Dynamic Pricing And Energy Efficiency Investment Strategies In A Green Supply Chain

Spurred by the increasing environmental awareness,firms start by implementing green supply chain,specifically,they are motivated to dynamically adjust green innovation(energy efficiency investment)and price to cater to the increasing green demand.Besides,firms can reduce production cost by technology learning on one hand,on the other hand,they seek cooperation with other supply chain members to enhance technology and achieve mutual benefits.From the perspectives of coordination,cost learning,decision right of energy efficiency and green technology licensing,this dissertation investigates pricing and energy efficiency investment strategies of firms.The detailed contents are as follows:This dissertation explores green supply chain coordination in a dynamic environment.Consider a green supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer.In the presence of energy efficiency dynamics,dynamic pricing and green innovation strategies in integrated and decentralized channels are computed and compared,and a two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.A Nash bargaining model is developed to distribute the extra-profit between channel members.The main results show that the two-part tariff which is a function of energy efficiency level can perfectly coordinate the supply chain.Manufacturer's coordination capability is improved by green effectiveness,but weakened by operational inefficiency effect.This dissertation studies green supply chain performance in the context of cost learning effect.In a single manufacturer-retailer setup,demand dynamics and cost learning effect are modeled,and channel members' behavior(forward-looking or myopic)is considered.Open-loop,feedback and myopic equilibria are derived,and sensitivity analysis is conducted to get some managerial insights.It is shown that forwardlooking behavior is preferred rather than myopic one for channel members.The supply chain efficiency under feedback equilibrium is larger than that under open-look equilibrium,and the later is larger than that under myopic equilibrium.Feedback equilibrium is beneficial to the manufacturer,but is harmful to the retailer.This dissertation exploits the channel members' preference on decision right of energy efficiency.Consider a two-echelon supply chain where the retailer is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower.Both of them jointly invest in energy efficiency to attract demand.Demand dynamics and cost learning effect are involved.Two scenarios are considered,where the decision right of energy efficiency is respectively held by manufacturer and retailer.The equilibria of two scenarios based on an exogenous or a bargained cost-sharing rate are compared.The results indicate that given a bargained cost-sharing rate,energy efficiency is governed by the manufacturer rather than the retailer,unless the retailer has a great bargaining power.Retailer's preference on the decision right is weakened by a larger cost learning effect or energy efficiency effectiveness,but improved by a greater investment cost.This dissertation investigates technology licensing strategy in a green supply chain.A two-stage game is modeled which is made up of an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)and a contract manufacturer(CM).The equilibria of two scenarios(with different licensing timing)are analyzed and compared,and channel members' preferences on licensing strategy are explored.It is found that when the market potential,competition intensity,royalty rate and revenue sharing rate are moderate,there exists a small region where the OEM prefers to make the licensing decision in Stage 2.However,the OEM is indifferent between making the licensing decision in the first or second stage in most cases.For a large region of parameter space,the two partners have the same preferences in terms of licensing.