The Research On The Structure Bias Of Chinese Local Government's Fiscal Revenue And Expenditure

Public finance is the basis of national governance,and the structure of fiscal revenue and expenditure in a region is the focus of local government on the economic and social development in the region.In the past 40 years of reform and opening up,China's local government has gradually become a relatively independent interest entity,and has shown a series of "alienation" characteristics in terms of fiscal revenue and expenditure which are different from the mainstream western economic theories.From the perspective of fiscal revenue,The main role of tax revenue in the local government revenue system has been decreasing.The non-tax revenue,such as budgetary non tax revenue,transfer payment income,local government debt and social security fund income have been increasing rapidly.From the analysis of fiscal expenditure,most of the local governments have obvious expenditure structure bias--are more biased in favor of production expenditure who can bring GDP growth in the short term,then investment returns cycle longer and the social security employment,education,health,environmental protection and other non-productive expenditure ratio decreased gradually.The "alienation" feature of the fiscal revenue and expenditure structure of Chinese local governments is essentially the centralized embodiment of the "economic person" of the local government in the public financial field under the constraint of the Chinese fiscal decentralization institution.With China's entry into the new era of China socialist,social principal contradiction transfers,which requires local governments to return "public person",the financial revenue and expenditure structure of "economic person" features faces new challenges.Therefore,understanding the theoretical logic mechanism,empirical test and putting forward some practical suggestions,has important theoretical value and practical significance to further improve the theory of fiscal decentralization,to regulate the local government fiscal revenue structure and to straighten out the relationship between central and local governments.The research perspective of the paper is put forward based on reviewing and commenting the literature related to the bias of China's local government's income and expenditure structure,the paper is mainly discussed from the following aspects:First,the theoretical analysis of the fiscal revenue and expenditure structure bias of Chinese local government."institutional arrangements—interest heterogeneity—behavioral game —structure bias" as the inner logic,that is under the Chinese FiscalDecentralization constraints,the local government forms "comparative advantage" between "economic person" and "public person",launched an evolutionary game with the central government from the two aspects of income and expenditure.the local government in different conditions,tend to have a different balance of payments structure.Second,the analysis of the current situation of the fiscal revenue and expenditure structure bias of local government in China.The paper makes a statistical analysis of the bias of the income structure and the expenditure structure of Chinese local governments,It also points out that this structural bias has serious consequences to the economic and social development.Third,the empirical analysis of the bias of the fiscal revenue and expenditure structure of local government in China.the Chinese fiscal decentralization to local government revenue and expenditure structure of structure bias the empirical results show that,the year of the Party Congress,Chinese fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact to the non-tax revenue of local government and has a significant negative effect to the tax revenue in the year before and the year of the Party Congress.Chinese fiscal decentralization has positive effect to local government constructive expenditure bias in the year after the election,has a significant negative impact to livelihood expenditure to on the performance of the election year.The forth,the analysis of the reasons for the bias of local government's revenue and expenditure structure.On the basis of a brief review of the three processes of the evolution of the Chinese fiscal decentralization institution,the five basic characteristics of the evolution of Chinese financial decentralization are summarized.and analyzes the causes of this structural bias from the perspective of Chinese fiscal decentralization.The fifth,the analysis of the countermeasures to standardize the structure of the fiscal revenue and expenditure of the local government in the new era.The local government should return to the basic attribute of "public person" as the goal,adhere to the public welfare,responsiveness,contract and collaboration principle,improve Chinese fiscal decentralization institution,formed incentive compatibility mechanism between the central and local government,to regulate and restrain the local government fiscal revenue bias.The marginal contribution is mainly reflected in the following: First,A theoretical analysis framework of the bias of the local government's fiscal revenue and expenditure structure is built.Using the analysis paradigm of new political economics,constructs a unified analysis framework of the "institutional arrangement--interest heterogeneous--behavior game--structure bias",under different constraints the localgovernment has different structure preference.Second,the theory of Chinese fiscal decentralization is expanded.A institutional of the evolution of Chinese fiscal decentralization since the founding of new China is reviewed,summed up the four basic characteristics of Chinese fiscal decentralization evolution,the fiscal expenditure decentralization and the transition time is as the interaction virtual variables to accurately measure the Chinese fiscal decentralization indicator,the reasons and suggestions of local government expenditure structure bias from the perspective of Chinese fiscal decentralization are analyzed.Third,the hypothesis of the local government's theory of human nature is expanded.the local government belongs to the "comparative interests" between the "public person" and "economic person".From the perspective of the local governments,it has different structural bias in different conditions,but all are in line with their objective function maximization.