| With the continuous development of online shopping,many enterprises have been selling products through Tmall,Jingdong mall and other e-commerce platforms.In this kind of selling model,e-commerce platforms provide a trading platform for sellers and consumers,and charge a certain commission.In just over a decade,this online platform selling model has developed into one of the main models of e-commerce in China.The rapid development of online platform sales mode has brought many operational problems to e-commerce platform,for example,channel competition,contract design,game structure selection strategy.In practice,the solution of these problems is conducive to the development of e-commerce platform enterprises and online economy.In theory,these critical operations in traditional supply chains will result in a series of new practical and scientific problems,due to the vertical competition among members of online platform selling model.Therefore,it is of great practical and theoretical significance to study the operation strategy of e-commerce platform in online platform selling.Therefore,this paper focuses on the online platform selling.Firstly,using the theory and method of multistage decision-making,the e-commerce platform's channel competition strategy is studied.Then,using the theory and method of information screening and mechanism design,e-commerce platform's optimal service contract design under asymmetric cost information is analyzed.Finally,using the theory and method of dynamic game model with incomplete information,the e-commerce platform's game structure selection,and the effect between game structure selection and information sharing strategy are studied.The specific research contents are as follows.1)The multi-channel competition strategy of e-commerce platform considering introduction of self-platform channel by retailer is studied(chapter 3).In the online platform selling model consisting with an e-commerce platform and a retailer,e-commerce platform intends to introduce self-operated channel and retailer intends to introduce online platform channel.Competition will inevitably arise among the three channel(i.e.self-operated channel of e-commerce platform,e-commerce platform channel and self-platform channel of retailer).It is of practical and theoretical significance to study this channel conflict and multi-channel competition strategy of e-commerce platform and retailer.Thus,two scenarios are investigated: e-commerce platform introduces self-operated channel and does not,considering two situations: with retailer introducing self-platform channel and not.Then,the optimal decision and profit of e-commerce platform and retailer in these cases are analyzed.Finally,based on the game theory,game result of both players' channel competition strategies are characterized and analyzed.The main results are as follows: when the online platform building cost of retailer is low,e-commerce platform should introduce self-operated channel,retailer will operates self-platform channel and e-commerce platform channel;and if retailer's two channels are both strong,both players will fall into prisoner's dilemma,otherwise,e-commerce platform's profit increases and retailer's decreases.When the cost is moderate,e-commerce platform should introduce self-operated channel,retailer will only operate self-platform channel;and if retailer's two channels are both strong,or retailer's platform channel is moderately competitive and self-platform channel is highly competitive,both players will fall into prisoner's dilemma,otherwise,e-commerce platform's profit increases and retailer's decreases.When the cost is high,if the self-platform channel is strong,both players will fall into chicken game.If not,e-commerce platform should introduce self-operated channel and retailer does not build online platform,in which e-commerce platform's profit increases and retailer's decreases.2)Multi-channel competition strategy of self-logistics-type e-commerce platform is studied(Chapter 4).In the online platform selling model consisting with an e-commerce platform and a retailer,the e-commerce platform owns self-logistics and intends to introduce self-operated channel,and the retailer intends to distribute through self-logistics-type e-commerce platform's self-logistics.Considering the control and logistic factor of the products,there exists four potential channels of distribution.As a result,a new form of channel conflict has emerged.It is of practical and theoretical significance to study this kind channel conflict and the sales strategy and logistics strategy of self-logistics-type e-commerce platform.This chapter firstly uses the consumer utility model to find out the potential situation,and the conditions for the existence of potential situations and the equilibrium results are analyzed.Finally,the logic tree to get the overall equilibrium is obtained,that is,the optimal channel competition strategy of self-logistics-type e-commerce platform.The results show that,when the self-logistics is not sufficiently strong,in terms of sales,self-logistics-type e-commerce platform should introduce self-operated channel.In terms of logistics,it is not profitable for him to open the self-logistics to the retailer.Whether he should use self-logistics to deliver his/her own products depends on self-logistics' unit cost.It is preferred to use the self-logistics to deliver self-products when the cost is sufficiently low.Otherwise,is not.When the self-logistics is sufficiently strong,the results become more complex.However,in any case,the self-logistics-type e-commerce platform optimal choice is in the following three cases,i.e.,the case that "e-commerce platform introduces self-operated channel,uses outsourcing-logistics,and does not open self-operated logistics to retailers",the case that "e-commerce platform introduces self-operated channel,uses self-logistics,and does not open self-operated logistics to retailers",and the case that "e-commerce platform introduces self-operated channel,uses outsourcing-logistics,and opens self-operated logistics to retailers".3)Optimal service contract design of e-commerce platform under cost information asymmetry is studied(Chapter 5).In the online platform selling model consisting with an e-commerce platform and a dual channel retailer,based on two typical revenue models of e-commerce platform(advertising model and commission model),two service contracts(advertising-type and commission-type)are designed.Firstly,under these two contracts,the impact of asymmetric cost information of dual-channel retailer on optimal contract design of e-commerce platform is anlyzed.Then,under the two kinds of information structures,the impact of contract types on the revenue of e-commerce platform and retailer is examined.The results show that,under the both contracts,the existence of dual channel-retailers' cost information asymmetry will change the optimal contract parameters.Moreover,it always causes the loss of high-cost dual-channel retailers,the e-commerce platform and the whole supply chain.Only low-cost dual-channel retailers can get extra information rents.Under cost information symmetry,contract type does not affect the profits of the supply chain's members.However,under cost information asymmetry,high-cost retailers' profits are the same under two contracts.For low-cost retailers and the whole supply chain,advertising-type contract is more advantageous,and the degree of advantage increases with the increase of the ratio of low-cost dual channel retailers.For e-commerce platform,commission-type contract is more advantageous;and the degree of advantage increases with the increase of the ratio of low-cost dual channel retailers.4)E-commerce platform's game structure selection and retailer's demand forecast information sharing strategy under demand information asymmetry is studied(Chapter 6).In this chapter,an online platform-selling model consisting of a retailer,an e-commerce platform and a third-party logistics is considered.The e-commerce platform could determine the game structure.In addition,the retailer owns the private demand forecast information and can choose to share with the e-platform,the 3PL,or both.Under three game structures(i.e.,Nash equilibrium game,platform-stackelberg game,3PL-stackelberg game),four optimization models of demand forecasting information sharing strategies(no sharing,only sharing with e-commerce platform,only sharing with 3PL,all sharing)are established.Based on these,the e-retailer's optimal information sharing strategy under different game structures and the e-platform's optimal game strategy under different information sharing strategies are investigated.The results show that,when the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is weak,e-commerce platform should make decisions before 3PL,and retailer will not share the information.When the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is strong,or when the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is moderate and the accuracy of the demand forecast is high,e-commerce platform should make decisions after 3PL,and retailer will share the information only with the e-commerce platform. |
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