| With the rapid development of urbanization,agricultural production and operation income is no longer the main source of income for farmers and families.When the agricultural labor force is transferred to the non-agricultural sector,the agricultural land for the peasant household is bound to complete the function transformation from the social security function to the pursuit of economic value.So in the context of China’s special farmland property rights system at the present stage,the weak and vague farmland property rights with limited power make the farmland performance in the factor of production market still poor.Under the realistic background of the large inflow of agricultural labor force into non-agricultural sectors,the transfer of agricultural land,the concurrent operation of agricultural land and the disposal of wasteland have become an alternative approach to allocate agricultural land resources.However,article 37 of the land management law of China(amended in 2004)clearly stipulates that "if the units or individuals contracted for the operation of cultivated land have abandoned their land for two consecutive years,the original contracting units shall terminate the contract and recover their land." For most farmers who want to retain farmland contracted management,the legal restrictions exclude the possibility of idle farmland being abandoned,forcing them to choose to transfer or combine their farmland.Considering the basic situation of more people and less land and the realistic restriction of the distance of migrant workers across provinces(cities),it is more economical to transfer agricultural land out of the country than to take part-time jobs.The weakness of the farmland property right system,enable farmers cannot provide clear ownership,express and standard farmland property rights certificate,high transaction cost in market circulation of farmland and land to occupy land believable threat forced families of farmland changing object bias will limit between relatives or close friends,at this time of farmland circulation is more for property security reasons rather than economic efficiency.On the one hand,the weak and vague property right of agricultural land makes the long-term investment in agricultural production and operation insufficient and the income growth weak.On the other hand,due to the limitations of relevant laws at present,rural land fails to act as effective collateral,and rural families still face credit rationing from the formal rural credit market.For engaged in agricultural production and operation of farm households,the household contract responsibility system according to the basic principles of head split the land adjustment become a kind of objective system requirements,combined with the land contract and management rights certificate does not reach the designated position,property right is fuzzy,the "four clear" make land rights instability,incomplete situation still exist.At this point,the operators tend to focus on short-term production and investment behaviors that are easy to be recovered,lack long-term investment incentives for protective agriculture of agricultural land,and accelerate the degradation of farmland resources,making agricultural growth difficult to sustain.In order to solve these problems,the Chinese government began a new round of reform of the property rights system of agricultural land that aims to "still empower" in 2009.One of the important measures is to complete the confirmation,registration and certification of farmland nationwide within five years from 2013.Although the existing research has made some achievements.However,from the perspective of research and the technical aspect of empirical analysis,the following deficiencies still exist:One is that the lack of in our country is being put into practice in the current farmland approval policy as an object of study,the existing literature,has not established a conjunction of China farmland property right system reform and the farm households in rural credit market participation of farmland changing market,participation and agriculture long-term investment behavior of the theoretical framework and empirical analysis system,and influence of farm households farmland property rights system reform of rural credit market participation of farmland changing market,participation and agricultural long term investment behavior mechanism and the effect exists heterogeneity is yet to be clear;Second,the research on farmland ownership and farmers’ production behavior is relatively scattered,lacking systematic and integrated research.Three is that study abroad in the majority with quantitative analysis,and the domestic is still in research methods and technical level is given priority to with policy analysis and qualitative research,existing literature mainly focused on qualitative analysis and case analysis of the local pilot areas,not able to take advantage of large sample survey data and econometric model accurately assess farmland mortgage system reform of the credit market effect,and the research topic of endogenous and sample selection bias and other issues still has not been solved well.Therefore,this study intends to improve the existing theoretical framework and empirical analysis technology in this field.The gradual reform of farmland ownership system provides a good research platform for us to build a "quasi-natural experiment" framework to study the policy effect of farmland ownership.Based on the household data of the fixed observation point of the ministry of agriculture from 2010 to 2015,this paper combines with the questionnaire survey to obtain the farmland ownership,farmland market participation,rural formal credit market information and long-term agricultural investment information,and USES the double difference method to investigate the policy effect of farmland ownership.The conclusion shows that at the present stage,the confirmation of farmland rights has shown a positive promoting