Study On IPO Decision Mechanism Of Enterprise Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

The transformation and upgrading of China's economic structure means that the economic structure based on debt financing will be replaced by the new economic form which is based on equity financing. The implementation of registration system will be the inevitable trend of the development of China's capital market, and it has an important practical reference value for the research of the IPO decision-making mechanism of Chinese enterprises.IPO can realize the direct financing of enterprises in the capital market, broaden the sources of funds, and help enterprises to establish a modern enterprise system. The timing of the IPO is an important part of the whole process of IPO. reasonable choice of listing time to improve the efficiency of enterprise funds, capital markets play efficient allocation of resources, are of great significance and ultimately improve the economic and financial system operation flexibility and vitality. The internal mechanism of IPO timing of enterprises, reasonable choice of listing time to improve the efficiency of enterprise funds, making capital markets play efficient allocation of resources, these are of great significance and ultimately improve the operation of the economy and the financial system's flexibility and vitality. Researching the formation mechanism of IPO timing, we need to know the main influencing factors of IPO timing, and these factor how to affect the timing of IPO.Moreover,we also need to know the relationship between enterprises and government, and how to interact and affect each other in order to make the IPO decision.This paper first reviews the relevant literature on the timing of IPO, especially the relevant research literature on the interaction between the government and the heterogeneous enterprises. We search the research results and practical evidence of the interaction between the government and the enterprise from the existing research results. On this basis, we select the macro economy and industry relevant data of China's capital market,, through empirical research to test the influence factors of enterprise IPO, the empirical results show that:There is a negative correlation between the obvious asset liability ratio and capital intensive enterprises and the long-term performance of companies, especially the asset liability ratio has a significantly negative effect on a few years after the IPO. It is more favorable for enterprises to choose the time of asset liability ratio and capital intensity. Macroeconomic factors have a significant effect on the performance of the companies after IPO. Enterprises need to integrate a variety of macroeconomic factors in the IPO timing and choose the best timing of long-term operation. In addition, because of China's stock market is not perfect, the stock issue price is strictly controlled by the government, the enterprise stock performance directly depends on investor sentiment, so enterprises can raise more funds when the market rising.On the one hand, IPO is a major policy decision made by the enterprise based on its own operating conditions. On the other hand, the effect of IPO is influenced by government policy and competition strategy. Enterprises win the market share, market position and market value by the competition of product market. IPO will affect the equilibrium output and product market strategy of other competitors in the industry, and then influence the market value of the competitors. We study the impact of IPO on the stock price and the long-term operating performance of the listed companies. Research shows that the IPO event has a negative impact on the stock prices of Listed Companies in the industry,and the negative impact of the product market competition enhanced the degree of competition. In the long term, the IPO event has reduced the market share of the listed companies, weakened their market competitiveness, and ultimately will have a negative effect on the long-term business performance of listed companies. The more intense of the product market competition and the greater demand uncertainty and heterogeneous risk, the more serious the impact of IPO on the long-term business performance of listed companies. The empirical study of this paper verifies the results of the above theoretical study.On this basis, this paper establishes a evolutionary game model, and analyzes the game.The evolutionary stable strategy of the game theory under different conditions is studied by multi-agent simulation. In the enterprise IPO regulatory aspects, due to the existence of regulatory costs, strict supervision is difficult to continue and efficiency is low. IPO regulatory agencies should strengthen the punishment of IPO fraud, establish a strict information disclosure mechanism, and give full play to the role of news media, investors and other external oversight. From the point of view of game analysis of IPO enterprises and listed companies, expected profit is the core factor of the enterprise market value. But the risk aversion of investors, and the covariance of the enterprise's profit and market portfolio interest rate are also important factors. The strategy choice of both parties of the proposed IPO enterprise and the listed company is dependent on the change of market factors.The two sides should collect market information and data measurement results as much as possible, and dynamically adjust their strategies according to the dynamic evolution and stability results.