A Study Of The Manufacturer Entry Strategy Based On B2C E-commerce Platform

With the rapid development of electronic commerce,the manufacturer entry strategy is considered as a widely used method of competition by the manufacturers.However,manufacturers built e-commerce platform are limited by capital,technology et al.The e-commerce platforms opening to the third-party sellers makes the manufacturers who do not have the ability to build e-commerce platforms by themselves possible to adopt the manufacturer entry strategy by the third-party platform.Manufacturer entry strategy also becomes an important problem concern of business and academia.In view of this,this thesis divides the manufacturer entry strategy into two modes according to the different ownership of the e-commerce platforms,one is the third-party platform entry strategy and the other is the self-built platform entry strategy.After reviewing previous related literature,the requirements of the manufacturer entry strategies based on different e-commerce platform modes have been discussed in this thesis.Meanwhile,this thesis presents the influence of the manufacturer entry strategy on the operational decisions and profits of the supply chain members.It provides some theoretical supports for the manufacturers who adopt the entry strategy in different conditions.The consumer surplus and the social welfare which brought from the manufacturer entry strategy are also analyzed.From the relative results,some suggestions are put forward for the relevant government departments to promote the development of e-commerce more effectively.Firstly,according to the ownership of the e-commerce platform,entry strategy of the manufacturer is divided into self-built platform entry mode and third-party platform entry mode,and the game models in the two modes are established respectively.This thesis analyzes the influence of the two different entry modes on the operational decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer,as well as the consumer surplus and the social welfare.The results show that,the manufacturer decreases the wholesale price in both modes to ease the "double marginalization".At the same time,the prices in the two channels are always higher in self-built platform entry mode than third-party platform entry mode,which illustrates that the channel conflict is more intense in the third-party platform entry mode.However,the manufacturer and the traditional retailer could get a "win-win" situation in some condition if the manufacturer adopts the self-built platform entry mode.While,if the manufacturer adopts the third-party platform entry mode,the "win-win" situation will not be achieved.At the same time,the consumer surplus and the social welfare always increased if the manufacturer adopts the entry strategy.And in most cases,the consumer surplus and the social welfare in the self-built platform entry mode are bigger than that in the third-party platform entry mode.Secondly,in view of the development situation of the large-scale e-commerce platform nowadays,the game models of third-party platform entry considering the factors of the counterfeits and coupons from the platform are established respectively.The power of third-party platform is taken into consideration in the game model with platform coupons,and the the game model is expanded including three game parts.This thesis analyzes the influence of the two factors of counterfeits and coupons on the operational decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer,as well as the consumer surplus and the social welfare.The results show that,the counterfeits from the platform will reduce the implementation scope of third-party e-commerce platform entry strategy,and reduce the profits of the manufacturer.While the coupons from the platform will enhance the cooperation relationship between the manufacturer and the third-party platform,and increase the profits of the manufacturer.However,these two factors make the manufacturer's third-party platform entry strategy further damage the interests of the traditional retailer.In a sense,in the background of the counterfeits or price limits on the platform,the rational manufacturer adds an electronic channel through a third-party platform could still increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare.At last,this thesis analyzes the multi-channel operation strategy after some powerful manufacturers built platforms by themselves.Because the self-built e-commerce platform has the weaknesses like few customers and high cost of sales,the manufacturers who have self-built platforms also have the demand to join in the third-party platforms.Game models for different multi-channel operation mode are established.At the same time,the multi-channel operation strategy with different parameters is gotten,through the comparative results of the profits of the manufacturer in different multi-channel operation strategy.Then this thesis analyzes the change of the retailer's profits in different multi-channel operation strategy.The result shows that the manufacturer who owns a self-built e-commerce platform joining in a third-party platform always damages the interest of the retailer.When the manufacturer takes the self-built e-commerce platform as the only electronic channel,the manufacturer and the retailer could form a win-win situation in some condition.