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Systems Analysis And Decision Making On The Patent-backed Loans

Posted on:2014-09-29Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:K QianFull Text:PDF
GTID:1369330482951778Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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In knowledge-based economy,intellectual capital which is now gradually replacing the physical capital,financial capital and it has become a major force in the development of economy.The use of patent as a financial guarantee for loans(Patent-backed loans)is an innovative approach which transforms "intellectual property" into "capital".According to the data,in spite of the supporting policies launched by the government,the banks are more or less reluctant to offer patent-backed loans.The existing literature research in this area is still in qualitative analyses phrase which lacking systematic analysis and empirical research.This paper attempts to focus on four aspects involving in financial systematic risk factors analysis,evolutionary game analysis,the bank's credit risk contract designing and the valuation of patent based on the scenario of patent-backed loans.The goal of the study is to provide corresponding suggestion to the different decision-making bodies,the main conclusion of this paper can be summarized as follows:Based on empirical research,firstly this paper constructed a credit risk factoring model based on structure equation model.Through several correcting steps,this paper obtained the key patent pledge risk factors in which the enterprise risk factor and appraisal risk factor have directly impact on the credit risk factor and the latter is more significant factor of both,indicating that fairness and precise of patent asset valuation conclusions is subject to certain question.In the mean while,the patent trading is affected by the constraints of reality.In this paper,replacing risks is the significant exogenous factor which affects the enterprise risk and appraisal risk,also this paper found that replacing risk is significantly associated with the bank loan management risk which gives that indirect explanation the short credit cycle of patent-backed loans.Because of the fact of asymmetric information environment between banks and enterprises,it is important to strengthen financial security.In "natural" conditions,the evolutionary game trend between banks and enterprises is constrained by initial conditions as well as the various key parameters in the payoff decision matrix.Due to the particularity of patent-backed loans which involves the patent assets valuation problem and the depreciation issues,the financial decision offered by banks could be very hard.Through studying,we found that corporate default probability and the depreciation rate of patents are key parameters.Considering the policy supporting mechanisms,evolutionary trend in the credit markets will be adjusted regardless of the initial position of system.When the policy incentive is large enough,the trend of bank's lending decision will be positive reinforcement which means banks are willing to give the patent-backed loans to the enterprises.The patent appraisal risk is the primary factor.Because of lots of factors affecting patent's value,the patent valuation can only focus on the economic factors resulting in disclosing insufficient risk information about the patent.Based on the structure of Patent Value Analysis index produced by China technology exchange,this paper proposed a new one,aimed at solving the problem in patent analysis with IP-backed loans.The research result shows that the legal dimension is of the highest weight of the model.Finally,the empirical analysis shows that the model is of operability and applicability.Meanwhile this study also provided a potential way to solve the fairness and precise problem in patent valuation by building a data base of patent quality index to assist the banks to make pledge rate decision on the patent-backed loans.As to Patent-backed loans,supposing that the function of patent value doesn't follow any determined probability distribution and the value of patent is of the substitutability and time derogatory,the thesis established a credit risky decision-making mechanism for banks under imperfect information using min-max regret criterion;Then this paper found the analytical solution of liquidation value of patent at the end of the loan.Finally the paper found the optimal solution of the r and q of Patent-backed loans model by Kuhn-Tucker condition.The results showed that:Firstly,final credit value of patent is determined by the initial value of only considering the patent market demand,the first order origin moment and the second order origin moment of the patent variable;Secondly,there is a negative correlation between the loan interest rates and the patent value at the end of the loan;Thirdly no clear correlation was found between credit rationing and the patent value at the end of patent-backed loan period.
Keywords/Search Tags:Patent Value, Pledge Financing, Stucture Equation Model, Evolutionary Game, Credit Contract Design
PDF Full Text Request
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