Supply Chain-to-Chain Competition:Structural Selection And Service Decision

Nowadays,the global economy and operation management are undergoing profound changes,market competition is becoming more and more intense,and supply chain competition has become a critical research hotspot in the field of management.Especially under the macroeconomic background of global economic integration and comprehensive deepening of China's reform and opening up,the transformation and upgrading is accelerating,which also poses unprecedented challenges for enterprise operation management and decision-making optimization.From the perspective of supply chain competition network,enterprises should not only face the competition of other enterprises in the vertical chain,but also take into account the horizontal competition of other supply chains at the same level.At the same time,in the operation practice,the competition between enterprises is gradually evolving into the supply chain-to-chain competition mode with the goal of synergistic competition and win-win.Therefore,the study of supply chain competition can not only enrich and develop the theoretical system of supply chain management,but also have important practical significance for the practical guidance of supply chain management.Two competing supply chains are taken as the research object in this paper,and the competition and optimization between supply chains are studied from the two dimensions of supply chain structural selection and service decision-making.This paper attempts to expand the research scope of supply chain in two aspects: the horizontal research extends from a single supply chain to the competitive behavior between two chains,and the vertical research changes from the price decision at the traditional market level to the structure and service decision at the operational level.On the basis of combing and analyzing relevant researches on supply chain competition and optimization decision-making at home and abroad,four parallel and independent supply chain competition problems are studied by comprehensively considering multiple types of power within and outside the supply chains: optimal structure selection under the competition of power equivalent supply chains,optimal structure selection under the competition of power unequal supply chains,supply chain decision considering service negative spillover effect under the competition of manufacturer-led supply chain,supply chain decision considering service negative spillover effect under the competition of retailer-led supply chain.The main work of this paper is as follows:Firstly,from the perspective of core enterprises in the two supply chains,optimal structure selection under the horizontal competition of power equivalent supply chains are studied based on the classic Hotelling model.We construct a Stackelberg-Nash double composite nested game model for supply chain horizontal competition under two power structures: manufacturer dominance and retailer dominance.Specifically,assuming that the structure of each supply chain is centralized or decentralized,three supply chain structure combinations of pure centralized structure(centralization-centralization),mixed structure(decentralization-centralization)and pure decentralized structure(decentralization-decentralization)are constructed.The Nash game model under each supply chain structure combination is constructed and corresponding equilibrium solution is obtained by means of optimization.Finally,the optimal supply chain structure is determined by comparing the equilibrium solutions under the three games,so as to obtain the dominant strategy and supply chain structure selection decision under the game.At the same time,in order to further compare and verify the influence of two different power types dominated by manufacturers and retailers on the competition and decision-making,the game equilibrium solution and decision results under two kinds of power are analyzed and compared comprehensively.The results show that under the horizontal competition of power equivalent supply chains,compared with centralized structure,decentralized supply chain has the structural advantage to improving not only its supply chain profits but also the competing chain.This interesting insight is counterintuitive to the common “double marginalization effect” under the internal competition of a single supply chain,and also explains the third-party outsourcing strategy of enterprises in practice from the perspective of the advantages of decentralized supply chain structure.In addition,both two supply chains are decentralized or integrated is the dominant strategy under horizontal competition of power equivalent supply chains,that is,purely decentralized structure or purely centralized structure is the optimal supply chain structure selection decisions under the competition.Secondly,considering the more general power imbalance among supply chains in practice,the optimal structure selection under the competition between two power asymmetry supply chains is further studied,and a two-tier Stackelberg nested game model is constructed.In detail,four supply chain structure combinations are designed: pure centralized structure(centralization-centralization),leader supply chain is decentralization and follower is centralization(decentralizationcentralization),leader supply chain is centralization and follower is decentralization(centralization-decentralization)and pure decentralized structure(decentralization-decentralization).The supply chain competition model under the four structure combinations is constructed and the Stackelberg equilibrium solution is obtained.By comprehensively comparing the equilibrium solutions under four supply chain structure combinations,the optimal supply chain structure under the game is analyzed in detail and the decision results of the dominant strategy and supply chain structure selection decision are determined.The results show that the dominant strategy of follower supply chain has nothing to do with the structure of leader supply chain,but closely related to the degree of competition between the supply chains.When the competition is strong enough,the decentralized structure dominates and is contrary to the “double marginalization effect”.At the same time,there is certain altruism in the change of supply chain structure from centralization to decentralization,which can significantly improve the performance of the rival.In addition,the structure that both two chains are decentralized or integrated is relatively stable in the game evolution.This further verifies the conclusion when the powers of two supply chains are equal.Then,based on the findings of external spillover effect,the paper further focuses on the spillover effect in the competition between supply chains,and expands the above research content and scope from the perspective of service negative spillover effect.Taking two manufacturers-oriented competitive supply chains with unequal power as the research object and assuming that the leader supply chain provides services,this subsection discusses the supply chain decision-making problem that considers horizontal competition and service negative spillover between supply chains.Similarly,four supply chain structure combinations are designed: pure centralized structure(centralizationcentralization),leader supply chain is decentralization and follower is centralization(decentralization-centralization),leader supply chain is centralization and follower is decentralization(centralizationdecentralization)and pure decentralized structure(decentralizationdecentralization).Optimal decision conditions are obtained through game optimization and comparison.The impact of supply chain competition and service negative spillover effects on supply chain optimal decision-making and servie decision are also analyzed.The results show that both the negative spillover effect of service and the competition between supply chains have a negative incentive effect on the manufacturers providing service and their supply chains,but the competition between supply chains has a certain free-riding effect on the supply chains that do not provide service,and the free-riding effect increases with the increase of competition.Furthermore,when the leader supply chain is centralized,it is more willing to provide a higher level of service and at the same time can obtain higher profits.If the structure of the leader supply chain remains unchanged,for the follower supply chain,when the service negative spillover is small,the service level provided by the leader in the decentralized structure is high,while when the service spillover effect is large,the service level provided by the leader in the follower centralized structure is high.In addition,from the perspective of supply chain network and externality,it is found that when one supply chain structure remains unchanged and the other one changes from centralized to decentralized,there will be a double marginalization effect.At the same time,structural changes from centralization to decentralization will produce certain "altruism" namely positive network externalities,so as to promote rival performance significantly increased.Finally,we further study the supply chain decision problem of considering service negative spillover in two retailer dominated competitive supply chains with unequal power.The four competition models of centralization-centralization,decentralization-centralization,centralization-decentralization and decentralization-decentralization are also constructed.The optimal decision conditions are obtained by game equilibrium solution and comparison,and the influence of competition degree and service negative spillover effect on the optimal decision of supply chain is analyzed.Then,a comprehensive comparison is made with the above research to verify whether the change of power structure in the chain has an impact on the game equilibrium and supply chain decision-making considering service negative spillover.The results show that the negative spillover effect has a negative incentive effect on service providers,that is,the optimal service level and profit provided by retailers decrease with the increase of the negative spillover effect.Supply chain-to-chain competition has a negative incentive effect on retailers providing services and their supply chains,while for supply chains that do not provide services,it can produce a certain free-riding effect to benefit them,and the free-riding effect becomes more and more obvious with the increase of competition.The change of supply chain structure from centralized to decentralized has a certain degree of "altruism",that is,when one supply chain structure remains unchanged while the other changes from centralized to decentralized structure,double marginalization effect will appear,but positive externality will be generated,which will promote the performance of competitive supply chain to improve significantly.