uncertain in the process of new product innovation to analyze the optimal technology licensing.