Research On Demand Information-Sharing In A Supply Chain With Competing Retail Channels

The advance of the information network consisting of Internet,electronic data interchange,bar code,and various application soft-wares,has enabled real-time information sharing among the supply chain members.However,technical feasibility does not mean that information sharing between the supply chain members is unobstructed.Effective incentive mechanisms need to be designed to realize information sharing.In this paper,we focus on demand information asymmetry among the supply chain members.Based on the actual operations of different supply chains,diverse information-sharing models under are proposed.Since the suppliers can sell products through various channels,retail channel competition does not only include the traditional competition between retailers,but also include the online-offline competition.In addition,the form of retail channel competition includes price competition and quantity competition.Nowadays,many researchers have concentrated on the supply chain management under retail channel competition and proposed diverse contracts to improve the supply chain performance,but there are still many problems are unsolved under information asymmetry.In this study,we relate quality improvement,players' risk attitudes and other issues into the information-sharing models.In general,this study includes the following three aspects.(1)Face the fact that supply chain members may have risk-averse attitudes,adopt an appropriate method to measure the players' risk attitudes,and study the value of the retailers' demand information sharing.Considering the supplier's product quality improvement,we mainly examine the following three situations:(1)all supply chain members are risk-neutral;(2)the retailers are risk-averse;(3)the supplier is risk-averse.We propose the supply chain information-sharing models without retail competition and with retail competition under three situations,respectively.Hence,we develop six models and analyze the supply chain members' optimal decisions under each model.Through model development,we find that the retailers are willing to share information when the supplier is efficient in improving product quality.Furthermore,when the retailers are not willing to share information,the supplier can induce the retailers to share information by side payments under specific conditions.Finally,sensitivity analyses are conducted,and the impacts of retail competition,risk aversion,and information accuracy on the retailers' information-sharing decisions are examined.(2)Considering that the supplier can sell products not only through the offline channel,but also through e-commerce platforms,we develop a dual-channel supply chain with one supplier and one retailer which possesses private demand information.Assuming the two members compete on retail price,we propose a signaling model and a screening model based on whether the supplier makes retail price decision first or the retailer makes retail price decision first.In the signaling model,we analyze the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium,respectively.Specially,intuitive criterion is adopted to refine multiple equilibria.In the screening model,we introduce a menu of contracts and develop the principle-agent model to realize information sharing in the supply chain.By model development,we find that in the signaling model,demand information asymmetry may lower the supply chain performance.But in the screening model,through optimal contract design,the supply chain performance can be improved comparing with the situation under demand information symmetry.(3)Develop a dual-channel supply chain,and consider the situation when the supplier makes effort to improve product quality and possesses private demand information.Because of demand uncertainty,the supplier's product quality and inventory decisions are noncontractible,thus the retailer cannot infer the supplier's demand information through the supplier's decisions.Hence,we propose the optimal menu of contracts to realize information sharing in the supply chain.Specially,because the sequences of the supplier's and the retailer's decisions are different in different supply chains,we consider the following two situations:(1)the supplier determines the inventory in the direct channel,then the retailer determines the order quantity;(2)the retailer determines the order quantity,then the supplier determines the inventory in the direct channel.In the above situations,we introduce the menu of two-part tariff contracts,develop the principle-agent models,and derive obtain the optimal menu to screen the supplier's private demand information.We further compare the supply chain members' optimal decisions and corresponding expected profits under the two situations,and analyze the impact of demand information asymmetry on the supply chain.In general,through case study,this paper analyzes the problems faced by the supply chain members under demand information asymmetry considering retail competition.In order to solve the problems,diverse supply chain structures are constructed.And optimal contract schemes are designed based on different supply chain structures to realize demand information sharing in supply chains.Our study is aim to enhance the collaboration between the supply chain members,and to provide useful suggestions to companies.