| In the past 40 years of reform and opening up,China has completed the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy.Decentralization reform and opening up to the outside world have greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of local governments to develop the economy,and injected vitality to the sustained and rapid development of China's economy.As an economy with a vast territory and huge regional differences,coordinating the development of regional economy and establishing a unified domestic market,and effectively allocating resources,is an effective way to promote the long-term development with the domestic scale economies effect.However,in the process of rapid development,the power of local government has been continuously strengthened.Under the impetus of decentralization reform,the local governments have strengthened the protection of the local economy for their own economic development,leading to the formation of the long-standing market segmentation phenomenon.However,neither the decentralization reform nor opening up,are not necessarily enable local governments to implement market segmentation.They just provide a feasible "soil" for the local government to implement market segmentation.The capacity of the local government to implement market segmentationa is more likely restricted by the legal system.Only in the imperfect legal system with a low cost of punishment,the local government is likely to implement the policy of market segmentation.Therefore,from the point of view of the legal system,the unclear regulation of the market and the judicial independence may be the deep-seated reasons for the local government to implement the local protection policy.The existence of judicial administrativization leads to the excessive exertion of administrative power and the intervention of local economic development,resulting in different levels of market segmentation.Market segmentation will distort the operation mechanism of the economy,lead to the failure of the market signal and the mismatch of social resources,disturb the macroeconomic stability,and then increase the regional economic gap.Recently,there are more and more research on the segmentation problem,but in the existing relevant research literature,systematic researches on the regional economic development from the perspective of law and economics are still quite scarce,lacking a relatively clear and complete theoretical framework for legal research about China regional economic development.Based on China's judicial practice data from the website of Openlaw about the first instance judgment of contractual dispute cases in the four municipalities in 2014,we classify the litigants to the in-system and the outside-system according to their intimacy with the government and distinguish the domicile of litigants and their lawyers,studying the influence of the litigants resources on the judgment to determine whether exist the phenomenon of judicial administrativization.The results show that the litigants in-system are able to win more significantly than the litigants outside-system due to the advantageous resource from the regime.Based on the geographical advantage,participants in litigation are able to approach the heart of local regime to get the resources related with the litigation by lower cost,making local plaintiffs get significantly higher win rate and local lawyers significantly improve their litigations' win rate in judicial judgment.To a certain extent,the empirical results verify the theoretical judgment about the existence of judicial administrativization in China.From the point of view of judicial administrativization,this paper constructs a model of an intertemporal cooperation selection from local government with different degree of judicial administrativization.It is found that the difference of the technical environment and the legal environment determined by the different degree of judicial administrativization are the decisive factors of the market segmentation.Whether the human capital accumulation effect of the segmented market can make up for the loss of the cooperative income or not,the region with higher degree of judicial administrativization has the motive to segment the market.Moreover,the higher the degree of market incompleteness is(i.e.the larger the risk cost and the transaction cost is),the bigger the two areas' initial level of technology and technological progress speed gap are,so the local governmen with higher degree of judicial administrativization has stronger motivation to segment the market.For the region with higher degree of judicial administrativization,regardless of whether the comparative advantage is reversed,the market segmentation is a rational choice.However,if they want to realize the increase of the total utility through the reversal of the comparative advantage,they must improve their technical level and legal environment.But the initial level of technology is usually relevant with the geographical location and natural resources endowment,which are usually not able to be changed.Moreover,the theorical model also shows that the technical level of the change makes little distribution to improve product market share.To improve the speed of technological progress is the key to change the segmentation of the market.What's more,the speed of technological progress depends on the legal environment in a large extent.So it is easier to promote technological progress if the legal environment is more perfect,the degree of judicial administrativization is lower,and the protection of property rights and contracts is more powerful.The theoretical analysis needs to be verified by empirical research.This paper selects the price index method which is universal choosed,with a relatively comprehensive coverage of 13 kinds of commodity price index.We not only calculate the relative price