The Study Of Fiscal Incentive System Of Effective Supply Of Rural Public Goods

There are all sorts of problems,such as insufficient supply,supply structural unbalance and mismatching between supply and demand.Solving these problems,the central government issued “The Comprehensive Implementation Plan for Deepening Rural Reform” in November;2015.The plan has done the top-down design for effective supply of rural public goods,in order that supply institution of basic public service would be promoted widely between rural and urban areas.“Public finance is foundation and important backbone of national governance.” The corresponding policy-making and institutional design have profound influence on effective supply of rural public goods.Since rural tax-fee reform,with institution innovation and reform of the dividend,the government has formulated and implemented a series of fiscal policies for supporting rural areas in rural public goods supply,in order that farmers could enjoy the fruits of reform and development.In rural public goods supply,however,the dynamic changes of the economic environment and the institutional environment will affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy tools.Especially,the dynamic changes of the external environment,such as the marketization and urbanization,are speeding up the outflow of rural labor,capital and land resources,and fiscal expenditure has been bringing "blood transfusion" to rural public goods in lack of “hematopoietic system design”.The lack of fiscal incentives caused weak sustainability,which has weakened supply efficiency of rural public goods.It is very important that the government will build a long-term mechanism of sustainable fiscal incentives.Reasonable financial institutional arrangement can activate multiple subjects and improve the supply efficiency of rural public goods,which also meets the objective requirement of the reform of "supply side".In this paper,on the basis of existing researches,the author has used the theories of fiscal decentralization,game theory,information economics and performance evaluation,who have taken fiscal incentive system in effective supply of rural public goods as the research subject.The author has explored the deep reason of supply inefficiency of China's rural public goods,and has studied incentive effect and action mechanism of fiscal policy tools in rural public goods supply,respectively from three aspects of decision-making mechanism,cooperation mechanism and performance evaluation mechanism.In the end,the author has come to the conclusion and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.In this paper,the main content and the chapters are arranged as following:The first part contains first,second and third chapter.The first chapter mainly elaborates research background and significance of the thesis,relevant literature review at home and abroad,the paper's main research contents,research methods and the definition of standards on effective supply of rural public goods;The second chapter mainly summarizes the theoretical basis of the evolution game,information economics,fiscal decentralization and performance evaluation,and it also expounds the relevance between the theoretical basis and my research;The third chapter mainly analyzes the present situation and problems of rural public goods supply in our country,and explores the deep reason of supply inefficiency of China's rural public goods,and fiscal policy tools of rural public goods supply have been briefly described.The second part includes the fourth chapter.Firstly we analyze two decision-making mechanisms of China's rural public goods supply—top-down supply-oriented decision-making mechanism and bottom-up decision-making mechanism of demand expression,and the problems existing in the process of interaction between two mechanisms have been studied.We deconstruct the bottom-up mechanism of demand expression.Taking government subsidies and reward of “one case one meeting” for instance,we use three theoretical models of indirect evolution,yardstick competition and ranking tournaments,and analyze the incentive effect and function mechanism on micro-subjects of government subsidies and reward of “one case one meeting”.In the end,we provide a theoretical analysis framework of the effectiveness of fiscal incentive mechanism in rural public goods supply.The third part contains chapter 5.It studied cooperation mechanism of multiple subjects,and firstly proposes four main theoretical hypothesis that fiscal incentives can promote the government through Chinese fiscal decentralization,fiscal management system reform and special fund in project scheme.It takes generalized space two-stage least squares method(GS2SLS)model for empirical test.Secondly,it analyzes motivation and benefits of market subjects in PPP;thirdly,the intrinsic motivation of social organizations to participate in the supply of rural public goods is studied.In the end,with revenue sharing mechanism theory,it also analyzes feasibility of multiple subject cooperation.The fourth part includes the sixth chapter.The sixth chapter mainly studies the performance evaluation mechanism of rural public goods supply,firstly the author analyzes the introduction of performance evaluation in rural public goods supply,and then according to the principles of science and rationality,the author builds comprehensive performance index system of rural public goods supply,according to the second part and the third part,the author adds rural residents participation,the degree of democratic in decision-making and farmers' satisfaction index to the index system,and introduces the cooperation supply index according to the correlation criterion;and in order to more comprehensive and objective evaluation of performance,the author have empirical analysis on the efficiency of rural public goods supply in our country with three-stage DEA and super-efficiency DEA model;in the end,the author put forward the mechanism design in government transfer based on the comprehensive performance of rural public product.The fifth part includes chapter 7.This paper respectively summarizes the main research conclusion the three mechanisms,and proposes policy recommendations,and reform measures of supporting system are put forward in the end.The innovation point of this essay is1,The author uses indirect evolution model to study government subsidies and reward of incentive effects on farmers' collective cooperation of public goods supply,and studies evolutionary stable equilibrium of farmer's collective cooperation with “replicator dynamics”;with “yardstick competition” model and ranking-order tournament model,the author also studied the mechanism in which government subsidies and reward motivate “up-responsible” and “bottom-responsible” behaviors of village cadres.The author relatively completely explains incentive effect of fiscal policy tools in the mechanism of demand expression of rural public goods supply.2,Based on the theoretical analysis of the Chinese fiscal decentralization,fiscal management system reform and special fund in project scheme,the author studies the influence of them on rural public goods supply,and use generalized space two-stage least squares method(GS2SLS)model to test four theoretical assumptions in this paper;3,The author empirically analyze supply efficiency of rural public goods,and firstly the author adopts the two-step method(Spearman inspection + the method by Pastor)to screen input and output index system of rural public goods,and then uses the three-stage DEA and super-efficiency DEA model to eliminate the significant influence to the efficiency by external environment and random disturbance,with which more comprehensive and accurate evaluation of supply efficiency of rural public goods is calculated.