| The exit problem of lease type affordable housing is a worldwide conundrum. In Britain, the national audit committee estimates that there are about 100,000 sets of social housing which is illegally occupied in 2012,and the government pays the annual price at about 9 billion pounds a year for this reason. Chinese government decided to vigorously develop public rental housing at the beginning of 2010. the construction of public rental housing (including low rent housing) had already achieved about 18,000,000 sets as of 2015. But the phenomenon of illegal occupation of public rental housing is very common from place to place, because of the imperfect exit mechanism and the inadequate exit management. From January to March in 2015,the National Audit Office organized all levels audit organs to audit the follow-up management and the related policies implementation of 40,800 units and 299,600 households, found that 23,400 households ,whose income or housing conditions had changed and no longer meet the security conditions, Illegally occupied 15,300 units of affordable housing and got 14,210,000 yuan housing rental subsidies.Many domestic scholars pay attention to the exit problem of public rental housing currently. But on the whole, the existing research is relatively general, and lack of in-depth research and analysis. And because of different social background,also the cause of formation and the ways of governance, existing research in foreign countries cannot describe and solve the problem of exit management of public rental housing in China. Therefore,it requires the indepth analysis of the exit problem of public rental housing in China , in the sense of both practice and theoretical development. This paper divided the exit problem further into the problem of fraud and the problem of nail houses , the former refers to the behaviors of hiding the truth,providing false information, forging proof materials and so on; the latter refers to the behavior of not exiting on time when the tenants’ conditions no longer meet the measures for the management of public rental housing.The main work and conclusion of this paper can be divided into the following four parts:Firstly, analysis of influencing factors of the problem of fraud and the problem of nail houses. This paper takes Hangzhou as an example, and investigated 1,000 tenants by using the combination of online and offline investigation method. Than Statistical analysis of 806 valid questionnaires based on unordered multinomial logistic model.The results show that the effects of current situation cognition of fraud and nail houses, market rent affordability , punishment cognition and audit difficulty cognition are significant. In addition, the elderly really against to exit, they are eager to have a stable life.Secondly, evolutionary game analysis of the problem of nail houses, the problem of nail houses is one of the most difficult problems of much public rental housing management departments currently, because general punishments have no effect at all,the only way to solve the problem is to sue to the court for enforcement. We find through evolutionary game analysis that the government departments should consider the proportion of the nail houses when deciding whether to prosecute, and the tenants will also consider the probability of governments’ prosecution when deciding whether become a nail houses. At last the example analysis shows that if the proportion of the tenants that exit on time is greater than 97.81%, the governments should not prosecute, otherwise the government departments should but only need to prosecute 41.46% of the nail houses, and this ratio will have enough deterrents force to cause the remaining tenants to voluntarily exit.Thirdly, principal-agent analysis of public rental housing fraud. In this paper, the moral hazard model between government departments and public rental managers is constructed based on the parametric method of distribution function, the incentive contract design process is analyzed and the relevant parameters of the optimal linear incentive contract are determined based on the theory of incentive. In our adverse selection model,social services time was chosen as a signal to construct the signal transmission model by reference the research results of Spence M.& Zeckhauser(1971).The result shows that if the public rental housing managers take a certain time of social services as a contract condition, than the tenants whose income reaches a certain level would actively exit public rental housing, because the revenue of hiding personal information will be less than the costs of providing social services.Thus the separating equilibrium is achieved.Fourthly, the construction of flexible exit mechanism of public rental housing.The two main modes of exit management are flexible and rigid, rigid exit mechanism emphasizes on exiting in form, and the flexible exit mechanism emphasizes on exiting in essence. Taken into account the "cold" phenomenon of public rental housing emerged in some areas of China and the needs of some special groups, we built a flexible exit mechanism of public rental housing which including the principle of flexible exiting, the modes of flexible exiting and their applicable conditions based on the systematically summarized the evolution law of the western countries’ exit mechanism.Compared with the existing literatures,this paper’s major contributions are as follows.Firstly,confirmed the main factors which affecting the tenants’ fraud or nail houses based on the unordered multinomial logistic model and the surveyed data.Existing researches haven’t further breakdown of exit problems, this paper divided the exit problem into two specific issues of fraud and nail houses, and empirical analysis of the influencing Factors of this two problems based on the unordered multinomial logistic model and the questionnaire data. In addition, the dependent variable of the existing research only has two options, exit or not, but we found through trial investigation that a large proportion of the tenants would choose according to the actual punishment taken by the governments to the illegal occupation, so the dependent variable is considered three options in this paper.Secondly, studied on the problem of nail houses in public rental housing from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Literature reviews found that some scholars have begun to study the exit problem of public rental housing by using of game tools,but most of which is classic game theory, only a few scholars such as Ai Jianguo(2012) try to use the evolution game theory. Inspired by this article, we constructed an evolutionary game model for the problem of nail houses, and made en example analysis based on the data collected from the public rental housing project of "Lan Qiao Ming Yuan "in Hangzhou City. The evolutionary game analysis provides the basis for government departments to determine the best timing and proportion of prosecution.Thirdly, studied on the problem of public rental housing fraud from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The existing research generally considered the government departments and public rental housing manager as the same subject, So rarely consider the incentive problem of public rental housing managers themselves.But we found through the surveys that there exists the problem of formalization during revenue audits in the management of public rental housing, and some managers allow the nail houses to continue living. Therefore, this article believes that the public rental housing managers are only the agent of the government, and moral hazard problems may exist , so we constructed a moral hazard model between government departments and public rental housing managers. In addition, in order to solve the problem of asymmetric information between public rental housing managers and the tenants, we built an adverse selection which chose social service time as the signal. The research results provide the basis for the government departments to design incentive contracts, and also provide new ideas for public rental housing managers in fraud management.This paper’s main results have application value in policy making and daily exit management of public rental housing, the main policy suggestions include: first,prosecute the nail houses should grasp accurate timing and determine the reasonable proportion; second, should pay attention to supervise and motivate of the public rental housing managers; third, social services can be considered as a condition to apply for public rental housing, or giving priority to the applicants who provide more social services time in the same conditions; fourth, should complement and improve the flexible exit mechanism based on the supply and demand situation of public rental housing, and should pay special attention to exit modes of the elderly and other special groups. |
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