Research On The Credit Governance Of Supervision Engineers Based On Incentive Theory

In recent years,with rapid development of construction industry,many problems gradually come out.Such us disordered construction market credit order,weak credit consciousness of the market main body,bad credit environment and so on,that result in the decrease of the whole social resource use efficiency.The supervisory engineer is one of the significant participants in construction market,whose professional level directly determines the construction quality and safety.Therefore,it is important to explore how to restrain the market behavior of supervision engineer and build effective credit management system.The study focuses on the supervisory engineer credit,aiming at the incomplete credit system and the low supervision efficiency,using interval intuitionistic fuzzy set,fuzzy preference language,principal-agent model,game theory and psychological contract.It combines explicit incentive and implicit incentive to governance credit of the supervisory engineer from the perspective of long-term and short-time.(1)Considering different weights of the stakeholders,the study introduces interval intuitionistic fuzzy set and 2-tuple linguistic to build the credit evaluation model.The results show that it can well reflect the degree of variance among the credit index information and effectively avoid the deviation cased by the inherent subjectivity of the stakeholders.Using context-free grammar to rich 2-tuple linguistic evaluation set,it fully embodies the characteristics of 2-tuple linguistic,which is closer to the thinking process of experts and natural language expression.(2)From the perspective of long-term credit governance,multi-task coordination equilibrium incentive model is built between the owner and supervising engineer using static game.The results show that incentive intensity is affected by the degree of risk aversion,the significant measure of effort,the marginal cost and credit preference.Others,building the tripartite game model of the owner,supervision engineer and contractor,the analysis results show that whether the supervisory engineer keep faith or not is related to the supervision cost,the supervise probability and the penalty of the owner.(3)Consider fairness preference to build the optimal risk-sharing and incentive contract model between the owner and the supervisor,which studies the effect on the risk-sharing and incentive contract of the fairness preference and credit preference while the supervisor undertakes various tasks.The results indicate that the risk-sharing is positively associated with the fairness preference,negatively with the credit preference.If keeping fairness preference and credit preference moderately balanced,the owner provides fixed salary contract for the supervisor that Pareto optimality can be reached.(4)Building the structural equation model of psychological contract and credit behavior though empirical study,the study governances the credit of supervising engineer in the long term from the perspective of implicit contracts.The results show that psychological contract,organizational commitment and organizational justice are indirectly affected supervising engineer's credit behavior though job satisfaction.Job satisfaction has a positive significant influence on credit behavior of supervision engineer.