The Mechanism Analysis Of Influence The Enterprises’ Behavior And Performance In The Industrial Organization Structure Mechanism And Information

An industry is a system composed of enterprises which are linked by the market. What factors affect the behavior choice of the enterprises in the industry, what factors determine the results and performance of the enterprises’ behavior, which is the research topic that has the theoretical significance and the realistic value.Every system must have structures, system structures decide the function of system, the system’s function realization degree that the performance is determined by the operation mechanism of the system. This paper starts with the basic idea of system science, reviewing and examining the new theory of industrial organization. Putting forward from the concepts, the organization of industry, the movement mechanism of intra-industry, the private information owned by enterprises, the behavior decision and performance of enterprises and so on, which are influenced and related each other in many aspects, closed analysis paradigm SCIMP of industrial organization system, this paradigm combines system theory, decision analysis, the microscopic analysis of industrial organization and other important aspects, providing a more effective analysis for the study of the theory of industrial organization paradigm. We study around the above aspects, establish a number of industrial organization theory game models, solve and analyze the equilibrium results of the short-term market, confirm the analytical paradigm of industrial organization theory in this paper, which is rational, adaptive and targeted.From the perspective of the structure of industrial organization, we study the horizontal industrial organization, that is usually in the sense of industry and vertical industry groups, namely, the linear supply chain etc and two classes of linear structure of industrial organization, establish and solve two kinds of models of N enterprises’ behavior:The optimal selection behavior of Cournot game and Stackelberg game about price on the triple linear supply chain, in which the Cournot game’s equilibrium results N of microeconomic analysis well explains the macroeconomic analysis results that the traditional industrial organization theory of the Bain, the equilibrium results of the triple linear supply chain find a conclusion that is strong and practical value: under certain conditions, the enterprises of leading decision get twice the profits than the enterprises that are after decision. It explains the pricing behavior of the resources of iron ore mining and other industries well, as well as the behavior of the large chain retailers that grab and extend terminal shop for the voice. At the same time, we study some typical industrial organization of the nonlinear structures and solve its short-term equilibrium, which is a good way to explain the choice behavior of pricing when the products supplier invest the retailers to join, especially for the interaction of the industrial organization structure and the enterprises’ behavior choice, which is the enterprises’behavior and performance on the flexible supply chain.We put forward the concept of the operating mechanism about industrial organization described by the game rules, moreover, we establish and solve the short-term equilibrium of the upstream and downstream to move first mechanism on the one and two linear supply chain as respectively, namely on the Linear oligopoly and monopoly competition linear supply chain, finding the internal mechanism that the enterprises’production and management decision and performance are affected by the different market demand functions, that is to say the existence condition of the first mover advantage and the late-mover advantage is the linear demand function and the exponential function of the market demand function, what’s more, the degree of the first mover advantage and/or the late-mover advantage decreases when the competition of industry became fierce.We also establish and solve the mechanism of remanufacturing and recycling behavior are subsidized by the government that is endogenous, the design model of optimal and incentive contract, which do with the remanufactures and recyclers, we conclude that the endogenous mechanism of government are the optimal results of exogenous parameter, which gives the value judgment of endogenous mechanism is researched.We point out the important role of the enterprises’private information in the market competition, study how the enterprises’private information to affect the enterprises’behavior and performance in our real life. Firstly, we research for the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide at the same time, it is in view of the horizontal structure of industrial organization, establish the Cournot game with production optimization decision-making and the Stackelberg game with the products price optimized under the condition of the private information, namely the unit cost of the enterprises’ products, which the equilibrium results fully show the private information makes the influence on the enterprises’ management decision-making behavior and their performance, that is to say, the enterprises without cost advantages and private information have more market performance, so there are fake of intrinsic motivation, getting the fake Spencer conditions. The enterprises have the advantage of cost information may suffer from an accident in the competition, so they have a positive motivation to reveal their own advantages of cost information. Secondly, we study the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide not simultaneously, with the vertical structure of industrial organization, establishing and solving the information signaling game and screening game models about the market demand information, which the Bayesian Nash equilibrium shows the value of private information, also the influence on the enterprises’ management decision-making behavior and their performance. Eventually, we extend to the problem of strategy optimization with the competition between the two linear chains, we establish and solve the dynamic games of incomplete information that the downstream retailers own the market demand information privately, the equilibrium results of analysis reveal that the uncertain information has an impact on the enterprises’ behavior and performance in the complex industrial organization.