Research On Pricing Considering Social Network Effect And Consumers' Bounded Rational Behavior

In general,revenue management is the process of selling the right product portfolio at the right time to the right consumer at the right price.The main decision-making contents in revenue management are:structural decision-making,quantity decision-making and price decision-making.Among them,structural decision-making refers to what kind of sales model is used for sales,quantity decision-making refers to what kind of product combination should be provided,and price decision-making refers to how to set the most excellent product price and when to adjust the price of the product,the price decision is the core management task in the process of income management,and the series of decisions in the income management will inevitably require a deep understanding and understanding of consumer behavior.As business models in today's economic society continue to innovate and business practices continue to innovate,consumer and business platforms,consumers and businesses,consumers and technology,consumers and products,consumers and consumers are increasingly interacting with each other.In-depth,consumer behavior characteristics and behavioral influences have emerged in an unprecedented way and are undergoing dynamic evolution in the direction of diversification,personalization,complexity,and networking.These new changes present new challenges and requirements for pricing decisions in revenue management,operations management,and marketing.On the one hand,the development of information technology has profoundly changed the econony and society and redefines the business model,making Internet +,shared econony,decentralized business model,020 and C2C e-commerce models possrble;at the same time,the development of information technology has greatly expanded the scope of trading and profoundly changed the consumer behavior.The above two changes have reshaped the business environment.In the new environment,consumer behavior is more difficult to portray and analyze,which brings a lot of pressure on business revenue management.Therefore,research focusing on consumer behavior in the new envronment and providing relevant scientific guidance for pricing decisions is of great practical significance.This paper first studies the impact of social network effects on pricing decisions of monopolistic merchants.In the two-stage pricing-consumption game model,consumers interact with merchants,and consumers and consumers interact to form a structurally complete social network.On the basis of having complete information on the characteristics of the social network structure,the merchants publish a random discount strategy for the consumer group,that is,giving the consumer an opaque pricing to maximize the profit;the consumer is based on the merchant's open pricing strategy and himself.Maximize utility by determining the number of products purchased in the social network.Based on the above research,increase other behavioral factors of consumers(transcendental belief,overconfidence,fair concern,etc.),explore the interaction between social networks and these behavioral factors,and use social network analysis methods and supermodular game analysis methods to infer the following conclusions:(1)Businesses with perfect information on social network structure can implement perfect price discrimination for consumers in social networks;(2)The existence of consumer prior belief does not affect the implementation of perfect price discrimination;(3)Consumers bounded rationality may compress the profit space under the social network,that is,the consumer's overconfidence behavior will weaken the role of the social network,and the excessive level of overconfidence(?=1)will prevent the merchant from implementing perfect price discrimination;(4)Fair concern behavior can have the opposite effect on consumers in different locations in the social network.In addition,this paper also studies the influence mechanism of the upper and lower limits of the merchant's public discount range on consumer perception and self-profit under the opaque pricing scenario.The research finds that:(5)The consumer cognitive parameter ?/? determines the merchant's choice only announce the upper limit of the discount range,or only announce the lower limit of the discount range or simultaneously announce the upper and lower limits of the discount range.On the other hand,volatility in the business environment still exists,and new uncertainties are constantly emerging,which continue to impact the steady state of the economic and social systems.In this paper,under the framework of supply chain operation management,we analyze production strategy,ordering strategy,pricing strategy and information sharing strategy for each supply chain member under risk type and intensity.Through Stackelberg game analysis,Hotelling model and optimization solution,the paper draws the following important conclusions:(1)Due to consumer risk perception and loss avoidance behavior,the occurrence of negative risk will reduce the profit of supply chain system;(2)When there is a positive risk in the market,consumers',risk perception and loss avoidance behavior will increase market demand and bring profit growth to suppliers and retailers.When the risk intensity increases further,due to price control and additional production costs existence,the profit growth rate of the members of the supply chain is reduced.When the risk inensity is so large that the marginal profit of the product is 0,the supplier stops production and bears the cost of stock-out at the same time as the retailer,and the profit of both parties will decrease as the risk intensity continues to increase;(3)In the negative risk,the supplier will disclose the risk-related information to the market to improve the overall performance of the supply chain.The retailer sharing the consumer information with the supplier will not affect the overall performance of the supply chain;(4)In positive risk,ssupplier and retailer information sharing strategies vary with risk intensity:the retailer will only conceal consumer information from suppliers when the risk intensity is small.The supplier will not disclose the risk information when the risk intensity is small,and disclose some risk information after the risk intensity is slightly larger.When the risk intensity is high,all the risk information will be announced.