| As an important part of China's forest resources,collective forests are directly related to the growth of forest resources and the increase of farmers' income.It is the entry point for realizing China's international commitment to carbon dioxide emissions and forest reserves in 2030.However,since the reform and opening up,the multiple changes of collective forest tenure system in China have made the property right and responsibility unclear,resulting in long-term problems of poor forest quality and low production level of collective forest.In order to solve the problem of property rights relations in the development of collective forests,China launched a new round of collective forest tenure reform in 2003.The main tasks are to “clear the property rights,issue the licenses,liberalize the management,implement disposal rights,insure the income rights,and implement the responsibility”,fully implemented the contracted management of the collective forest by the farmers,and made the farmers become the main business entities of the collective forest.Under the background of the new round of reform,the various management behaviors of farmers in forestry management have become the focus of the theoretical and practical sessions.Although this reform has given farmers a relatively complete collective forest property right and achieved initial reform results,its advancement also faces some practical problems.On the one hand,the existence of multiple property rights models in real life makes the implementation of property policies in different regions significantly different,resulting in the collective forest property rights held by farmers are not exactly the same as the policy expectations.On the other hand,farmers still manage the forestland extensively and are unwilling to participate in the forestland transfer after the reform.The collective forest property rights have not changed much in the enthusiasm of the farmers' forestry production and management,and the collective forest management performance needs to be improved.Under the current institutional arrangements,how to effectively encourage farmers to make various behavioral decisions in forestry management has become the key to improving the collective forest management performance,and it is also a realistic problem that needs to be solved to deepen the collective forest tenure reform.According to the property right theory,property rights play their role by influencing people's goals and behaviors,that is,collective forest property rights directly affect farmers' behavioral decisions in forestry operations,and thus determine the forestland management performance.Therefore,it is necessary to explore how the collective forest property rights affect the farmers' management behaviors and the forestland management performance.The research has the significance meanings for improving the collective forest tenure reform,enhancing collective forest management performance and promoting the sustainable development of collective forests.Based on property right theory,institutional change theory and farmers' behavior decision theory,this paper constructs a theoretical analysis framework.On the basis of reviewing and summarizing the evolution process of collective forest tenure system in China,this paper uses the survey data of 536 bamboo forest growers in Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces to analyze the current management behavior of farmers under the new round of collective forest tenure reform.Furthermore,this paper uses the Double-Hurdle model to explore the impact of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestland investment behavior.The binary Logit model and Tobit model used to analyze the impact of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestland transfer behavior.The Heckman model used to study the impact of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestry labor allocation behavior.Then through the investment incentives,forestland allocation and labor allocation played by property rights,this paper uses the multiple linear regression model,the mediation effect test model,the SFA model and the Tobit model to test the relationship between the collective forest property rights and the forestland management performance.Finally,the paper put forward the policy recommendations to improve the collective forest tenure reform and improve the collective forest management performance.The main conclusions are as follows: First,under the reform,farmers have a low level of understanding of the reform plan of the collective forest tenure system in their villages,but most farmers believe that the reform has a positive impact on their own families.Among the property rights,the farmers' awareness of tenure security and transfer rights are higher,but the level of cognition of mortgage rights is lower.After the reform,the forestry investment level of farmers is still not high,and the production mode is still relatively extensive.The investment levels of different production links are ranked as follows: logging input > weeding input > fertilizing input.As for the forestland transfer,the incidence of forestland transfer is quite low,and the weak nature of forestry production makes farmers less willing to transfer in forestland.As for the labor allocation,the overall labor allocation of farmers is lower after the reform,and the number of laborers engaged in forestry production is particularly small.In addition,farmers' perceptions and economic behaviors vary widely between provinces.Second,by studying the impact of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestland investment behavior,it can be found that there are differences in the impact of farmers' different production links.In addition to the weeding section,tenure security can promote the weeding probability,and transfer rights and mortgage rights have no effect on the probability of weeding.Transfer rights help to improve the weeding input,but tenure security and mortgage rights have no significant effect on it.In terms of fertilizing section,tenure security can increase the input in fertilization,while transfer rights and mortgage rights have no impact on the fertilization input.In the aspect of logging section,tenure security increases the probability of farmers logging bamboo forests,but mortgage rights significantly reduce the logging probability,and transfer rights have no effect.Tenure security and transfer rights are also conducive to raising the level of logging input,and mortgage rights have no significant effect.Third,by analyzing the influence of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestland transfer behavior,it can be concluded that tenure security is not the main factor affecting farmers' participation in forestland transfer,wihle transfer rights and mortgage rights will help increase the possibility of farmers participating in forestland transfer.At the same time,tenure security is also not the key factor affecting the probability and scale of farmers transferring out forestland,but transfer rights and mortgage rights can promote the probability and scale of farmers transferring out forestland.Fourth,by exploring the impact of collective forest property rights on farmers' forestry labor allocation behavior,it can be found that tenure security and transfer rights do not significantly affect whether farmers participate in forestry labor,and mortgage rights have an incentive effect on the probability of farmers participating in forestry labor.Tenure security and mortgage rights have not had a significant impact on the proportion and supply time of forestry labor,but transfer rights have a significant inhibitory effect on the proportion and supply time of forestry labor.Finally,this paper uses the farmers' data which has bamboo output to verify the relationship between collective forest property rights and forestland management performance.The results indicate that: on the one hand,in terms of forestland output,tenure security help to increase the output level of farmers' forestland.Transfer rights also have a significant effect on the farmer's forest output,while mortgage rights does not significantly affect forest output.The mediation effect analysis found that tenure security is to increase forestland output through the indirect effect of forestland investment,while transfer rights increase forestland output through the indirect effects of forestland investment and non-agricultural labor.Although mortgage rights does not directly affect forest output,it has an impact on forest output through the indirect effect of non-agricultural labor,but the impact is small.On the other hand,the average production efficiency of forestland is 0.5942,and the output elasticity of labor input,capital investment and bamboo forest area were 0.4220,-0.1691 and 0.4792 respectively.In the collective forest property rights,tenure security can significantly improve forestland production efficiency,while transfer rights and mortgage rights have no obvious effect on the production efficiency of farmers' forestland. |
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