Study On Optimal Mechanism Design Of All-for-one Tourism Marketing Based On Stackelberg Game

With the urgency of China's tourism industry facing transformation and upgrading,and the demand for supply-side structural reform,the country puts forward strategic development model of all-for-one tourism.Under this background,local governments around the country also put forward their implementation plans of all-for-one tourism.The key is that local governments of tourist cities are responsible for all-for-one tourism,how do local governments carry out all-for-one tourism marketing and have a sustainable marketing effectiveness,to attract more tourists for local tourism service industry,create more tourism consumption and economic opportunities,and ensure that the tourism service industry try to improve the quality of tourism services,instead of making damage behavior of tourist interests and overall interests of the tourist cities.To achieve the above objectives,this research firstly regards local governments and tourism service industry as a tourism supply chain,and presents an optimal mechanism design of city marketing and industrial organization management of tourism service industry in tourist cities based on the perspective of supply chain coordination.Optimal mechanism means a mechanism that satisfies the incentive compatibility and individual rational constraint,and maximizes the expected return in the meantime.And eventually achieving the overall profit maximization of city marketing of local governments,and also realizing the profit maximization of individual tourism services in the same time.Secondly,on this basis,assume that there exists an overall coordination mechanism among multiple tourism functional areas in the tourist city,multiple tourism functional areas can be regarded as a whole,namely operated centralized by a large enterprise,and a marketing enterprise under the jurisdiction of local governments is responsible for all-for-one tourism marketing of the whole tourist city,and presents an optimal cooperation mechanism design of all-for-one tourism marketing between the marketing enterprise and tourism functional area.Thirdly,according to the conclusions and requirements of the two mechanism design models,it verifies and analyzes related business cases of rural tourism and ancient town tourism.Lastly,a series of policy suggestions about all-for-one tourism marketing and tourism service industry are put forward.This research adopts comprehensive research methods including theoretical analysis,mathematical model analysis,case analysis.It combines theory of industrial organization,mechanism design theory and game theory,and summarizes and analyzes systematically issues related to the research literature at home and abroad including all-for-one tourism,tourism functional area,tourism supply chain and supply chain coordination etc.On this basis,it carries out studies on optimal mechanism design between local government and tourism service industry,and optimal cooperation mechanism design between marketing enterprise and tourism functional area,surrounding the overall profit maximization of all-for-one tourism marketing.And it draws a series of conclusions as follows.(1)From the perspective of overall industry,it regards tourism service industry with all the individual tourism enterprises in the tourist city as a whole.Then local government carrying out all-for-one tourism marketing in tourist cities and tourism service industry providing tourism services can be regarded as a tourism supply chain.The local government is responsible for investment of city marketing,tourism service industry is responsible for investment of providing tourism services,all-for-one tourism marketing attracts more tourists for tourism service industry,and the tourism service industry's income increases,local government levies taxes on tourism service industry,thereby forming a tourism supply chain with stakeholders.(2)There exists phenomena of fraud,overcharging,mandatory shopping with zero and negative tour expense in tourism service industry.The problem is rooted in that tourism supply chain between local government and tourism service industry failed to achieve supply chain coordination.Because the behavior of every link in the supply chain in pursuit of profit maximization,doesn't lead to overall profit maximization of supply chain.The problem can be resolved by supply chain coordination with optimal mechanism design,and achieve the efficiency goal of supply chain coordination.(3)According to optimal mechanism design of supply chain coordination between city marketing and tourism service industry,only starting from the efficiency,it proposes a countermeasure of tourism supply chain coordination in tourist cities,namely a single enterprise group entrusted by the local government should operate centralized tourism services in tourist city.Or operate centralized relatively tourism services by horizontal alliances and longitudinal alliance.And the large enterprise group or alliances unified manage all the operators providing tourism service by two-grade principal-agent.The local government should share part of operating costs of tourism service industry by the provision of infrastructure subsidies.The total tax rate collected by the local government should be the same as proportion of operating costs of tourism service industry shared by the local government.Under the theoretical condition of mechanism design model,this mechanism can ensure that at the same time of seeking the maximum profit for tourism service industry,the overall profit maximization of tourism supply chain can be achieved.(4)On the basis of the former optimal mechanism design,it proposes an optimal cooperation mechanism method between a marketing enterprise for all-for-one tourism and an enterprise operating tourism functional areas in tourist city by Stackelberg Model.The optimal cooperation mechanism is cooperation condition of game equilibrium under social welfare maximization.It obtains two different optimal cooperation mechanisms according to two different situations that cooperation mechanism designer is respectively the marketing enterprise and tourism functional area.When the marketing enterprise is cooperation mechanism designer,marketing enterprise stakes in tourism functional area,and optimal cooperation mechanism requires that marketing enterprise shares revenue of tourism functional area,and meanwhile operating cost of tourism functional area should be shared by marketing enterprise,and the proportions of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing are the same.When tourism functional area is cooperation mechanism designer,marketing enterprise shares revenue of tourism functional area,and meanwhile operating cost of marketing enterprise should be shared by tourism functional area,and the proportions of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing are decided by Bargaining game between marketing enterprise and tourism functional area,and their sum is 1.Example analysis showed that the investment for all-for-one tourism marketing of marketing enterprise,is in proportion to the ratio of revenue-sharing of tourism functional area by marketing enterprise.(5)Under all-for-one tourism model,the tourist cities can realize an innovation of marketing model,namely transform from multi-agent and non-uniform marketing model,which means city marketing of local government and business marketing of scenic area exist side by side,into single-agent and uniform marketing model,which means local government is only responsible for all-for-one tourism marketing,tourism service industry in tourism functional area is only responsible for providing tourism service.This innovative marketing model separating marketing investment from tourism service,opens up optimal cooperation mechanism method between a marketing enterprise for all-for-one tourism and tourism functional areas.(6)Verification and analysis of relevant cases shows that rural tourism joint operation under the guidance and organization of local governments forms operated centralized industrial market structure of rural tourism services by industrial organization management.The self-organization mechanism of agritainment also keeps in line with the adjustment direction of industrial market structure,thereby efficiency target of overall profit maximization of supply chain would be realized for its behavior in pursuit of profit maximization by the operated centralized rural tourism joint operation.Wuzhen tourism implements grouping management by a large scale group enterprise funded by the local government,Beijing West leisure resort implements overall building policy,which also forms operated centralized industrial market structure of tourism services.The consortium funded by local government of Cuenca ancient city in Spain invests construction of cultural tourism infrastructure,and carries out special subsidies to new shop operators in the ancient city.All the cases above verify the requirements of optimal mechanism design model of all-for-one tourism marketing carried out by local government and industrial organization of tourism service industry to varying degrees.