| This dissertation addresses the problem of "radical evil" as first articulated by Immanuel Kant, and in light of the treatment Kant's analysis given by Friedrich Schelling, Soren Kierkegaard's own treatment of the issue in a manner that sought to retain a commitment to transcendental human freedom and the possibility of moral alternatives. In light of September 11, 2001, it is no less a problem for this century than it was in the nineteenth. For Kant, radical evil presented a genuine challenge to his ethics of autonomy, which as a propensity to subvert the moral law, results in a corruption of our moral disposition, and can be resolved only through a "natural religion" of pure reason. Yet for Schelling, a Kantian account of evil as a propensity to subvert the moral law lacks a motivational justification for its choice. Schelling offers an alternative account as a deliberate propensity to subvert not the moral law, but the natural order of the world, so that self-will is no longer subordinate to the divine and universal will. In light of Schelling's critique of Kant, I argue that Kierkegaard presents an existential ethic that retains a commitment to transcendental freedom through an ethics of authenticity in practicing commanded neighbor love, while avoiding the difficulties that Kant faced. |
