Research On Return Of Control Power,Administrative Intervention And Corruption Of Executive In State-owned Enterprises

In recent years,corruption of executive in SOEs has become an inevitable social problem,therefore,the executive power of SOEs has become a hot topic in the discussion of society,and it has become the key factor in the corruption of SOEs.The paper holds that,on the one hand,executive in SOEs possess absolute control power of enterprises,and it's a very common fact in China,and most of SOEs evolve to be “enterprises controlled by executive” during further expansion process.“Power leads to corruption and absolute power results in absolute corruption”.A kind of dissimilation mechanism exists inherently in power and it accelerates the tendency to corruption.On the other hand,power is an important incentive factor and control power plays a crucial role in incentive contract of modern enterprise managers.As a kind of incentive mechanism,return of control power has particular incentive function during reform course of SOEs.Market-oriented reform since 1970 s starts along the path of decentralizing power and transferring profits,and it's constantly enhanced,The state delegates power to enterprises to make them manage independently and entrepreneurs make own decisions,which is undoubted fully releasing entrepreneurship.As a result,creation significance of control power for entrepreneurship rent in SOEs can't be weakened when condemning the power of executives.Academically,research on corruption problem of executive in SOEs can be traced to why executive in SOEs exceed own power boundary to grab private interests and pursue power as ultimate goal regardless of violating law and discipline? As a kind of system,what's inherent incentive functions is? Why return of power for entrepreneurs in SOEs distort? The corruption of some executive in enterprises involves a large amount of money and people,so it can be judged that large system loophole exists in current management system of SOEs.System decides behavior selection of executives,namely corruption or integrity.System also decides potential entrepreneurial behavior,namely rent seeking or innovation.The specific research of this paper mainly includes follow chapters:The chapter 1 is introduction.Based on current situation of corruption of executive in SOEs,this chapter proposes research questions,objective and significance,makes explicit main idea and core contents of research,determines analytical framework,corresponding research methods,technical route and innovation points,and defines core concepts of paper.The chapter 2 includes related theories and literature review.This chapter collates and reviews representative literature and related theories involved in research.By classifying related theories,this paper makes clear the latest research progress of current corruption of executive,the return of control rights,the institutional environment of entrepreneurship and so on,then it combs,establishes the connection,shortcomings,limitation and so on to establish the theoretical basis for this topic,but also to lay a solid theoretical basis for the follow-up study.The chapter 3 are system background and formation mechanism for the generation of control power of executive in SOEs.This chapter clarifies evolution process and formation mechanism of control power of executive under system background,makes explicit the important role of control power of executive for incentive contract of domestic enterprises by government as a kind of system arrangement.However,due to endogenous defect of shareholding structure,widespread centralized management culture,imperfect monitoring mechanism,tolerant and acquiescent attitude of government towards executive in SOEs for a long time,generalization and extensification tendency of executive's control power are fostered.The chapter 4 is incentive paradox analysis of entrepreneurs under return of control power in SOEs.Firstly,improper market-oriented reform,thinking set and convention formed by original role lead to serious deviation between actual role(entrepreneur)and nominal role(official)of executive in SOEs,subject of control power,and entrepreneurship is suppressed.Secondly,this chapter also studies characteristics,reasons and manifestations of return mechanism of control power of executive in SOEs,and conducts economic deduction.The chapter 5 is empirical research design.This chapter strives to make researched questions dominant and quantitative,thus conducting normative empirical research.It constructs theoretical model of research,transforms that distortion mechanism of return of control power of executive results in corruption in SOEs into relationship among four variables,and proposes related research hypothesis on this basis.And the variables and data involved in the empirical model are designed and explained in detail.The chapter 6 are empirical results and analysis.Firstly,This chapter makes in-depth exploration about the influence relation among control power of executive,administrative intervention and corruption of executive.According to empirical results,the greater control power of executive,the greater possibility of corrupt behavior of executive in SOEs.Administrative intervention has positive regulating effect on control power and corruption of executive,but positive regulating effect weakens after anti-corruption.Secondly,this chapter further analyzes influence of control power of executive and administrative intervention on entrepreneurship.The empirical results show that control power of executive is negatively correlated to entrepreneurship and that incentive function of entrepreneurs doesn't work.Before anti-corruption,administrative intervention intensifies this negative correlation to some extent.After anti-corruption,the situation changes and certain positive correlation exists between control power of executive and entrepreneurship.However,administrative intervention has negative regulating effect on control power of executive and entrepreneurship.The chapter 7 are policy suggestions.This chapter proposes related countermeasures and suggestions for corruption governance of executive in SOEs and reconstruction of entrepreneurship.The chapter 8 are research conclusions,limitations and future prospects.This chapter firstly summarizes theoretical and empirical conclusions.Then,aiming at existing limitations of research and future research direction,this chapter presents some ideas and expectations of author.The paper takes the return on control as a clue and analyzes the mechanism of action between the control right of senior executives and corruption in SOEs,which trying to uncovers the black box that power(control power)triggers corruption,and reveals system inducement behind power-abuse corruption of executive in SOEs.In this paper,the analysis of corruption of executive in SOEs is not only limited to influence of control power on corruption of executive,but extended dissimilation problem of entrepreneurs(absence of entrepreneurs),subjects of control power in SOEs,and incentive paradox of entrepreneurs caused by distorted return mechanism of control power under administrative intervention.Additionally,the paper not only makes detailed and rigorous logic deduction in theory,but also makes normative empirical research.