variance between a province(city,district)and its adjacent areas,but also calculate the relative price variance among the provinces in all other regions.The geographically weighted market segmentation index which eliminates the transport costs is slightly less than the simple arithmetic average of the market segmentation index,but their overall trend is the same.The degree of market segmentation from 2003 to 2005 in China experienced a rapid decline after the small increase,and fell again after the rise to a new heights in the period from 2008 to 2010.Then,we collect the information of the litigants from the first instance judgment of contractual dispute cases in various provinces,and calculate the judgement ratios of the litigants within and outside the system.We use the ratio between the two kinds of litigants to measure the degree of their judicial administrative from the perspective of judicial entity,and study the relationship between judicial administrativization and regional market segmentation.The results show that,on the national level,the degree of judicial administrativization has a positive impact on the degree of market segmentation.And there are two kinds of mechanisms of the effect of on market segmentation.On the one hand,the higher the degree of judicial administrativization is,the more serious the degree of market segmentation is.On the other hand,judicial administrativization has interaction impact on market segmentation with the initial level of technology and the technical progress.Namely,on the condition that the degree of judicial administrativization is given,the initial level of technology and the speed of technological progress relieve the impact on market segmentation induced by judicial administrativization in a certain extent.The empirical result also shows that the interaction impact from the speed of technological progress is stronger.In addition,from the perspective of judicial procedure,we use judicial transparency and administrative transparency as indirect indicators of judicial administrativization,studying the relationship between judicial administrativization and regional market segmentation with fixed effect model.The results show that the factors which influence market segmentation have great differences in different regions.Judicial administrativization significantly affects market segmentation only in the western region.In the eastern region,market segmentation is significantly affected by the level of opening up,government consumption,trade barriers.In the central region,market segmentation is significantly affected by the level of the marketization and the speed of technical progress.Finally,using the judgement ratio between the litigants within and outside the system as an indicator of local judicial administrative level,we empirical analysize the relationship between judicial administrativization and regional economic growth from the perspective of judicial entity.The empirical results suggest that nationwide,judicial administrativization shows U-shaped relationship with economic growth,that is when the judicial administrativization is at a high level,to improve the the degree of judicial administrativization will be conducive to local economic growth,while the judicial administrative level is less than a critical value,to reduce the degree of judicial administrativization will be conducive to local economic growth.In addition,from the perspective of judicial procedure,we use judicial transparency and administrative transparency as indirect indicators of judicial administrativization,studying the relationship between judicial administrativization and economic growth.In addition to the direct impact on economic growth,the results also show that judicial administrativization and market segmentation interactionally affect economic growth.Regionally,the impact on economic growth made by judicial administrativization still shows U-shaped relationship in the middle and western regions.In the eastern region,the effect showed only a linear relationship.And in the eastern and middle regions,judicial administrativization and market segmentation still take interactive impact on economic growth.But in the western region,the two variables separately affect economic growth.The main innovations of this paper have the following three aspects:firstly,there are many researches about market segmentation and China's regional economic development,but few scholars studied from the perspective of legal system.In this paper,we have systematically studied the relationship among judicial administrativization,market segmentation and regional economic development from the perspective of judicial administrativization,using the mathematical modeling and quantitative regression analysis method.Secondly,the scholars usually analysize the issue of China's judicial administrativization theoretically from the perspective of institutional arrangements.There is no any indicator reflecting the degree of judicial administrativization,and there also lack relevant empirical research.Using the micro data from Chinese judicial practice,we have calculated the judgement ratio between the litigants within and outside system from different regions as an indicator of judicial administrativization.At the same time,we have empirically verified the theoretical judgment about the existence of judicial administrativization in china with the data of China's judicial practice.Thirdly,we have introduced the judicial administrativization and market segmentation into the economic growth model,and empirically studied the role of the two variables played in the regional economic development.Of course,limited by the capacity of the author,there are still some deficiencies when we construct the indicator of judicial administrativization and deal with the endogeneity of the variable. |
PDF Full Text Request