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Research On The Mechanism Of Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard In The Process Of Precise Poverty Alleviation And Avoidance Measures

Posted on:2020-02-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q Y LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330572973865Subject:Labor economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the implementation of the Precise Poverty Alleviation Strategy,China's antipoverty work has made major breakthroughs.However,when the top-down precise poverty alleviation dominated by government is in practice,on the one hand,it is subject to the complexity,arduousness and urgency of anti-poverty issues.On the other hand,it is also troubled by such problems as adverse selection and moral hazard in the case of asymmetric information,multi-layer principal-agent process,which affect the efficiency of precise poverty alleviation and the process of winning the fight against poverty.This paper first explores the framework and operation mechanism of precise poverty alleviation,in order to reveal the theoretical and realistic basis of adverse selection and moral hazard,that is,the information asymmetry,the incompatibility of incentives and the asymmetry of powers and responsibilities in the process of precise poverty alleviation.Secondly,based on game theory,this paper studies the formation mechanism of adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of precise poverty alleviation by constructing the mathematical models such as signaling model and nested three-layer principal-agent model,while the main manifestations of adverse selection and moral hazard are poor households identification bias and project targeting bias respectively.Thirdly,based on the survey data of poor villages in Gansu province,this paper makes an empirical study on the adverse selection and moral hazard in precise poverty alleviation by constructing Logit model and project targeting bias model,and tests its influence on the implementation effect of precise poverty alleviation policy.The empirical results show that the poor households identification bias rate is 26.8%,the project targeting bias rate is 40.45%,and the degree of mass capture is 0.45,the degree of elite capture is 0.16,and the mismatch degree of poor households to household resources is 0.07.Finally,based on the mechanism design theory,from the perspective of incentive compatibility,explore risk aversion and mechanism optimization measures in the process of precise poverty alleviation from five aspects,namely,incentive goals,information sharing mechanism,supervision mechanism,employment incentive mechanism and long-term incentive mechanism.
Keywords/Search Tags:precise poverty alleviation, information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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