Study On Interest Coordination For Franchise Construction Project Based On Bounded Rationality

Based on the real implementation for the franchise construction project,this thesis used many theories and methods such as Project Management,Project Investment,Financing Theory,Game Theory,Information Economics,Mathematical Statistics et al.,to study the coordination of the participants in view of bounded rationality.Through the summarization for the franchise construction project,the thesis firstly discussed the project's participants and their complicated conflicts.According to the characteristics of franchise construction project,this thesis analyzed the difficulty in conflicts coordination.To solve this problem,not only the contractual system but also the behavioral variables of the decision maker should be considered in the model.Next,this thesis sketched the Bounded Rationality Theory's development.And the influence factors of behavior in decision procedure were summarized.From the intrinsic and external factors,this thesis analyzed the bounded rationality's influences to decision making,and listed some important bounded rationality phenomenon in franchise construction project decision making process.Firstly,this thesis discussed the conflict between the government's concession period and the private investment.A new decision making method had been studied on the concession term for BOT projects based on an assumption that the project company is risk averse or loss averse decision-maker,and government is risk neutral.On the basis of Stackelberg game model,the optimal solution was derived through numerical examples.The solution showed that if the government ignores the risk attitude of project company,the company will not achieve its opportunity utility.Secondly,this thesis established mathematical models to analyze the equity allocation problem of PPP projects through a comparison of the models with and without the effects of the theory of "contracts as reference points." Some important conclusions from the optimal solution of the investment ratio were derived.Thirdly,this thesis introduced the overconfidence,the dismissal compensation and into the construction period incentive model of BOT project.Under the assumption that the general contractor is overconfident and the project company may default,the effect of overconfidence on the effort level and incentive coefficient were analyzed through mathematic model,with the influence of dismissal compensation on default probability.By comparing the result with former literature,this thesis found that the different mathematic description of overconfidence may get the different conclusion.And the dismissal compensation can inhibit the project company's default risk.Finally,based on empirical analysis method,this thesis discussed the main officers in government's decision making in franchise construction program.Based on the ambivalence,the officers may transfer the risk to private investor,because of the pressures from many respects.This thesis proved this conclusion,and found out several influence factors.