effect on farmers’ factor allocation and production and management behavior,mainly in the following three aspects:Firstly,under the background of the reality of a large number of outflow of agricultural labor force,weak force farmers to transfer such as relatives and friends on rural land property rights,such as zero rent non-market actions to maintain stable land rights,the empirical results show that to turn a side view,farmland counterpoising truly widens the transaction boundary farmland changing market,prompted the farmland to the enterprise,such as cooperative more efficient transfer agricultural management main body,at the same time,reduce farmland circulation between the friends and relatives,the farmland equaling significantly changed the participation of farmland changing market structure,but on the overall farmland transfer probability and the area of influence is not significant.Furthermore,the confirmation of farmland rights significantly increased the proportion of paid transfer and contract signing,but had no effect on the circulation period.From the perspective of the transferee,the farmland ownership has significantly reduced the probability and area of the transfer of rural households as members of the village collective,but it has no effect on the term of agricultural land operation.Weak fuzzy farmland property rights in farmland transfer force farmers more stability safety of farmland property rights rather than other factors,such as rent,operational efficiency and reversed transmission farmers to circulate the land to non-market actions to relatives and friends rather than a more operational efficiency of the new agricultural main body,it has to do with the government to promote farmland circulation,runs counter to the policy objectives of the moderate scale management.It can effectively improve the marketization and standardization of farmland transfer by entrusting farmland property rights with clear and stable standard legal expression through farmland confirmation,registration and certification.Therefore,the future should be continued in the future to deepen the rural land ownership should be at the same time to achieve the implementation of relevant supporting systems.Secondly,At the present stage,farmland ownership has limited influence on farmers’formal credit market participation.As far as the conclusion of this paper is concerned,the participation of farmland ownership in the formal credit market of farmers focuses on promoting the nominal formal credit demand of farmers.Further,farmland at this stage because of legal restrictions still failed to act as effective collateral,originally a farmer credit demand in the name of the mortgage collateral requirements are still unable to meet,high transaction cost and complicated loan application process still exist,so the farmland counterpoising truly did not show significantly positive influence on their formal credit.Finally,this chapter investigates the impact of farmland ownership on formal credit market participation.The empirical results show that due to the restriction of short term of farmland transfer,farmland ownership has no effect on the nominal formal credit demand,the effective formal credit demand and the formal credit access.We find the significant positive effect of farmland ownership on nominal formal credit demand in the transfer households with a longer term of operation.Farmland equaling as farmland information standardization,formalized processing,given the right subject is more clear and stable property compared with previous expectations,but if this clear right if because current laws restricting or problems such as lack of supporting the market failed to play its proper role,then farmland rights clarity and can not effectively alleviate rural credit constraints.Thirdly,the confirmation of farmland rights significantly improves farmers’ long-term investment behavior in agriculture.The empirical results show that,first of all,the current farmland ownership significantly improves the long-term agricultural investment--agricultural fertilizer investment linked to a specific plot.Furthermore,the impact of farmland ownership on fattening investment is greater among farmers who have experienced land adjustment,showing certain heterogeneity.Secondly,farmers invest more in their own agricultural land than they transfer into agricultural land,and the difference in investment intensity between different ownership of agricultural land will be further expanded due to the ownership of agricultural land.Furthermore,the incentive effect of farmland ownership on the investment of farmland into households is significantly influenced by the term of farmland operation.The long term of agricultural land management is favorable for the transfer of agricultural land into the households to respond to the farmland ownership to improve the stability of land ownership and thereby improve the level of agricultural fertilizer investment.Finally,there is no significant effect on the long-term agricultural investment-agricultural machinery investment-which is not connected to a particular plot.According to based on the above theory and empirical research,according to the reform of farmland equaling farmland circulation,the rural credit market,and the effect of long-term investment agriculture and its mechanism of action and influence factors of farmland property right system arrangement the general path of other countries for reference and experience,innovation fit actual farmland property right system in China,put forward the government effectively participate in the way of farmland property right system arrangement and innovation policy mechanism and path of the current optimization of farmland property right system arrangement and puts forward improvement Suggestions for improving the eventually made policy elements configuration further rationalization proposal is put forward. |
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