The Countermeasures Of Rural Environmental Pollution Control Based On Rural Households' Pollutants Discharge

Since the reform and opening up,China's rural economy has achieved remarkable development that draws worldwide attention.However,the situation of rural environment is grim.Due to the lack of disposal systems and public facilities for sewage discharge and garbage collection,non-point source pollution caused by domestic pollution is increasingly becoming serious in the rural area.To effectively tackle non point source pollution in rural China not only meets the need for the overall development of Chinese society,but also contributes to promoting the living quality of rural residents.In recent years,there have been lots of domestic researches conducted on rural environmental pollution.But they mainly focus on agricultural non-point source pollution,while special researches on non-point source pollution caused by sewage and garbage are rare and in a primary stage.Based on the systematic review of relevant theories and research results,this paper starts from presenting the current situation of China's rural environmental pollution and theoretically analyzes the relationship between the total supply under Nash equilibrium(conditions)and the total supply under Pareto optimality(conditions)from the perspective of quantitative economics,and performs an economic analysis of the rural households' pollutants discharge and pollution control participation,and studies rural households' behavior decision-making based on the game model.The paper,based on CVM(Contingent Valuation Method),empirically evaluates the rural households'willingness to pay for living environment pollution control in rural areas in Huzhou,Zhejiang,and analyzes different treatment modes that cover decentralized domestic sewage treatment mode,corporate domestic sewage treatment mode,and collaborative garbage disposal mode from the perspective of technology and policy.What's more,this paper draws lessons from developed countries' experience and learns from their rural environment management policy and technology practice,and puts forward countermeasures to promote and apply pollution treatment technology,improve relevant laws and regulations,strengthen the government's credibility,enhance cooperation in pollution control,etc.Results show that rural environmental pollution is caused by both historical and realistic reasons on the lacks of policies and measures.The improvement of material life has a direct relation with the environmental pollution in rural areas.With other factors remaining unchanged,the contribution ratio of rural households' pollutants discharge to rural environmental pollution in rural area is becoming larger and larger.During the process of rural development,it is impossible to completely prohibit or absolutely avoid environmental pollution.Negative effects such as "broken window effect" lead to further environmental deterioration,while positive factors like conformity effect will bring about comforting results.To deal with the disorder of rural sewage discharge,the rural households should exercise their rights and perform their obligations in pollution control.The control of rural environmental pollution must cover the whole population,the whole area and the whole process,just like"mopping the floor".To improve the quality of rural environment,the government should play a core role.Yet considering cost and efficiency,it also requires the participation of social forces.According to the results of the study on rural environmental pollution based on the game model,to maximize rural households' individual interest will result in rural households' taking the individual optimal strategy instead of collective optimal strategy.They will "thumb a free ride" during the process of pollution control and take an uncooperative attitude in pollution discharge.This is the main cause of rural households' pollutants discharge behaviors under the market mechanism,and is also the reason why it is difficult to improve rural living environment in a short time.The dynamic game between rural households and environmental regulators analysis shows that when the lacks of external oversight,disorderly pollutants discharge behavior of rural households will increase dramatically.Researches have shown that the environmental policies and laws in China do not match with economic and social development.We should actively guide rural households to reduce pollutant discharge with policies,prevent rural households from improper pollutant discharge with laws,and conduct effective pollutant discharge with technology.Empirical evidences of rural households'pollutants discharge in Huzhou show that,with the improvement of living standard in rural areas,rural households'pollutants discharge will continue to grow.Studies have shown that policies and measures will have significant effect on rurl households'behavior.At the same time,rural households' willingness to pay for pollution control is relatively high,which shows the large potential of rural environment pollution control.That will have a positive influence on the government's policy making.Innovation of this paper:First,this paper examines the decision-making behaviors of rural households' pollutants discharge in rural pollution control and empirically assesses rural households' willingness to pay for environment pollution control.Compared with existing researches'main angle of studying agricultural production,this paper's research perspective is innovative.Second,this paper not only analyzes the decision-making behaviors of rural households' pollutants discharge,provides some suggestions on pollution control policy making,but also discusses the application and selection of relevant technology.Compared with existing researches that focus on the terminal control of pollution sources,this paper combines policy and management with technical implementation and carries on a deep research pertaining to the process of rural environment pollution control,to some extent breaking the mold that most current researches are limited in studying mechanism control and technical approaches,therefore being innovative in research content.Third,this paper employs game theory in analyzing rural households'decision-making behaviors of rural non-point source pollution control and the influence mechanism of government intervention based on several theories including environmental economics,agricultural economics and decision-making behavior theory,applies the Binary Logistic Regression model in analyzing the relationships between various factors which affect rural households' social attributes in rural environment pollution control,and uses Contingent Valuation Method to estimate the rural households' willingness to pay for environment improvement,thus being innovative in research method.