Optimization Of Supply Chain Decisions And Coordination Under Rebate Mode

With the speeding up of the product update and the rapid development of e-commerce, marketing has become the Holy Grail for company to survive and win the competition. For the marketing strategy of the modern company, rebate promotion is one of the most widely used and influential promotion tools. Differing from the price discount, rebate promotion requires consumers first to pay full price, and then redeem the crash under certain rules with some time limit. Based on business research and literature review, the dissertation deeply discusses and analyzes the optimization of supply chain decision-making and coordination under rebate mode. First, using the present-biased preference theory to model, this study examines the optimal rebate and pricing strategies for the manufacturer and retailer. Sec-ond, discussing the joint rebate decisions under stochastic demand in supply chains. Third, investigating the supply chain rebate contracts to coordinate the supply chain with risk pref-erence. And finally, a new rebate mode--The third rebate is proposed and studied in the background of the e-commerce era. The innovative work is summarized as follows:Because of the particular feature of the rebate promotion (Buy first, redeem later), by using the present-biased preference theory, under which consumers in the market are di-vided into two groups:naive consumers and sophisticated consumers, and then demand function is modeled for each group. Further, examining the most commonly used rebate mode-manufacturer rebate, the manufacturer's optimal rebate strategy and retailer's opti-mal pricing strategy are derived under a Stackelberg game theory framework.Analyzing the joint rebate decisions under random demand in supply chains, which includes both manufacturer and retailer offering rebates to consumers, only manufacturer offering rebates to consumers and only retailer offering rebates to retailers. Under the joint rebate mode, yielding the manufacturer's best rebate decision and the retailer's best rebate decision and ordering decision on the basis of two common demand functions (Nonlinear demand and linear demand), and also showing the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. By comparison of the different rebate modes, also the impacts on the supply chain members' profits are investigated.Considering the supply chain rebate contracts with risk preference. Manufacturers often use channel rebates to encourage retailers to increase order quantity, and therefore the supply chain contract associated with rebates can be used to coordinate the supply chain. When a manufacturer faces a retailer with risk averse, this study takes Condition Value at Risk (CVaR) as a measurement criterion, examining how to design the proper supply chain rebate contract to coordinate the supply chain. By analyzing the two different types of supply chain rebate and penalty contract (ORP contract by orders or SRP contract by sales), providing proper contract parameters for the coordination of the supply chain, and also making comparisons with the risk-neutral case.With the rapid development of e-commerce, a new rebate mode-the third party rebate is presented and addressed. With the participation of the third party platform, in addition to the online buying, consumers can also purchase products through rebate mode. Based on consumer utility theory, a study on the online retailer's pricing and commission decisions and rebate decisions for the third-party platform are investigated. For the conflict between the two sales modes, an improved revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate the system which results in achieving a win-win situation for the online retailer and the third party rebate platform.