Study On Interests Coordinaion Mechanism For BOT Project Participants Based On Game Model

Based on the real implementation procedure for the large-scale infrastructure project with the BOT scheme, this paper uses many theories and methods such as Project Management, Project Investment and Financing Theory, System Theory, Game Theory, Decision Theory and Information Economics, to study the interests coordination mechanism between the participants in the BOT project from the principal agent.Through the summarization for the project financing and BOT scheme, the paper firstly discusses the project's participants with the complicated contracts, which suggests a BOT project's contractual system with the project company in the center be proposed from the system theory. And then the principal agent relationship in the BOT project's contractual system is analyzed to point out the incentive mechanism that can efficiently coordinate the conflict between the BOT project's participants should be designed from the contract.Next, the paper mainly analyzes the potential conflict between the participants in the BOT project's biding, negotiating, financing and building, and then further explores the relevant incentive coordination mechanism based on the game model from the participants'contractual coordination.(1) Under the fact that the investment consortium's private information such as the operating and managing ability is unknown to the government, a direct two-dimensional auction mechanism model on the investment and concession term for BOT project is proposed by the mechanism design theory. The BOT project's direct auction contract's optimal form and corresponding distribution program are obtained through the analysis of model.(2) The conflict between the government's concession period and the private investment is discussed. To encourage the private sector to make the construction investment as much as possible, thus an incentive concession scheme is considered. Based on the incentive idea of the Stackelberg game, it is necessary for the government to determine a BOT project's profitable period according to the construction cost and transfer one part of a profitable period as a concession period to the private investor. Therefore, a Stackelberg game model is proposed between the public and private sector. By solving the model, the government's optimal incentive decision and the private optimal investment strategy are respectively obtained.(3) An optimal capital decision-making model on the debt-equity allocation is proposed based on the game model between the creditor and the project company under the limited recourse financing for the BOT project. In the model, the creditor and the project company respectively do investment in BOT project according to CAPM, and their strategies of investment are in conflict with each other. Based on the model, the existence and properties of their optimal strategies are studied by the game theory. The researching results show that the project company's final repay under the maximization of its expected profit not only is not more than the project's maximal repay ability but also can make the creditor's expected profit equal to its required revenue in the contract, which contributes to coordinate their interests conflict and realize their cooperation.(4) In view of the relationship between BOT project's construction and operation in a fixed concession period, it is considered that the project company grants a BOT project to the general contractor through an incentive duration contract. Based on the fact that the contractor's working efficiency can't be observed in the construction, a principal-agent model with the project company as the leader and the contractor as the follower is proposed. By the solution of model, the optimal form of incentive contract is respectively studied under the contractor's observable and unobservable working efficiency. The results show that the optimal contract can make the contractor complete the project construction in time to achieve the double win when the project's future revenue is large enough.In sum, some interests coordination schemes based on the game model are studied to coordinate the conflict between the participants such as the government, private investor, project company, debt consortium, construction contractor in the BOT project, which provides the important theoretical support for the implementation and management of BOT project.