Research On High-level Professional Talent Incentive Mechanism Of Chinese Securities Company

The operation mode of the securities industry decides the important mission ofcompany performance improvements that the special group of high-levelprofessionals will undertake and their positive role is more remarkable compared tothe same type of talents of other industries. The theoretical circle has conducted quitea lot study on the mechanism of incentive and constraint of Chinese securitiescompanies with top executives as its research object.The research angle of viewmostly is about the correlation of the incentive constraints mechanism and executiverequirements or enterprise performance under the management theory. The high-levelprofessional talents of securities companies seldom are taken as research object.Therefore, this article taking high-level professional talents as the research objectpresents pioneering significance. The angles of view in previous research focus toomuch on incentive mechanism itself, namely the effect of different means of incentive.This research extends its perspective to the corporate governance of Chinesesecurities companies and applies property rights theory, principal-agent theory,incentive theory, human capital theory and correlation theory to the analysis of thecorporate governance mode resulting from property right structure of Chinesesecurities companies. From the angle of view of salary incentive, ownership structure,board characteristics of the corporate governance, the paper demonstrates themotivation factors which can influence the performance of high-level professionaltalents and finally deduce the incentive constraints mechanism of high-levelprofessional personnel. This is the theoretical framework of this study.First this paper reviews about the theories of the high level professional talents,corporate governance, incentive and constraint at home and abroad. On the basis ofthese theories, the paper demonstrates the cause and the present situation and theessence of high-level professional talents incentive theory of the securities companiesin China and puts forward the argumentation that the corpotate governance factorssuch as salary incentive, ownership structure, board characteristics affect the incentiveeffect of the high-level professionals, which determine the work performance. The resulting theoretical hypothesis and conceptual model thus formed. Second, this paperstudies168staff in27securities companies distributed in north China, east China,northwest, southwest, central and southern China through small-scale interview,questionnaire survey method, using SPSS17.0software to analyze the investigationresult through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. Third, on thebasis of the empirical study of the high-level professional talents incentive mechanism,the following conclusions are drawn:（1）Salary incentive is still one of the important means of incentive that Chinesesecurities companies adopt, and long-term equity incentive has a significant incentiveeffect on high-level professionals.（2）Ownership structure for Chinese securities companies has great correlationfunction to the high-level professional talents incentive constraint mechanism.（3）Board characteristics play an invisible role for the high-level professional talentsincentive constraint mechanism in Chinese securities companies.Its scale,configuration, and the number of independent directors affect the work performanceof the high-level professionals to different degrees.