Research On The Selling Mode In E-commerce Supply Chain Under The Environment Of Multi-channel Supplier Competition

With the fast growth of electronic commerce,big online platforms(e-tailers)such as Amazon and Taobao have attracted many third-party sellers.Therefore,the competition among the e-tailer's suppliers is becoming increasingly fierce.Different e-tailers usually adopt different selling modes.And the e-tailer typically uses different selling modes for different commodities.Based on these observations,this paper discusses the issue of the e-tailer's best selling mode in a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and a common e-tailer,based on the consideration that the online channel of the suppliers affects their offline channel demands,competition arises between the suppliers' online channels,and the suppliers have cost advantage in their online channel relative to offline channel.This paper establishes a dynamic game model in the respective setting of price competition and quantity competition,focusing on the impact of factors such as the suppliers' cross-channel spillover effect,online competition intensity,online cost advantage,on the the e-tailer's best selling mode.Then we extend the basic model,analysing the impact of transfer payment on the suppliers' motive to enter the e-channel and the impact of the e-tailer's network externality effect on its best selling mode.Finally,we compare the conclusions derived in the respective setting of price competition and quantity competition.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)In the setting of price competition,if the cross-channel spillover effect is negative,the e-tailer always prefers agency selling mode to reselling mode.If the cross-channel spillover effect is positive and strong,the e-tailer always prefers reselling mode to agency selling mode.If the cross-channel spillover effect is positive but mild,the e-tailer's best selling mode also depends on the competition intensity.If the competition intensity is also mild,the e-tailer prefers agency selling mode;otherwise,the e-tailer prefers reselling mode.Bigger cost advantage makes the agency selling mode more prevalent for the e-tailer.We also find that a positive transfer payment from the e-tailer to the supplier strengthens the supplier's motive to enter the e-channel and the e-tailer's network externality effect make the agency selling mode more dominant for the e-tailer.(2)In the setting of quantity competition,if the cross-channel spillover effect is negative,when the competition intensity is mild,the e-tailer prefers agency selling mode;otherwise,the e-tailer prefers reselling mode.When the cross-channel spillover effect is positive and substantial,the e-tailer always chooses reselling mode.When the cross-channel spillover effect is positive but relatively small,as the competition intensity increases,the e-tailer first chooses agency selling mode,then hybrid mode,and finally reselling mode.(3)The main differences in the conclusions between price competition setting and quantity competition setting are as follows:with price competition,hybrid mode doesn't exist.However,with quantity competition,the e-tailer may choose hybrid mode if the cross-channel spillover effect is positive but relatively small.In addition,when the cross-channel spillover effect is negative,the e-tailer will always choose agency selling mode in the setting of price competition,but it may choose reselling mode if the competition is relatively intense in the setting of quantity competition.These results shed light on the operations strategy for all sides of the e-commerce supply chain.For instance,under which circumstance should the e-tailer adopt the novel agency selling mode instead of the conventional reselling mode?Is it beneficial for the suppliers to enter the e-channel provided by the e-tailer?...