Hume's foundational project in Book I of the 'Treatise'

The only account of the nature of his project in the Treatise Hume ever offered was in the Introduction to the Treatise and in the Abstract, written by Hume after the Treatise. In the Introduction Hume proposes "a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." In the Preface to the Abstract Hume suggests that "were his philosophy received, we must alter from the foundation the greatest part of the sciences." And in the Abstract itself he claims that the Treatise "seems intended for a system of the sciences." Interpreters of Hume, however, have not taken seriously Hume's ambition to establish a foundation for the sciences, or what I shall call "Hume's foundational project" Indeed, Hume is generally not even considered a systematic philosopher. In my dissertation I provide a reading of the foundational project as Hume carries it out in Book 1. I argue in my introduction that in Book 1 Hume is engaged in the task of grounding mathematics and natural philosophy on the senses or experience.;In Chapter One I examine the nature of experience that is the foundation of the foundational project itself. I criticize the standard interpretation of Hume's theory of perceptions or the theory according to which Humean perceptions are the immediate objects of the mind and his method involves a confinement to an internal or introspective point of view. I identify this standard reading as the main obstacle in our understanding of Hume's attitude towards the external or natural world and the plausibility of the foundational project. I argue, in contrast to this interpretation, that Hume's foundational project assumes that in sense perception we encounter bodies, that is, the ordinary objects of our experience. I find in Hume's theory of perceptions evidence of a method that avails itself of ordinary observations of phenomena in everyday life as well as an appeal to phenomenological features of consciousness. I employ Hume's method as he establishes his theory of perceptions to propose a new way of understanding Hume's empiricism and his foundational tasks.;In Chapter Two I discuss Hume's application of the foundational method as he contributes to natural philosophy and mathematics. I start by defending the view that although there are no impressions of space and time, Hume does ground the ideas of space and time in experience. I then discuss in detail the arguments he advances in his contributions to natural philosophy: his rejection of the existence of vacuum, his argument against absolute time and his arguments concerning matter and its qualities. His contributions to mathematics concern his arguments against the infinite divisibility of space or extension and his treatment of geometry. Hume approaches the discussion of these diverse topics by starting from our ideas of these subjects and their grounding in experience.;In Chapter Three I advance a reading of Hume's conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is grounded in experience or the properties of objects as they appear to the senses. The central concern of Chapter Three is, however, Hume's treatment of inductive or causal reasoning. I defend the view that Hume starts his examination of causal reasoning by assuming that it is successful and thus that the task he sets for himself in Part iii of Book I is to uncover the source of the justification of causal reasoning or of the belief that issues from causal reasoning. I argue that many of the discussions and revisions and conflicts of Part iii can be best illuminated if we attribute to Hume the intention of establishing a mechanism by which causal belief or the belief that issues from causal reasoning can be grounded in the senses, despite the fact that the imagination plays a pivotal role in the generation of causal reasoning. I argue that Hume seeks to ground causal belief in the senses and thus that his treatment of causal reasoning conforms to the same strategy of justification or validation he employs throughout Book I, namely the tracing of ideas back to their origin in experience. This interpretation fits Hume's discussion of causal reasoning squarely within the foundational project that he announces in the Introduction and the Abstract, and thereby helps to make visible the overlooked unity and systematicity of Hume's project in Book I of the Treatise.